This paper gives a philosophical outline of the importance of plausible ontologies in the social sciences and argues how mechanisms and processes should be placed as the foundation in the social world. The argumentation is mainly based on a critical appraisal of the use of mechanisms and processes in the works of Norbert Elias, Charles Tilly, and Jon Elster. I start by elaborating on how inquiries of scientific interest evolve to shed light on cases, facts and the things that constitute (...) such facts, whilst the actual explanation demands the description of mechanisms and processes. Basically, focusing on variation and difference making is not sufficient to sustain claims of ontological plausibility and reasonableness. It is thus pointed out how the practices and proceedings of the social sciences can be ontologically enhanced by embracing the complementary roles of mechanisms plus processes together with difference making, as is performed in a special science such as biology, as well as is informally but promisingly pursued in the works of the discussed social scientists. While discussing their work, it is also argued that we should differentiate between processes and mechanisms in order to formalize this approach, which highlights the role of technologies and institutions as prime building blocks for social explanation. I conclude by presenting a claim that in taking seriously that the purported relations between beings and entities need to make discursive sense and historical sense, the social sciences will increase our cognitive success about the things of the world. (shrink)

This article advocates for the validity of Realist Evaluation (RE) as a manifestation of Critical Realism in evaluation research despite criticisms suggesting that the former disregards principles from Bhaskarian ontology. Specifically, I argue that critics overstate RE's philosophical actualism in their argument that its inclination towards technocratic knowledge impedes its scrutiny of stratified social systems. Notwithstanding its limitations in fully elucidating causal structural mechanisms in social inquiry, I argue that RE's research rationale can contribute to the stages of explanatory research (...) based on CR by bridging the comprehension of mechanisms linked to micro-interventions with exploring potential structural forces operating across levels of reality. To illustrate this point, I present a case of a policy evaluation study I led that demonstrates how a RE-oriented research design facilitated a transition from investigating specific programme mechanisms within the interventions' context to proposing transcendental questions about the governance of the education system in Colombia. (shrink)