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  1. Can One Be Two?: A Synopsis of the Twinning and Personhood Debate.Mark Rankin - 2013 - Monash Bioethics Review 31 (2):37-59.
    It has been argued that the possibility of monozygotic twinning disproves the conservative position on foetal personhood that defines the foetus as a person from conception. This article will canvass arguments for and against this proposition, in order to arrive at a conclusion as to the relative strength of this finding.
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  • Aquinas as an Advocate of Abortion? The Appeal to 'Delayed Animation' in Contemporary Christian Ethical Debates on the Human Embryo.David Albert Jones - 2013 - Studies in Christian Ethics 26 (1):97-124.
    It has become common, in both popular and scholarly discourse, to appeal to ‘delayed animation’ as an argument for abortion (DAAA). Augustine and Aquinas seemingly held that the rational soul was infused midway in pregnancy, and therefore did not regard early abortion as homicide. The authority of these thinkers is thus cited by some contemporary Christians as a reason to tolerate or, for proportionate reasons, to promote first-trimester abortion and embryo experimentation. The present essay is an exercise in aetiology. It (...)
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  • A thomistic perspective on the beginning of personhood: Redux.Jason T. Eberl - 2007 - Bioethics 21 (5):283–289.
    Response to Jan Deckers' critique of the author's earlier article on the beginning of personhood from a Thomistic perspective in which the author revises and further refines his view.
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  • What Happens When the Zygote Divides? On the Metaphysics of Monozygotic Twinning.Jeremy W. Skrzypek - 2024 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 49 (4):336-353.
    It is often argued that certain metaphysical complications surrounding the phenomenon of monozygotic twinning force us to conclude that, prior to the point at which twinning is no longer possible, the zygote or early embryo cannot be considered an individual human organism. In this essay, I argue, on the contrary, that there are in fact several ways of making sense of monozygotic twinning that uphold the humanity of the original zygote, but also that there is no easy answer to what (...)
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