Graded epistemic logic is a logic for reasoning about uncertainties. Graded epistemic logic is interpreted on graded models. These models are generalizations of Kripke models. We obtain completeness of some graded epistemic logics. We further develop dynamic extensions of graded epistemic logics, along the framework of dynamic epistemic logic. We give an extension with public announcements, i.e., public events, and an extension with graded event models, a generalization also including nonpublic events. We present complete axiomatizations for both logics.

Adding certain cardinality quantifiers into first-order language will give substantially more expressive languages. Thus, many mathematical concepts beyond first-order logic can be handled. Since basic modal logic can be seen as the bisimular invariant fragment of first-order logic on the level of models, it has no ability to handle modally these mathematical concepts beyond first-order logic. By adding modalities regarding the cardinalities of successor states, we can, in principle, investigate modal logics of all cardinalities. Thus ways of exploring model-theoretic logics (...) can be transferred to modal logics. (shrink)

Adding certain cardinality quantifiers into first-order language will give substantially more expressive languages. Thus, many mathematical concepts beyond first-order logic can be handled. Since basic modal logic can be seen as the bisimular invariant fragment of first-order logic on the level of models, it has no ability to handle modally these mathematical concepts beyond first-order logic. By adding modalities regarding the cardinalities of successor states, we can, in principle, investigate modal logics of all cardinalities. Thus ways of exploring model-theoretic logics (...) can be transferred to modal logics. (shrink)

We extend the languages of both basic and graded modal logic with the infinity diamond, a modality that expresses the existence of infinitely many successors having a certain property. In both cases we define a natural notion of bisimilarity for the resulting formalisms, that we dub $\mathtt {ML}^{\infty }$ and $\mathtt {GML}^{\infty }$, respectively. We then characterise these logics as the bisimulation-invariant fragments of the naturally corresponding predicate logic, viz., the extension of first-order logic with the infinity quantifier. Furthermore, for (...) both $\mathtt {ML}^{\infty }$ and $\mathtt {GML}^{\infty }$ we provide a sound and complete axiomatisation for the set of formulas that are valid in every Kripke frame, we prove a small model property with respect to a widened class of weighted models, and we establish decidability of the satisfiability problem. (shrink)

We prove a completeness theorem for Kmath image, the infinitary extension of the graded version K0 of the minimal normal logic K, allowing conjunctions and disjunctions of countable sets of formulas. This goal is achieved using both the usual tools of the normal logics with graded modalities and the machinery of the predicate infinitary logics in a version adapted to modal logic.

We go on along the trend of [2] and [1], giving an axiomatization of S4⁰ and proving its completeness and compactness with respect to the usual reflexive and transitive Kripke models. To reach this results, we use techniques from [1], with suitable adaptations to our specific case.

Volume 34, Issue 2-3, June - September 2024.

Weakly Aggregative Modal Logic ) is a collection of disguised polyadic modal logics with n-ary modalities whose arguments are all the same. \ has interesting applications on epistemic logic, deontic logic, and the logic of belief. In this paper, we study some basic model theoretical aspects of \. Specifically, we first give a van Benthem–Rosen characterization theorem of \ based on an intuitive notion of bisimulation. Then, in contrast to many well known normal or non-normal modal logics, we show that (...) each basic \ system \ lacks Craig interpolation. Finally, by model theoretical techniques, we show that an extension of \ does have Craig interpolation, as an example of amending the interpolation problem of \. (shrink)

We prove the canonical models introduced in [D] do not exist for some graded normal logics with symmetric models, namelyKB°, KBD°, KBT°, so that we define a new kind of canonical models, the general ones, and show they exist and work well in every case.

We introduce a class of neighbourhood frames for graded modal logic embedding Kripke frames into neighbourhood frames. This class of neighbourhood frames is shown to be first-order definable but not modally definable. We also obtain a new definition of graded bisimulation with respect to Kripke frames by modifying the definition of monotonic bisimulation.

The main purpose of the paper concerns the question of the existence of hard mathematical facts as truth-makers of mathematical sentences. The paper defends the standpoint according to which hard mathematical facts do not exist in semantic models of mathematical theories. The argumentative line in favour of the defended thesis proceeds as follows: slingshot arguments supply us with some reasons to reject various ontological theories of mathematical facts; there are two ways of blocking these arguments: through the rejection of the (...) principle of extensionality for individual terms or through the rejection of the principle of Wittgenstein; the first way cannot be accepted because it leads to the practice of softening mathematical facts; the second way, called fine-graining facts, cannot be accepted because it also results in the practice of softening facts. Hence, only soft mathematical facts can be introduced into semantic models of mathematical theories. Because they should be rather interpreted as mental representations of mathematical objects, they no longer satisfy the semantic role of truth-makers in relation to mathematical sentences. The argument formulated in the paper is based on the analysis of mathematical extensions of the basic non-Fregean logic. Sixty-two definitions of potential fact-identity connectives are also presented. The paper's conclusion may be interpreted as undermining the situational paradigm of building semantics for mathematical languages. (shrink)