Switch to: References

Citations of:

The Mind, the Brain and the Face

Philosophy 60 (234):477-493 (1985)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Why machines cannot be moral.Robert Sparrow - 2021 - AI and Society (3):685-693.
    The fact that real-world decisions made by artificial intelligences (AI) are often ethically loaded has led a number of authorities to advocate the development of “moral machines”. I argue that the project of building “ethics” “into” machines presupposes a flawed understanding of the nature of ethics. Drawing on the work of the Australian philosopher, Raimond Gaita, I argue that ethical dilemmas are problems for particular people and not (just) problems for everyone who faces a similar situation. Moreover, the force of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Human beings and giant squids (on ascribing human sensations and emotions to non-human creatures).David Cockburn - 1994 - Philosophy 69 (268):135-50.
    A television nature programme a year or two ago contained a striking sequence in which a giant squid was under threat from some other creature . The squid responded in a way which struck me immediately and powerfully as one of fear. Part of what was striking in this sequence was the way in which it was possible to see in the behaviour of a creature physically so very different from human beings an emotion which was so unambiguously and specifically (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Are we our brains?Stephen Burwood - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (2):113-133.
    My aim in this paper is to destabilise the brain-is-self thesis, something that is now regarded in some quarters as philosophical commonsense. My contention is that it is the epithelial body that enters into the formation of our sense of self and that largely bears the burden of personal identity as well as playing the key role in grounding our psychological ascriptions. Lacking any sensorimotor or social presence of its own, the brain by itself cannot "underlie" selfhood, but only as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Vulnerable Lives.Bob Plant - 2019 - In Peter Atterton & Tamra Wright (eds.), Face to face with animals: Levinas and the animal question. Suny Press. pp. 31-61.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Face to face with animals: Levinas and the animal question.Peter Atterton & Tamra Wright (eds.) - 2019 - Suny Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark