Background: This article combines foundational and empirical aspects of healthcare education and develops a framework for teaching ethical theories inspired by pragmatist learning theory and recent work on the concept of moral resilience. It describes an exemplary implementation and presents data from student evaluation. Objectives: After a pilot implementation in a regular ethics module, the feasibility and acceptance of the novel framework by students were evaluated. Research design: In addition to the regular online module evaluation, specific questions referring to the (...) teaching of ethical theories were added using simple (yes/no) and Likert rating answer formats. Participants and research context: At the Bern University of Applied Sciences, a total of 93 students from 2 parallel sub-cohorts of the bachelor’s program in nursing science were sent the online survey link after having been exposed to the same modular contents. A total of 62% of all students participated in the survey. Ethical considerations: The survey was voluntary and anonymous. Students were free to write their name and additional comments. Findings: Students consider ethical theories—as taught within the proposed framework—as practically applicable, useful, and transferable into practice. Discussion: Teaching ethical theories within the proposed framework overcomes the shortcomings described by current research. Students do not consider the mutually exclusive character of ethical theories as an insurmountable problem. Conclusion: The proposed framework is likely to promote the effectiveness of healthcare ethics education. Inspired by pragmatist learning theory, it enables students to consider ethical theories as educative playgrounds that help them to “frame” and “name” the ethical issues they encounter in daily practice, which is seen as an expression of moral resilience. Since it does not advocate a single ethical theory, but is open to the diversity of traditions that shape ethical thinking, it promotes a culturally sensitive, ethically reflected healthcare practice. (shrink)

D Benatar argues that in the author’s recent article Moral theories in teaching applied ethics, the author overlooked important roles that could be played by moral theories in such teaching. In this reply, the cases that Benatar suggests are considered and for each an alternative approach is suggested that will avoid the costs discussed in the original paper and will also be a more effective response to that particular issue.

In his response to my earlier criticism, Rob Lawlor argues that the benefits I suggest can be derived from teaching moral theories in applied ethics courses can be obtained in other ways. In my reply, I note that because I never claimed the benefits could be obtained only from teaching moral theories, Dr Lawlor’s response fails to refute my earlier argument that some attention to moral theories is an option in applied ethics courses.

Recent discussion has focused on whether or not to teach moral theories, and, if yes, to what extent. In this piece the author argues that the criticisms of teaching moral theories raised by Rob Lawlor should lead us to reconsider not whether but how to teach moral theories. It seems that most of the problems Lawlor identifies derive from an uncritical, theory-led approach to teaching. It is suggested that we might instead start by discussing practical cases or the desiderata of (...) a successful moral theory, and then build up to comparing theories such as consequentialism, deontology, and so on. In this way, theories are taught but students do not take them to be the alpha and omega of moral thinking. (shrink)

This response addresses criticisms in this journal of an Editorial written by Willem Landman and Udo Schuklenk. I demonstrate that the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights is in crucial aspects deficient, despite attempts in this journal to defend the Declaration against its critics. I focus on individual versus societal interests, research ethics, informed consent and the use of “human dignity” to illustrate the weaknesses of the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. This article concludes with reflections on (...) what documents such as the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights ought to be called to avoid the mislabelling of what essentially are policy documents. (shrink)

At or near the beginning of many textbooks and syllabi in applied or professional ethics is a unit on philosophical moral theories (such as utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics). However, teaching such theories is of questionable value in this context. This article introduces the moral vocabulary approach. Instead of burdening students with complex ethical theories, they are introduced to the logic of elementary moral concepts. This avoids many of the drawbacks of teaching ethical theories, while preserving the benefit of equipping (...) students with the conceptual tools they need to critically analyse ethical issues. (shrink)

It is increasingly common for universities to provide cross-curricular education in bioethics as part of contemporary attempts to produce 'global citizens.' In this article I examine three perspectives drawn from research into pedagogy that has been conducted from the perspective of cognitive anthropology and consider its relevance to bioethics education. I focus on: two metaphors of learning, participation and acquisition, identified by Sfard; the psychological notion of moral development; and the distinction between socialization and enculturation. Two of these perspectives have (...) been particularly fruitful in understanding the processes of teaching and learning in a variety of domains. The third perspective has been developed in relation to the formal ethical education of medical students. I examine their relevance for 'non-professional' bioethics education suggesting that if we take seriously the idea that it is part of 'educating for citizenship' then the distinction between 'ethics' and 'politics' is blurred as such programmes aim at the development of student's political subjectivity. (shrink)