In opposing Stephen Douglas’s alleged popular right to choose a slave constitution, Abraham Lincoln developed a rudimentary conception of the normative presuppositions of democratic rights that prefigures the theory of popular sovereignty articulated by Jürgen Habermas. While Lincoln was influenced by a civic republican conception of natural rights, and referred to personal autonomy in arguing that some political choices violate the grounds of collective self-governance rights, both Lincoln—as read by Jaffa—and Habermas conceive human rights not as trans-political principles but as (...) linking moral norms with the rule of law (or coordination through political power in general). The comparison shows that Habermas’s approach to the co-originality of civil liberties and democratic rights implies that legitimate secession, revolution, and primary constituent authority must be oriented toward creation of a just legal order. This enriched linkage approach explains why the right to democracy, like the right to basic liberty, is inalienable. (shrink)