Switch to: References

Citations of:

Lying to oneself

Journal of Philosophy 57 (18):588-595 (1960)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Self-deception.Ian Deweese-Boyd - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Virtually every aspect of the current philosophical discussion of self-deception is a matter of controversy including its definition and paradigmatic cases. We may say generally, however, that self-deception is the acquisition and maintenance of a belief (or, at least, the avowal of that belief) in the face of strong evidence to the contrary motivated by desires or emotions favoring the acquisition and retention of that belief. Beyond this, philosophers divide over whether this action is intentional or not, whether self-deceivers recognize (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • The Definition of Lying and Deception.James Edwin Mahon - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Survey of different definitions of lying and deceiving, with an emphasis on the contemporary debate between Thomas Carson, Roy Sorensen, Don Fallis, Jennifer Saul, Paul Faulkner, Jennifer Lackey, David Simpson, Andreas Stokke, Jorg Meibauer, Seana Shiffrin, and James Mahon, among others, over whether lies always aim to deceive. Related questions include whether lies must be assertions, whether lies always breach trust, whether it is possible to lie without using spoken or written language, whether lies must always be false, whether lies (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   103 citations  
  • Self-Deception: A Case Study in Folk Conceptual Structure.Carme Isern-Mas & Ivar R. Hannikainen - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
    Theoretical debates around the concept of self-deception revolve around identifying the conditions for a behavior to qualify as self-deception. Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that various candidate features—such as intent, belief change, and motive—are treated as sufficient, but non-necessary, conditions according to the lay concept of self-deception. This led us to ask whether there are multiple lay concepts, such that different participants endorse competing theories (the disagreement view), or whether individual participants assign partial weight to various features and consequently waver (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Epistemology of Attention.Catharine Saint-Croix - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
    Root, branch, and blossom, attention is intertwined with epistemology. It is essential to our capacity to learn and decisive of the evidence we obtain, it influences the intellectual connections we forge and those we remember, and it is the cognitive tool whereby we enact decisions about inquiry. Moreover, because it is both an epistemic practice and a site of agency, attention is a natural locus for questions about epistemic morality. This article surveys the emerging epistemology of attention, reviewing the existing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On the “tension” inherent in self-deception.Kevin Lynch - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):433-450.
    Alfred Mele's deflationary account of self-deception has frequently been criticised for being unable to explain the “tension” inherent in self-deception. These critics maintain that rival theories can better account for this tension, such as theories which suppose self-deceivers to have contradictory beliefs. However, there are two ways in which the tension idea has been understood. In this article, it is argued that on one such understanding, Mele's deflationism can account for this tension better than its rivals, but only if we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Twisted Self Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):117-137.
    In instances of "twisted" self-deception, people deceive themselves into believing things that they do not want to be true. In this, twisted self-deception differs markedly from the "straight" variety that has dominated the philosophical and psychological literature on self-deception. Drawing partly upon empirical literature, I develop a trio of approaches to explaining twisted self-deception: a motivation-centered approach; an emotion-centered approach; and a hybrid approach featuring both motivation and emotion. My aim is to display our resources for exploring and explaining twisted (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Moral masquerades: Experimental exploration of the nature of moral motivation.C. Daniel Batson - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):51-66.
    Why do people act morally – when they do? Moral philosophers and psychologists often assume that acting morally in the absence of incentives or sanctions is a product of a desire to uphold one or another moral principle (e.g., fairness). This form of motivation might be called moral integrity because the goal is to actually be moral. In a series of experiments designed to explore the nature of moral motivation, colleagues and I have found little evidence of moral integrity. We (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Belief and self-deception.Amelie Rorty - 1972 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 15 (1-4):387-410.
    In Part I, I consider the normal contexts of assertions of belief and declarations of intentions, arguing that many action-guiding beliefs are accepted uncritically and even pre-consciously. I analyze the function of avowals as expressions of attempts at self-transformation. It is because assertions of beliefs are used to perform a wide range of speech acts besides that of speaking the truth, and because there is a large area of indeterminacy in such assertions, that self-deception is possible. In Part II, I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Kant on lies, candour and reticence.James Edwin Mahon - 2003 - Kantian Review 7:102-133.
    Like several prominent moral philosophers before him, such as St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas, Kant held that it is never morally permissible to tell a lie. Although a great deal has been written on why and how he argued for this conclusion, comparatively little has been written on what, precisely, Kant considered a lie to be, and on how he differentiated between being truthful and being candid, between telling a lie and being reticent, and between telling a lie and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • 19. Self-Deception, Autonomy, and Moral Constitution.Stephen L. Darwall - 1988 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 407-430.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Self-deception.John V. Canfield & Don F. Gustavson - 1962 - Analysis 23 (December):32-36.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Literal self-deception.Maiya Jordan - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):248-256.
    It is widely assumed that a literal understanding of someone’s self-deception that p yields the following contradiction. Qua self-deceiver, she does not believe that p, yet – qua self-deceived – she does believe that p. I argue that this assumption is ill-founded. Literalism about self-deception – the view that self-deceivers literally self-deceive – is not committed to this contradiction. On the contrary, properly understood, literalism excludes it.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Is Self-Deception Pretense?José Eduardo Porcher - 2014 - Manuscrito 37 (2):291-332.
    I assess Tamar Gendler's (2007) account of self-deception according to which its characteristic state is not belief, but imaginative pretense. After giving an overview of the literature and presenting the conceptual puzzles engendered by the notion of self-deception, I introduce Gendler's account, which emerges as a rival to practically all extant accounts of self-deception. I object to it by first arguing that her argument for abandoning belief as the characteristic state of self-deception conflates the state of belief and the process (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Self-deception.Stanley Paluch - 1967 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 10 (1-4):268-278.
    Is it possible for me to believe what I know not to be the case? It certainly does not seem possible for me, at the same time, to be aware of the fact that a given proposition is true and yet believe that the proposition is false. Models of self?deception which have the implication that this is possible are usually described as ?paradoxical?. However, many philosophers believe that there are genuine cases of self?deception which non?paradoxical models of self?deception mirror and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Responsibility and Self-Deception: A Framework.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2012 - Humana Mente 5 (20).
    This paper focuses on the question of whether and, if so, when people can be responsible for their self-deception and its consequences. On Intentionalist accounts, self-deceivers intentionally deceive themselves, and it is easy to see how they can be responsible. On Motivationist accounts, in contrast, self-deception is a motivated, but not intentional, and possibly unconscious process, making it more difficult to see how self-deceivers could be responsible. I argue that a particular Motivationist account, the Desire to Believe account, together with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Self-deception needs no explaining.Herbert Fingarette - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):289-301.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • A formal account of dishonesty.C. Sakama, M. Caminada & A. Herzig - 2015 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 23 (2):259-294.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • (1 other version)Self-Deception.Herbert Fingarette - 2000 - University of California Press.
    With a new chapter This new edition of Herbert Fingarette's classic study in philosophical psychology now includes a provocative recent essay on the topic by the author. A seminal work, the book has deeply influenced the fields of philosophy, ethics, psychology, and cognitive science, and it remains an important focal point for the large body of literature on self-deception that has appeared since its publication. How can one deceive oneself if the very idea of deception implies that the deceiver knows (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • The Puzzle of Self‐Deception.Maria Baghramian & Anna Nicholson - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1018-1029.
    It is commonly accepted that people can, and regularly do, deceive themselves. Yet closer examination reveals a set of conceptual puzzles that make self-deception difficult to explain. Applying the conditions for other-deception to self-deception generates what are known as the ‘paradoxes’ of belief and intention. Simply put, the central problem is how it is possible for me to believe one thing, and yet intentionally cause myself to simultaneously believe its contradiction. There are two general approaches taken by philosophers to account (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Self deception.Béla Szabados - 1974 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (September):41-49.
    People do, quite naturally and not uncommonly, speak of other people as deceiving themselves, as being their own dupes. A man's child is ill and growing constantly worse. The father keeps talking optimistically about the future, keeps explaining away the evidence, and keeps pointing to what he insists are signs of improvement. We can easily imagine ourselves deciding that he has deceived himself about his son's condition. Nor is it the case that talk of self-deception is appropriate only in connection (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • 'Strong' self‐deception.David Pugmire - 1969 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 12 (1-4):339-346.
    Even if many instances of reflexive, and even of interpersonal, deception do not involve knowledge or belief of the deceiver to the contrary of the belief he fosters, it is conceivable that some instances could. This is obscured in Stanley Paluch's treatment of self?deception by the dubious contention that one couldn't be self?deceived if one could affirm that one knew (was aware) that P and believed not?P, and that one couldn't be described as knowing P and believing not?P unless one (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Paradoxes of self-deception.John V. Canfield & Patrick Mcnally - 1960 - Analysis 21 (June):140-144.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Self‐deception about truthfulness.Matt Sleat - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):693-708.
    European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 693-708, June 2022.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Cognitive and motivational bases of self-deception: Commentary on Mele's irrationality.Martha L. Knight - 1988 - Philosophical Psychology 1 (2):179-188.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Deception.Leonard Linsky - 1963 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 6 (1-4):157 – 169.
    Philosophers have based arguments on the contention that we arc deceived in our dreams. I argue that we are not, and that this can be shown by considerations concerning the meaning? of the word ?deceive?. This kind of argument, common in recent philosophy, has been much criticized. In a methodological digression (sections 2?6), some aspects of the nature, the rationale, and the relevance of the appeal to ordinary language in philosophy are exposed and defended. The paper presents an analysis of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Sartre on the Self-Deceiver's Translucent Consciousness.Phyllis Sutton Morris - 1992 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 23 (2):103-119.
    Sartre posed a problem for himself in his discussion of bad faith: how is it possible to deceive oneself, given the unity and translucency of consciousness? Many critics of Sartre interpret translucency as transparency; some, such as M.R. Haight, conclude that Sartre's account of consciousness makes self-deception impossible.A reply to those critics takes the form of showing that translucent consciousness has a number of dimensions: (a) non-positional versus positional aspects; (b) prereflective versus reflective levels; (c) temporally synthetic flux; and (d) (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Self-Deception: A Reflexive Dilemma.T. S. Champlin - 1977 - Philosophy 52 (201):281 - 299.
    It is not easy to see how self-deception is possible because the man who deceives himself seems to be required to play two incompatible roles, that of deceiver and that of deceived. This makes self-deception sound about as difficult as presiding at one's own funeral. Many attempts have been made to remove the air of paradox from self-deception. These attempts are all unsuccessful, and they are best seen as expressions of philosophical puzzlement rather than as actual solutions. In particular, the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Queer revelations: Desire, identity, and self-deceit.Leslie A. Howe - 2005 - Philosophical Forum 36 (3):221–242.
    I argue that understanding the self in terms of narrative construction does not preclude the possibility of error concerning one’s own self. Identity is a projection of first and second-order desires and a product of choice in relation to desire. Self-deceit appears in this connection as a response to an identity that one has constructed through choice and/or desire but not acknowledged in one’s self-account, reflecting a conflict between desires or a motivated failure to account. This analysis is applied primarily (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Draft for Understanding the Historical Background of Changes in the Ideological Language and Communication of Secret Services in 20th Century’s Hungary.Bela Revesz - 2020 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 33 (3):855-898.
    Words can mean different things to different people. This can be problematic, mainly for those working together in a bureaucratic institution, such as the secret service. Shared, certified, explicit and codified definitions offer a counter to subjective, solitary and/or culturally dominant definitions. It’s true that codified secrecy terms for secret services can be seen to involve a number of political, cultural, subcultural “languages”, but if words come from unclassified or declassified files, memorandums and/or records, one needs a deep understanding of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Self-deception and belief attribution.Steven D. Hales - 1994 - Synthese 101 (2):273-289.
    One of the most common views about self-deception ascribes contradictory beliefs to the self-deceiver. In this paper it is argued that this view (the contradiction strategy) is inconsistent with plausible common-sense principles of belief attribution. Other dubious assumptions made by contradiction strategists are also examined. It is concluded that the contradiction strategy is an inadequate account of self-deception. Two other well-known views — those of Robert Audi and Alfred Mele — are investigated and found wanting. A new theory of self-deception (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • (1 other version)Davidson on Rationality and Irrationality.Simone Gozzano - 1999 - In Mario de Caro (ed.), Interpretations and Causes: New Perspectives on Donald Davidson’s Philosophy. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    In this paper I argue that Davidson's solution to the paradoxes of irrationality is incompatible with his holistic assumption on the mental.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Sobre el etnocentrismo y la paradoja de la convicción.Claudio Cormick - 2019 - Factótum. Revista de Filosofía 20 (21):1-12.
    G. A. Cohen (2000) provided us with a challenging “paradox of conviction” by means of pointing out the fact that, even when we realize that we hold certain beliefs (for example, political or religious ones) only because we have been raised to have them, this discovery does not modify what we believe. This seems to be irrational, but acknowledging that fact would entail that irrationality is much more widespread than we are, in principle, willing to accept. In this article we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Autoengaño y voluntarismo doxástico.Gustavo Fernández Acevedo - 2018 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 57:139-160.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Sich in die eigene Tasche lügen? Selbsttäuschung als irrationales Projekt.Amber Griffioen - 2017 - PHILOKLES: Zeitschrift Für Populäre Philosophie 21:4-23.
    This article for the PHILOKLES Journal for Popular Philosophy surveys a few common theoretical approaches to the phenomenon of self-deception before putting forward a thus far relatively unexplored intentionalist option, namely what the author calls the "project model of self-deception". On this model, self-deception is understood as a dynamic, diachronic activity, aimed at the preservation of a certain self-image, to which an agent is implicitly committed. The author shows how this model can make subjects responsible for their self-deceptions without running (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Motivating Influence of Emotion on Twisted Self-Deception.Mario R. Echano - 2017 - Kritike 11 (2):104-120.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Attribution of Responsibility to Self‐Deceivers.Anna Elisabetta Galeotti - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (4):420-438.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Fingarette on self-deception.Bela Szabados - 1977 - Philosophical Papers 6 (May):21-30.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Defining self-deception.Jennifer Radden - 1984 - Dialogue 23 (1):103-120.
    In this paper I shall first expose a weakness shared by several philosophical discussions of self-deception: I shall show that these discussions have failed to give it a complete analysis. The apparent phenomenon of self-deception is all too familiar, and yet its adequate characterization in general terms is wanting. More exactly, I shall argue that to understand self-deception statically, as these accounts have done, has been—and must be—to fail to give a characterization of it as a state of mind, sufficient (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Rorty on belief and self‐deception.Béla Szabados - 1974 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):464-473.
    In this note I argue that although Rorty's programme (Inquiry, Vol. 15, No. 4) to bring into focus the role that belief plays in self?deception is a salutary one, her actual claims obscure that role. It is also contended that Rorty fails to de?mythologize self?deception, since her account is either paradox?ridden or else describes a concept recognizably distinct from the concept of self?deception.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Self-deception and psychological realism.Catherine Wilson - 1980 - Philosophical Investigations 3 (4):47-60.
    Philosophers interested in the "paradox of self-Deception" have argued that self-Deception either (a) does not occur; (b) occurs but is unintelligible; or (c) can be explained by reference to sub-Components of a single personality. I argue that self-Deception can be explained as a variety of weakness of the will, Without the realist's mythology of dual or triple selves.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Motivated irrationality and divided attention.Robert Dunn - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):325 – 336.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Lug und Selbstbetrug.Marc Andree Weber - 2024 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 72 (3):323-343.
    People who, by intention or negligence, deceive themselves put other people at risk of being misinformed. The paper argues that this kind of misinforming other people is to be avoided for largely the same reasons for which lying is to be avoided – regardless of what exactly these reasons are. This makes the ethical evaluation of self-deception in part dependent on the ethical evaluation of lying. In order to bring out this result as clearly as possible, detailed characterisations of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Überschatten.Ranier Carlo V. Abengaña - 2017 - Kritike 11 (2):i-i.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Autoengaño Y evidencia.Gustavo Fernández Acevedo - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (3):125-161.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Gelassenheit.Paolo A. Bolaños - 2019 - Kritike 13 (2):i-i.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)Critical notice.Alan R. Drengson - 1974 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):475-484.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Self-Deception in Belief Acquisition.Mario R. Echano - 2019 - Kritike 13 (2):131-155.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • 10. Psychoanalysis and Self-Deception.Edward Erwin - 1988 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 228-245.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Bibliography.Uma Narayan - 1988 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), Perspectives on Self-Deception. University of California Press. pp. 553-558.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Seis décadas de estudios sobre el autoengaño: problemas perennes y nuevos interrogantes.Gustavo Fernández Acevedo - 2018 - Páginas de Filosofía 19 (22):9-32.
    En las últimas seis décadas el fenómeno del autoengaño ha sido objeto de creciente interés no sólo en el ámbito de la filosofía, dentro de la cual fue tradicionalmente estudiado, sino también en el de distintas ciencias, entre ellas la psicología, las neurociencias, la biología evolucionista y las ciencias sociales. Este incremento en el interés ha redundado en una proliferación de interrogantes y propuestas teóricas de muy diversas clases, sin que hasta la fecha se haya logrado una teoría unificada que (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark