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Where's the person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.details
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Cognitive ethology comes of age.Michael Tomasello - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):168-169.details
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We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared Agency.Deborah Tollefsen & Shaun Gallagher - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (2):95-110.details
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The artificial view: toward a non-anthropocentric account of moral patiency.Fabio Tollon - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 23 (2):147-155.details
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Collective intentionality and the social sciences.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.details
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The human being as a bumbling optimalist: A psychologist's viewpoint.Masanao Toda - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (2):235-235.details
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The cost of forfeiting causal inheritance.Justin Thomas Tiehen - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):491-507.details
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Is this any way to be a realist?John L. Tienson - 1990 - Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):155-164.details
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Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.details
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Neural Representations Observed.Eric Thomson & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (1):191-235.details
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In What Sense Is Phenomenology Transcendental?Amie L. Thomasson - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):85-92.details
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Introspection and phenomenological method.Amie L. Thomasson - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):239-254.details
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Capacity, Mental Mechanisms, and Unwise Decisions.Tim Thornton - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (2):127-132.details
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Market epistemology.Michael Thicke - 2017 - Synthese:1-24.details
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Market epistemology.Michael Thicke - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5571-5594.details
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Folk-Psychological Interpretation of Human vs. Humanoid Robot Behavior: Exploring the Intentional Stance toward Robots.Sam Thellman, Annika Silvervarg & Tom Ziemke - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
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Explaining Economic Crises: Are There Collective Representations?Paul Thagard - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):266-283.details
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Narrative and meaning in science and religion.John A. Teske - 2010 - Zygon 45 (1):91-104.details
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Externalism, relational selves, and redemptive relationships.John A. Teske - 2011 - Zygon 46 (1):183-203.details
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Twofileness. A Functionalist Approach to Fictional Characters and Mental Files.Enrico Terrone - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (1):129-147.details
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What really matters.Charles Taylor - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):532.details
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Evidence for Teaching in an Australian Songbird.Hollis Taylor - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.details
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Jaka teoria działania? O Mechanice działań Michała Barcza.Maciej Tarnowski - 2020 - Filozofia Nauki 28 (4):83-102.details
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Intelligent neurons.G. Székely - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):388-389.details
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Two conceptions of subjective experience.Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):299-327.details
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Some ethical implications of neurosciences.Charles Susanne & M. Szente - 1997 - Global Bioethics 10 (1-4):111-121.details
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Authors' Reply: Why a Connectionist Perspective on Emotion is Helpful.Gaurav Suri & James J. Gross - 2022 - Emotion Review 14 (2):116-120.details
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Problem spaces, language and connectionism: Issues for cognition.Patrick Suppes - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (3):457-458.details
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Sensations and pain processes.Kenneth J. Sufka & Michael P. Lynch - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):299-311.details
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Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either.Bart Streumer - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):419-436.details
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Two theories of group agency.David Strohmaier - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1901-1918.details
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Self-Interpretation as First-Person Mindshaping: Implications for Confabulation Research.Derek Strijbos & Leon de Bruin - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):297-307.details
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Organisations as Computing Systems.David Strohmaier - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology 6 (2):211-236.details
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Introduction: a cartography of contemporary cognitive social theory.Piet Strydom - 2007 - European Journal of Social Theory 10 (3):339-356.details
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Inferential and non-inferential reasoning.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):1-29.details
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Why Animals Can't Act.Ralf Stoecker - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):255-271.details
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Optimal confusion.Stephanie Stolarz-Fantino & Edmund Fantino - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (2):234-234.details
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Delusions and brain injury: The philosophy and psychology of belief.Tony Stone & Andrew W. Young - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):327-64.details
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Delusions and Brain Injury: The Philosophy and Psychology of Belief.Tony Stone & Andrew W. Young - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):327-364.details
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Connectionism, Realism, and realism.Stephen P. Stich - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):531.details
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Fresh starts.Helen Steward - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):197-217.details
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When is it selectively advantageous to have true beliefs? Sandwiching the better safe than sorry argument.Christopher L. Stephens - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (2):161-189.details
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Secular Worldviews: Scientific Naturalism and Secular Humanism.Mikael Stenmark - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (4):237-264.details
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Science and selection.Kim Sterelny - 1994 - Biology and Philosophy 9 (1):45-62.details
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Rationality and reflective equilibrium.Edward Stein - 1994 - Synthese 99 (2):137-72.details
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Quel Arrière-plan pour l'esprit?Pierre Steiner - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (3):419-444.details
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Implicit versus explicit computation.Kent A. Stevens - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):387-388.details
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Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.details
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