In this paper, I argue that the success of evolutionary debunking arguments hinges on what theory of epistemic justification one endorses. More specifically, I argue that what it takes to satisfactorily respond to evolutionary debunking arguments depends on what view of epistemic justification one is operating under and that a thorough analysis of any line of response to evolutionary debunking arguments must take into account whether there is a specific view of justification motivating the response or looming in the background. (...) In particular, I argue that pace Andrew del Rio’s claim in the article “Why Undermining Evolutionary Debunkers is Not Enough,” merely undermining the empirical claim can in fact be a successful line of response to debunkers if one endorses a particular version of doxastic conservatism. I also argue that examining how satisfying a response to an evolutionary debunking argument seems to us and considering what theory of justification is looming in the background of the response can shed light on the plausibility of certain theories of epistemic justification. (shrink)