Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Thomas Reid on Induction and Natural Kinds.Stephen Harrop - 2022 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 20 (1):1-18.
    I examine the views of Thomas Reid with respect to a certain version of the problem of induction: Why are inductions using natural kinds successful, and what justifies them? I argue that while both Reid holds a kind of conventionalist view about natural kinds, this conventionalism has a realistic component which allows him to answer both questions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Natural Philosophy and the Use of Causal Terminology: A Puzzle in Reid's Account of Natural Philosophy.Aaron D. Cobb - 2010 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 8 (2):101-114.
    Thomas Reid thinks of natural philosophy as a purely nomothetic enterprise but he maintains that it is proper for natural philosophers to employ causal terminology in formulating their explanatory claims. In this paper, I analyze this puzzle in light of Reid's distinction between efficient and physical causation – a distinction he grounds in his strict understanding of active powers. I consider several possible reasons that Reid may have for maintaining that natural philosophers ought to employ causal terminology and suggest that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Reid on Particularism, Habit, and Personal Identity.Jong Won Kim - 2015 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 13 (3):203-217.
    Are the first principles in the philosophy of Thomas Reid derived inductively from particular experience, or are they self-evident? Is Reid an epistemic particularist, or a methodist? Some scholars interpret him as an epistemic particularistic, while others hold that he is a methodist like other philosophers of his time. This debate was central to an exchange between Roderick Chisholm and Keith Lehrer. Taking the general belief in personal identity as an example, this paper aims to show which interpretation is more (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark