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  1. Consciousness, attention and the Connection Principle.John R. Searle - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):198-203.
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  • What next? Ramifications for empirical psychology.Benny Shanon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):197-198.
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  • Comments on the Connection Principle.Vinod Goel - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):189-190.
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  • Progress within the bounds of memory.Steven A. Sloman - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):679-680.
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  • On computational theories and multilevel, multitask models of cognition: The case of word recognition.Arthur M. Jacobs - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):670-672.
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  • Interactions on the interactive brain.Martha J. Farah - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):90-104.
    When cognitive neuropsychologists make inferences about the functional architecture of the normal mind from selective cognitive impairments they generally assume that the effects of brain damage are local, that is, that the nondamaged components of the architecture continue to function as they did before the damage. This assumption follows from the view that the components of the functional architecture are modular, in the sense of being informationally encapsulated. In this target article it is argued that this “locality” assumption is probably (...)
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  • Modularity need not imply locality: Damaged modules can have nonlocal effects.Edgar Zurif & David Swinney - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):89-90.
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  • Playing Flourens to Fodor's Gall.Tim van Gelder - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):84-84.
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  • The localization/distribution distinction in neuropsychology is related to the isomorphism/multiple meaning distinction in cell electrophysiology.Gerald S. Wasserman - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):87-88.
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  • Locus-pocus.Carlo Semenza - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):80-80.
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  • Throwing out the neuropsychological data with the locality bathwater?Philip Servos & Elizabeth M. Olds - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):80-81.
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  • The functional architecture of visual attention may still be modular.Carlo Umiltà - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):82-83.
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  • Distributed locality and large-scale neurocognitive networks.M. Marsel Mesulam - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):74-76.
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  • Computational levels again.Mike Oaksford - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):76-77.
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  • Parallel distributed processing challenges the strong modularity hypothesis, not the locality assumption.David C. Plaut - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):77-78.
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  • Perception and its interactive substrate: Psychophysical linking hypotheses and psychophysical methods.Robert Sekuler - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):79-79.
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  • No threat to modularity.Yosef Grodzinsky & Uri Hadar - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):70-71.
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  • Go with the flow but mind the details.Glyn W. Humphreys & M. Jane Riddoch - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):71-72.
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  • Further advantages of abandoning the locality assumption in face recognition.Jules Davidoff & Bernard Renault - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):68-68.
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  • Neurocomputing and modularity.Joachim Diederich - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):68-69.
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  • Clarifying the locality assumption.Clark Glymour - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):69-70.
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  • Phenomenal fallacies and conflations.Gilbert Harman - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):256-257.
    A “fallacy” is something like the sense-datum fallacy, involving a logically invalid argument. A “conflation” is something like Block's conflation of the (alleged) raw feel of an experience with what it is like to have the experience. Trivially, a self is conscious of something only if it accesses it. Substantive issues concern the nature of the conscious self and the nature of access.
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  • Modularity, interaction and connectionist neuropsychology.Nick Chater - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):66-67.
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  • Simulating nonlocal systems: Rules of the game.John A. Bullinaria - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):61-62.
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  • Local representations without the locality assumption.A. Mike Burton & Vicki Bruce - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):62-63.
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  • Understanding self and other.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):142-154.
    We consider the various criticisms and requests for clarification made by the commentators of our framework for understanding intentional relations. Our response is organized according to the main themes in the target article: general theory, phylogeny, development, and autism. We also add some discussion of further issues, such as simulation and moral theory, that were not addressed in the target article.
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  • Are blind babies delayed in achieving social understanding?Carol Slater - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):141-142.
    Barresi & Moore's account predicts that infants deprived of visual input will be delayed in achieving social understanding, a hypothesis that receives some support from studies of language use. by blind children. It is proposed that recently developed false belief and appearance/reality tasks be used to explore this issue further. Three possibly distracting conceptual issues are also discussed.
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  • Four-year-old humans are different: Why?Katherine Nelson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):134-135.
    The intentionality schema is an abstraction that relates phylogenetic and ontogenetic sequences of social understanding, but it also obscures the differences between humans and other primates. In particular, it ignores human social developmental and communicative history and the important roles that language plays in human understanding of others' intentional states.
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  • Understanding that looking causes knowing.David R. Olson & Bruce Homer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):135-135.
    Barresi & Moore provide an impressive account of how the coordination of first and third person information about the self and other could produce an account of intentional relations. They are less explicit as to how the child comes to understand the basic epistemic relation between experience and knowledge, that is, how informational access causes belief. We suggest one route.
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  • Social relations and understanding the intentional self.Annerieke Oosterwegel - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):136-136.
    Although Barresi & Moore could have grounded their framework more explicitly in existing models, they offer a provocative testbed for the assumptions of symbolic interactionism and further thinking about self-regulation, especially in autistics.
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  • Ontogeny, evolution, and folk psychology.Daniel J. Povinelli, Mia C. Zebouni & Christopher G. Prince - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):137-138.
    Barresi & Moore assume an equivalence between ontogenetic and evolutionaiy transformations of social understanding. The mechanisms of evolution allow for novel structures to arise, both through terminal addition and through the onset of novel pathways at time points that precede the end points of ancestral pathways. Terminal addition may not be the appropriate model for the evolution of human object-directed imitation, intermodal equivalence, or joint attention.
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  • Understanding minds and selves.R. Peter Hobson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):132-132.
    Barresi & Moore provide a welcome focus on children's abilities to integrate first and third person information about intentional relations but they pay insufficient attention to the origins of children's understanding of the nature of subjective orientations vis-à-vis a shared world and the potential significance of such understanding as a source (rather than an outcome) of domain-general information-processing capacities.
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  • Self-knowledge, knowledge of other minds, and kinesthetic-visual matching.Robert W. Mitchell - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133-133.
    The “intentional schema” seems identical to or dependent upon kinesthetic–visual matching, both of which account for similar empirical findings. The intentional schema, however, fails to account for variability in children's understanding of false belief and differences in children's understanding of self and other in pretense.
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  • But what is the intentional schema?Adam Morton - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133-134.
    The intentional schema may not be sufficiently characterized to make questions about its role in individual and species development intelligible. The idea of metarepresentation may perhaps give it enough content. The importance of metarepresentation itself, however, can be called into question.
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  • First person representations need a methodology based on simulation or theory.Robert M. Gordon - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):130-131.
    Although their thesis is generally sound, Barresi & Moore give insufficient attention to the need for a methodology, whether simulation based or theory-based, for choosing among alternative possible matches of first person and third person information. This choice must be sensitive to contextual information, including past behavior. Moreover, apart from simulation or theory, first person information would not help predict future behavior.
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  • Comparative cognitive studies, not folk phylogeny, please.Colin Allen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):122-123.
    Barresi & Moore (B&M) provide a useful tool for the comparative study of social cognition that could, however, be improved by more subtle analysis of first person information about intentional relations. Knowledge of misrepresentation also needs to be better handled within the theory. I urge skepticism about B&M's sweeping phylogenetic claims.
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  • Stvarna intencionalnost 2. Zašto intencionalnost stvara svijest?Galen Strawson - 2006 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 26 (2):297-318.
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  • The epiphenomenal mind.Simon Buttars - unknown
    The Epiphenomenal Mind is both a deflationary attack on the powers of the human mind and a defence of human subjectivity. It is deflationary because in the thesis I argue that consciousness is an epiphenomenal consequence of events in the brain. It is a defence of human subjectivity because I argue that the mind is sui generis real, irreducible, and largely an endogenous product (i.e. not dependent on society or its resources). Part I is devoted to arguing that the conscious (...)
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  • Déstabiliser le sens.François Recanati - 2001 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 2 (217):197-208.
    Contribution au numéro spécial de la Revue Internationale de Philosophie sur John Searle.
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  • Perspectives récentes pour une phénoménologie de l'intentionnalité.Denis Seron - 2005 - Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 1.
    L?ambition de cette étude est de présenter succinctement, mais aussi de problématiser un courant nouveau venu dans le paysage philosophique con­temporain, qu?on intitule usuellement « intentionnalité phénomé­nale » ou, plus techniquement, « représentationalisme internaliste » 1 . Ce cou­rant est tout récent. Bien qu?on le fasse parfois remonter à un article de Brian Loar de 1987 (Loar 1987 ; cf. Horgan et Kriegel, à paraître, p. 2 ) , on peut dire qu?il n ?a vraiment pris son essor que dans (...)
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  • Logical Machines: Peirce on Psychologism.Majid Amini - 2008 - Disputatio 2 (24):1 - 14.
    This essay discusses Peirce’s appeal to logical machines as an argument against psychologism. It also contends that some of Peirce’s anti-psychologistic remarks on logic contain interesting premonitions arising from his perception of the asymmetry of proof complexity in monadic and relational logical calculi that were only given full formulation and explication in the early twentieth century through Church’s Theorem and Hilbert’s broad-ranging Entscheidungsproblem.
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  • Critical Notice/Études critiqueJohn Searle’s Making the Social World.Jeffrey Hershfield - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (4):759-778.
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  • Darwin’s Algorithm, Natural Selective History, and Intentionality Naturalized.Philip Hanson - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (sup1):53-83.
    Dan Dennett and Jerry Fodor have recently offered diametrically opposed estimations of the relevance of the theory of natural selection to an adequate theory of intentionality. In this paper, I show, first, how this opposition can be traced largely to differences both in their respective understandings of what the theory of natural selection includes, and in their respective ‘pre-theoretic’ takes on the datum to be explained by a theory of intentionality. These differences, in turn, have been ‘pre-selected’ by contrasting outlooks (...)
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  • Qualia and Materialism: Introduction.Don Ross & John Thorp - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (3):435.
    Though the days of consciousness-raising are mostly passed, the days of consciousness seem to be upon us, or, at least, to be upon philosophers. Dennett's recentConsciousness Explainedis the flagship for a flotilla of new major works on the subject, by Flanagan, Jackendoff, Searle, Seager and others. It seems to be something of a convention in such work that one begins by complaining that consciousness is a sorely neglected topic among philosophers; this cliché has created the faintly comical situation in whicheveryoneis (...)
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  • Information integration based predictions about the conscious states of a spiking neural network.David Gamez - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):294-310.
    This paper describes how Tononi’s information integration theory of consciousness was used to make detailed predictions about the distribution of phenomenal states in a spiking neural network. This network had approximately 18,000 neurons and 700,000 connections and it used models of emotion and imagination to control the eye movements of a virtual robot and avoid ‘negative’ stimuli. The first stage in the analysis was the development of a formal definition of Tononi’s theory of consciousness. The network was then analysed for (...)
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  • Artificial Intelligence, Religion, and Community Concern.Matt J. Rossano - 2001 - Zygon 36 (1):57-75.
    Future developments in artificial intelligence (AI) will likely allow for a greater degree of human‐machine convergence, with machines becoming more humanlike and intelligent machinery becoming more integrated into human brain function. This will pose many ethical challenges, and the necessity for a moral framework for evaluating these challenges will grow. This paper argues that community concern constitutes a central factor in both the evolution of religion and the human brain, and as such it should be used as the organizing principle (...)
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  • Searles verpatzte Lösung des Freiheitsproblems.Wolfgang Lenzen - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (1):35-68.
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  • Semantic Biology and the Mind-Body Problem: The Theory of the Conventional Mind.Marcello Barbieri - 2006 - Biological Theory 1 (4):352-356.
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  • Theories and measures of consciousness develop together☆.Anil K. Seth - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):986-988.
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