La idea de autonomía que Rawls presenta en la segunda siega de su obra –en Political Liberalism y en Justice as Fairness– no se limita únicamente a la concepción tradicional de la autonomía como reivindicación de derechos. En estricto rigor, no es una concepción jurídica sino “construida”. El aspecto central de esta construcción es la diferencia que, en el fondo, establece entre la mera “autonomía política” y un concepto específico –construido– de la autonomía, ideado en el contexto de la posición (...) original. Este último concepto –el de la “autonomía plena”– en cuanto dispositivo teórico distinto de la noción tradicional de la “autonomía política”, describe más bien un estado de hecho ideal, o de realización de la libertad que resguardan los derechos políticos. Este aspecto añadido encarna, al interior del constructo teórico, el contenido normativo de la propuesta rawlsiana, de clara inspiración republicana. El análisis muestra efectivamente que a fin de cuentas es este concepto de la autonomía plena, y no la tradicional noción jurídica de la autonomía política, la verdadera clave que subyace al argumento que elabora Rawls acerca de la estabilidadde la sociedad bien ordenada. (shrink)

The republican project of freedom as non-domination commits the State to endowing citizens with the resources and attitudes necessary to both apprehend domination and abstain from dominating others. This, some have argued, renders it incompatible with political liberalism, which eschews the promotion of personal liberal virtues, being derived independently of any 'comprehensive doctrine'. Republican freedom is therefore depicted as penetrating deeper, in its application, into intimate and 'private' spheres. I argue, through a Rousseauist interpretation of Rawls's social contract, that its (...) 'political' stricture need not, however, preclude any socially transformative, emancipatory role. Thus, the promotion of freedom as non-domination is compatible with the 'modelled constraints' of Rawls's original position. Far from transgressing the 'political' limits of State power, the goods associated with non-domination may instead be seen as necessary to the realisation of 'moral personality'—independently of the 'final ends' for which it may be exercised. (shrink)

Philip Pettit is the most important contemporany advocate of the republican tradition in political philosophy. He advances a concept of freedom as non-domination, and constrasts it with the liberal conception of freedom as non-interference. He claims that two features distinguish domination from interference: The capacity of interference , and the fact that the interference is arbitrary. I shall argue that Pettit´s republicanism is not sufficiently differente from liberalism, certainly not from John Rawls´s liberalism. The only relevant difference between republicanism and (...) liberalism is related to : the notion of arbitrariness. Yet this difference makes republicanism an unattractive version of liberalism, insofar as it, paradoxically, allows for republicanism to legitimize a grave form of domination, paternalism, and, in general, domination coming from the state. This problem gets exacerbated by Pettit´s consequentialist framework. (shrink)