The question of how society should deal with social conflicts arising from cultural differences persists. Should we adopt an exclusivist approach by excluding reasons based on specific cultural traditions (culture-based reasons) from public debates about social policy, especially because these reasons do not appeal to the public at large? Or should we resort to an inclusivist approach by including reasons based on cultural traditions in public debate to give recognition to the diverse cultural identities of those who practice these traditions? (...) While these two approaches assign different roles to cultural traditions in public debate, both seem to welcome compromise between conflicting parties. This paper reviews contending normative approaches for dealing with conflicts in multicultural societies and explores the place of culture-based reasons in public debates designed to resolve conflicts. (shrink)

Debates on the moral status of human embryos have been highly and continuously controversial. For many, these controversies have turned into a fruitless scholastical endeavor. However, recent developments and insights in cellular biology have cast further doubt on one of the core points of dissent: the argument from potentiality. In this article we want to show in a nonscholastical way why this argument cannot possibly survive. Getting once more into the intricacies of status debates is a must in our eyes. (...) Not merely intellectual coherence but the standing and self-understanding of current stem cell research might profit from finally taking leave of the argument from potentiality. (shrink)

Recent advancements in developmental biology enable the creation of embryo-like structures from human stem cells, which we refer to as human embryo-like structures (hELS). These structures provide promising tools to complement—and perhaps ultimately replace—the use of human embryos in clinical and fundamental research. But what if these hELS—when further improved—also have a claim to moral status? What would that imply for their research use? In this paper, we explore these questions in relation to the traditional answer as to why human (...) embryos should be given greater protection than other (non-)human cells: the so-called Argument from Potential (AfP). According to the AfP, human embryos deserve special moral status because they have the unique potential to develop into persons. While some take the development of hELS to challenge the very foundations of the AfP, the ongoing debate suggests that its dismissal would be premature. Since the AfP is a spectrum of views with different moral implications, it does not need to imply that research with human embryos or hELS that (may) have ‘active’ potential should be completely off-limits. However, the problem with determining active potential in hELS is that this depends on development passing through ‘potentiality switches’ about the precise coordinates of which we are still in the dark. As long as this epistemic uncertainty persists, extending embryo research regulations to research with specific types of hELS would amount to a form of regulative precaution that as such would require further justification. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDas Potenzialitätsargument ist das wohl wichtigste Argument der Gegner der verbrauchenden Embryonenforschung und des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs. Weil schon der frühe Embryo eine potenzielle Person sei, so das Argument, besitze er bereits den moralischen Status einer Person. Mit der Möglichkeit, aus differenzierten somatischen Zellen „ethisch unproblematische“ induzierte pluripotente Stammzellen zu gewinnen, schien diese PA-Problematik zumindest für die Forschung umgangen. Indessen zeigen neuere wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse, dass auch aus pluripotenten Zellen neue Organismen erwachsen können. Der Beitrag argumentiert dafür, dass nach der Logik von PA (...) nicht nur iPS-Zellen, sondern auch die somatischen Zellen, aus denen diese entstehen, als potenzielle Personen mit Würde und Lebensrecht anzusehen wären. Aufgrund dieser Implikationen ist PA auch nicht als Argument für ein Lebensrecht von Embryonen geeignet. (shrink)

Das Potenzialitätsargument (PA) ist das wohl wichtigste Argument der Gegner der verbrauchenden Embryonenforschung und des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs. Weil schon der frühe Embryo eine potenzielle Person sei, so das Argument, besitze er bereits den moralischen Status einer Person. Mit der Möglichkeit, aus differenzierten somatischen Zellen „ethisch unproblematische“ induzierte pluripotente Stammzellen (iPS-Zellen) zu gewinnen, schien diese PA-Problematik zumindest für die Forschung umgangen. Indessen zeigen neuere wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse, dass auch aus pluripotenten Zellen neue Organismen erwachsen können. Der Beitrag argumentiert dafür, dass nach der Logik (...) von PA nicht nur iPS-Zellen, sondern auch die somatischen Zellen, aus denen diese entstehen, als potenzielle Personen mit Würde und Lebensrecht anzusehen wären. Aufgrund dieser Implikationen ist PA auch nicht als Argument für ein Lebensrecht von Embryonen geeignet. (shrink)