This paper extracts and articulates the account of normativity in Plato’s Philebus. Central to this account is the concept of measure, which plays both an ontological and a normative role. With regard to the former, measure is what makes particular things to be the specific kind of thing they are; with regard to the latter, measure supplies the appropriate standard for determining whether or not those things are good or bad instances of their kind. As a result of measure playing (...) these two roles, normative evaluation is grounded in the ontological structure of the thing being evaluated. (shrink)

En este artículo trato de mostrar la diferencia entre el concepto de tò posón, la cantidad determinada o proporción matemática, válida en el terreno de las realidades cuantificables, y el concepto de tò métrion, la justa medida, válida en el terreno de las acciones humanas, no cuantificables. Argume..