Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Explanation of Cognition.John R. Searle - 1997 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 42:103-.
    What sorts of systematic explanations should we and can we seek in cognitive science for perception, language comprehension, rational action and other forms of cognition? In broad outline I think the answer is reasonably clear: We are looking for causal explanations, and our subject matter is certain functions of a biological organ, the human and animal brain.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Information integration based predictions about the conscious states of a spiking neural network.David Gamez - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):294-310.
    This paper describes how Tononi’s information integration theory of consciousness was used to make detailed predictions about the distribution of phenomenal states in a spiking neural network. This network had approximately 18,000 neurons and 700,000 connections and it used models of emotion and imagination to control the eye movements of a virtual robot and avoid ‘negative’ stimuli. The first stage in the analysis was the development of a formal definition of Tononi’s theory of consciousness. The network was then analysed for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Artificial Intelligence, Religion, and Community Concern.Matt J. Rossano - 2001 - Zygon 36 (1):57-75.
    Future developments in artificial intelligence (AI) will likely allow for a greater degree of human‐machine convergence, with machines becoming more humanlike and intelligent machinery becoming more integrated into human brain function. This will pose many ethical challenges, and the necessity for a moral framework for evaluating these challenges will grow. This paper argues that community concern constitutes a central factor in both the evolution of religion and the human brain, and as such it should be used as the organizing principle (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Realism and the Problem of Agency.Margaret Archer - 2002 - Journal of Critical Realism 5 (1):11-20.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Searles verpatzte Lösung des Freiheitsproblems.Wolfgang Lenzen - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (1):35-68.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Semantic Biology and the Mind-Body Problem: The Theory of the Conventional Mind.Marcello Barbieri - 2006 - Biological Theory 1 (4):352-356.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Theories and measures of consciousness develop together☆.Anil K. Seth - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):986-988.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • True fiction: Philosophy and psychology of religious belief.Ilkka Pyysia¨Inen - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):109-125.
    The phenomenon of religious belief has been much discussed in philosophy of religion. However, a priori argumentation alone cannot establish what religious belief is like as a psychological attitude. Recent advances in the cognitive science of religion have paved the way for a new, naturalized philosophy of religion. Taking into account the relevant results and hypotheses presented within these disciplines, it is possible to develop a more empirically informed philosophy of religious belief. Instead of asking whether believing is rational, it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • A view of the world from a split-brain perspective.Dahlia W. Zaidel - 1994 - In [Book Chapter].
    The extent to which observed behavior in the complete commissurotomy patients is supported by only one hemisphere would depend on individual differences interacting with a variety of factors such as genetics, intelligence, and so on. The lesson imparted here is that there is sufficient functional redundancy in the neocortex so that the capacity to maintain a wide range of abilities is within the control of one hemisphere. And, yet, as seen in what is missing in the patients' behavior, one hemisphere (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • A theoretical framework for the study of spatial cognition.Maurizio Tirassa, Antonella Carassa & Giuliano Geminiani - 2000 - In Maurizio Tirassa, Antonella Carassa & Giuliano Geminiani (eds.), [Book Chapter].
    We argue that the locomotion of organisms is better understood as a form of interaction with a subjective environment, rather than as a set of behaviors allegedly amenable to objective descriptions. An organism's interactions with its subjective environment are in turn understandable in terms of its cognitive architecture. We propose a large-scale classification of the possible types of cognitive architectures, giving a sketch of the subjective structure that each of them superimposes on space and of the relevant consequences on locomotion. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Sharedness as an innate basis for communication in the infant.Francesca M. Bosco & Maurizio Tirassa - 1998 - In Morton Ann Gernsbacher & Sharon J. Derry (eds.), Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Lawerence Erlbaum. pp. 162-166.
    From a cognitive perspective, intentional communication may be viewed as an agent's activity overtly aimed at modifying a partner's mental states. According to standard Gricean definitions, this requires each party to be able to ascribe mental states to the other, i.e., to entertain a so-called theory of mind. According to the relevant experimental literature, however, such capability does not appear before the third or fourth birthday; it would follow that children under that age should not be viewed as communicating agents. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Scientific models as information carrying artifacts.Anna-Mari Rusanen & Otto Lappi - unknown
    We present an information theoretic account of models as scientific representations, where scientific models are understood as information carrying artifacts. We propose that the semantics of models should be based on this information coupling of the model to the world. The information theoretic account presents a way of avoiding the need to refer to agents' intentions as constitutive of the semantics of scientific representations, and it provides a naturalistic account of model semantics, which can deal with the problems of asymmetry, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Indistinguishable from magic: Computation is cognitive technology. [REVIEW]John Kadvany - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (1):119-143.
    This paper explains how mathematical computation can be constructed from weaker recursive patterns typical of natural languages. A thought experiment is used to describe the formalization of computational rules, or arithmetical axioms, using only orally-based natural language capabilities, and motivated by two accomplishments of ancient Indian mathematics and linguistics. One accomplishment is the expression of positional value using versified Sanskrit number words in addition to orthodox inscribed numerals. The second is Pāṇini’s invention, around the fifth century BCE, of a formal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Subjekt und selbstmodell. Die perspektivität phänomenalen bewußtseins vor dem hintergrund einer naturalistischen theorie mentaler repräsentation.Thomas K. Metzinger - 1999 - In 自我隧道 自我的新哲学 从神经科学到意识伦理学.
    This book contains a representationalist theory of self-consciousness and of the phenomenal first-person perspective. It draws on empirical data from the cognitive and neurosciences.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Over‐interpreting functional neuroimages.Marc Burock - unknown
    Cognitive neuroscientists use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure properties of a participant’s brain during a cognitive task. These imaging results are transformed into compelling pictures of brain activity using statistical models. I will argue that, for a broad class of experiments, neuroimaging experts have a tendency to over‐interpret the functional significance of their data. This over‐interpretation appears to follow from contentious theoretical assumptions about the mind‐brain connection, and from a propensity to conflate the anatomical location of a statistically‐significant (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Fallacies or analyses?Jennifer Church - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):251--2.
    To demonstrate that a fallacy is committed, Block needs to convince us of two things: first, that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is distinct from that of access consciousness, and second, that it picks out a different property from that of access consciousness. I raise doubt about both of these claims, suggesting that the concept of a phenomenal property is the concept of a property to which we have a special sort of access.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Literalism and contextualism : Some varieties.Francois Recanati - 2005 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in philosophy: knowledge, meaning, and truth. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 171--196.
    Both Literalism and Contextualism come in many varieties. There are radical, and less radical, versions of both Literalism and Contextualism. Some intermediate positions are mixtures of Literalism and Contextualism. In this paper I describe several literalist positions, several contextualist positions, and a couple of intermediate positions. My aim is to convince the reader that the Literalism/Contextualism controversy is far from being settled. In the first section, I look at the historical development of Literalism. This development reveals a gradual weakening. The (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The dependence of language on consciousness.Jordan Zlatev - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (6):34-62.
    The first hurdle to overcome in approaching the complex topic of the relation between language and consciousness is terminology. So let me begin, in good philosophical style, by explaining the senses in which I use the three lexical terms in the title. Luckily I need not explain those of the three grammatical words the, of, and on: there is probably a minor library of semantic literature devoted to that. I need not, since I both know their meanings pre-theoretically, and know (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Causal processes, semiosis, and consciousness.Claus Emmeche - manuscript
    The evolutionary emergence of biological processes in organisms with inner, qualitative aspects has not been explained in any sufficient way by neurobiology, nor by the traditional neo-Darwinian paradigm — natural selection would appear to work just as well on insentient zombies (with the right behavioral input-output relations) as on real sentient animals. In consciousness studies one talks about the ‘hard problem’ of qualia. In this paper I sketch a set of principles about sign action, causality and emergent evolution. On the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • A-life, organism and body: The semiotics of emergent levels.Claus Emmeche - manuscript
    1Center for the Philosophy of Nature and Science Studies, Blegdamsvej 17, DK-2100 Copenhagen, Denmark. Published pp. 117-124 in: Mark Bedeau, Phil Husbands, Tim Hutton, Sanjev Kumar and Hideaki Suzuki : Workshop and Tutorial Proceedings. Ninth International Conference on the Simulation and Synthesis of Living Systems.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Aspects of Complexity in Life and Science.Claus Emmeche - 1997 - Philosophica 59 (1).
    A short review of complexity research from the perspective of history and philosophy of biology is presented. Complexity and its emergence has scientific and metaphysical meanings. From its beginning, biology was a science of complex systems, but with the advent of electronic computing and the possibility of simulating mathematical models of complicated systems, new intuitions of complexity emerged, together with attempts to devise quantitative measures of complexity. But can we quantify the complex?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Communicative competence and the architecture of the mind/brain.Maurizio Tirassa - 1999 - Brain and Language 68:419-441.
    Cognitive pragmatics is concerned with the mental processes involved in intentional communication. I discuss a few issues that may help clarify the relationship between this area and the broader cognitive science and the contribution that they give, or might give, to each other. Rather than dwelling on the many technicalities of the various theories of communication that have been advanced, I focus on the different conceptions of the nature and the architecture of the mind/brain that underlie them. My aims are, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Is consciousness necessary to high-level control systems?Maurizio Tirassa - 1994 - [Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)].
    Building on Bringsjord's (1992, 1994) and Searle's (1992) work, I take it for granted that computational systems cannot be conscious. In order to discuss the possibility that they might be able to pass refined versions of the Turing Test, I consider three possible relationships between consciousness and control systems in human-level adaptive agents.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Spin-mediated consciousness theory: An approach based on pan-protopsychism.Huping Hu & Maoxin Wu - 2002
    As an alternative to our original dualistic approach, we present here our spin-mediated consciousness theory based on pan-protopsychism. We postulate that consciousness is intrinsically connected to quantum mechanical spin since said spin is embedded in the microscopic structure of spacetime and may be more fundamental than spacetime itself. Thus, we theorize that consciousness emerges quantum mechanically from the collective dynamics of "protopsychic" spins under the influence of spacetime dynamics. That is, spin is the "pixel" of mind. The unity of mind (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The path not taken.Daniel Dennett - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):252-253.
    The differences Block attempts to capture with his putative distinction between P-consciousness and A-consciousness are more directly and perspicuously handled in terms of differences in richness of content and degree of influence. Block's critiques, based on his misbegotten distinction, evaporate on closer inspection.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Reply to Nes.Tim Crane - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):215–218.
    Brentano (1874) described intentionality in a number of different ways: as ‘the intentional inexistence of an object’, ‘reference to a content’, ‘direction towards an object’, and ‘immanent objectivity’. All these phrases were intended to mean the same thing, but such elegant variation can give rise to confusion. In my Elements of Mind (2001) I tried to give a simpler description: intentional states all involve directedness upon an object and what I call (following Searle 1992) aspectual shape. My aim in doing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • On Two Alleged Conflicts Between Divine Attributes.Torin Alter - 2002 - Faith and Philosophy 19 (1):47-57.
    Some argue that God’s omnipotence and moral perfection prevent God from being afraid and having evil desires and thus from understanding such states—which contradicts God’s omniscience. But, I argue, God could acquire such understanding indirectly, either by (i) perceiving the mental states of imperfect creatures, (ii) imaginatively combining the components of mental states with which God could be acquainted, or (iii) having false memory traces of such states. (i)–(iii) are consistent with the principal divine attributes.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Names and words in the philosophy of zhuangzi.Guorong Yang - 2008 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (1):1-26.
    The examination of names and words constitutes an important aspect of the philosophy of Zhuangzi. With the debate over the relationship between name and reality as its background, this examination not only involves the connection between form and meaning, but also targets at the connection between concepts and objects. The debate over the relationship between name and reality correlates with the discussion of the connection between words and meanings or ideas. For Zhuangzi, the function of names and words is first (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Contextual logic with modalities for time and space.Haim Gaifman - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (4):433-458.
    Contextuality is trivially pervasive: all human experience takes place in endlessly changing environments and inexorably moving time frames. In order to have any meaning, the changing items must be placed within a more stable setting, a framework that is not subject to the same kind of contextual change. Total contextuality collapses into chaos, or becomes ineffable. While basic learning is highly contextual (one learns by example), what is learned transcends the examples used in the learning. Perhaps, in a similar manner, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Are current philosophical theories of consciousness useful to neuroscientists?Philip R. Sullivan - 2006 - Behavior and Philosophy 34:59-70.
    Two radically different families of theory currently compete for acceptance among theorists of human consciousness. The majority of theorists believe that the human brain somehow causes consciousness, but a significant minority holds that how the brain would cause this property is not only currently incomprehensible, but unlikely to become comprehensible despite continuing advances in brain science. Some of these latter theorists hold an alternate view that consciousness may well be one of the fundamentals in nature, and that the extremely complex (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Building brains for bodies.Rodney A. Brooks & Lynn Andrea Stein - 1994 - Autonomous Robotics 1 (1):7-25.
    We describe a project to capitalize on newly available levels of computational resources in order to understand human cognition. We are building an integrated physical system including vision, sound input and output, and dextrous manipulation, all controlled by a continuously operating large scale parallel MIMD computer. The resulting system will learn to "think" by building on its bodily experiences to accomplish progressively more abstract tasks. Past experience suggests that in attempting to build such an integrated system we will have to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • Eating soup with chopsticks: Dogmas, difficulties and alternatives in the study of conscious experience.Rafael E. Núñez - 1997 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (2):143-166.
    The recently celebrated division into ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ problems of consciousness is unfortunate and misleading. Built on functionalist grounds, it carves up the subject matter by declaring that the most elusive parts need a fundamentally and intrinsically different solution. What we have, rather, are ‘difficult’ problems of conscious experience, but problems that are not difficult per se. Their difficulty is relative, among other things, to the kind of solution one is looking for and the tools used to accomplish the task. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Functionalism and logical analysis.Paul Livingston - 2005 - In David Woodruff Smith & Amie Lynn Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 19.
    After more than thirty-five years of debate and discussion, versions of the functionalist theory of mind originating in the work of Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, and David Lewis still remain the most popular positions among philosophers of mind on the nature of mental states and processes. Functionalism has enjoyed such popularity owing, at least in part, to its claim to offer a plausible and compelling description of the nature of the mental that is also consistent with an underlying physicalist or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Expertise and the evolution of consciousness.Matt J. Rossano - 2003 - Cognition 89 (3):207-236.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Why classical mechanics cannot accommodate consciousness but quantum mechanics can.Henry P. Stapp - 1995 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 2.
    It is argued on the basis of certain mathematical characteristics that classical mechanics is not constitutionally suited to accommodate consciousness, whereas quantum mechanics is. These mathematical characteristics pertain to the nature of the information represented in the state of the brain, and the way this information enters into the dynamics.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Neural unpredictability, the interpretation of quantum theory, and the mind-body problem.Matthew J. Donald - 2002 - Quant-Ph/0208033.
    It has been suggested, on the one hand, that quantum states are just states of knowledge; and, on the other, that quantum theory is merely a theory of correlations. These suggestions are confronted with problems about the nature of psycho-physical parallelism and about how we could define probabilities for our individual future observations given our individual present and previous observations. The complexity of the problems is underlined by arguments that unpredictability in ordinary everyday neural functioning, ultimately stemming from small-scale uncertainties (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Principles for Implicit Learning.Axel Cleeremans - 1997 - In Dianne Berry (ed.), How Implicit is Implicit Learning? Oxford University Press.
    Complete URL to this document: http://srsc.ulb.ac.be/axcWWW/93-Principles.html.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Words About Young Minds: The Concepts of Theory, Representation, and Belief in Philosophy and Developmental Psychology.Eric Schwitzgebel - 1997 - Dissertation, University of California Berkeley
    In this dissertation, I examine three philosophically important concepts that play a foundational role in developmental psychology: theory, representation, and belief. I describe different ways in which the concepts have been understood and present reasons why a developmental psychologist, or a philosopher attuned to cognitive development, should prefer one understanding of these concepts over another.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Proprioceiving someone else's movement.Barbara Montero - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):149 – 161.
    Proprioception - the sense by which we come to know the positions and movements of our bodies - is thought to be necessarily confined to the body of the perceiver. That is, it is thought that while proprioception can inform you as to whether your left knee is bent or straight, it cannot inform you as to whether someone else's knee is bent or straight. But while proprioception certainly provides us with information about the positions and movements of our own (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Implementation and indeterminacy.Curtis Brown - 2004 - Conferences in Research and Practice in Information Technology 37.
    David Chalmers has defended an account of what it is for a physical system to implement a computation. The account appeals to the idea of a “combinatorial-state automaton” or CSA. It is unclear whether Chalmers intends the CSA to be a computational model in the usual sense, or merely a convenient formalism into which instances of other models can be translated. I argue that the CSA is not a computational model in the usual sense because CSAs do not perspicuously represent (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Why everything doesn't realize every computation.Ronald L. Chrisley - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):403-20.
    Some have suggested that there is no fact to the matter as to whether or not a particular physical system relaizes a particular computational description. This suggestion has been taken to imply that computational states are not real, and cannot, for example, provide a foundation for the cognitive sciences. In particular, Putnam has argued that every ordinary open physical system realizes every abstract finite automaton, implying that the fact that a particular computational characterization applies to a physical system does not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • [Star] Penrose is wrong.Drew McDermott - 1995 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 2:66-82.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The role of emotions in the explanation of action.Élisabeth Pacherie - 2002 - European Review of Philosophy 5:53-92.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Searle on the Brink.Selmer Bringsjord - 1994 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 1.
    In his recent _The Rediscovery of the Mind_ John Searle tries to destroy cognitive science _and_ preserve a future in which a ``perfect science of the brain'' (1992, p. 235) arrives. I show that Searle can't accomplish both objectives. The ammunition he uses to realise the first stirs up a maelstrom of consciousness so wild it precludes securing the second.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Quantity of experience: brain-duplication and degrees of consciousness. [REVIEW]Nick Bostrom - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (2):185-200.
    If a brain is duplicated so that there are two brains in identical states, are there then two numerically distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? There are two, I argue, and given computationalism, this has implications for what it is to implement a computation. I then consider what happens when a computation is implemented in a system that either uses unreliable components or possesses varying degrees of parallelism. I show that in some of these cases there can be, in a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Sensations and the language of thought.Adam Vinueza - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):373-392.
    I discuss two forms of the thesis that to have a sensation is to token a sentence in a language of thought-what I call, following Georges Rey, the sensational sentences thesis. One form of the thesis is a version of standard functionalism, while the other is a version of the increasingly popular thesis that for a sensation to have qualia is for it to have a certain kind of intentional content-that is, intentionalism. I defend the basic idea behind the sensational (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • How can Searle avoid property dualism? Epistemic-ontological inference and autoepistemic limitation.Georg Northoff & Kristina Musholt - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (5):589-605.
    Searle suggests biological naturalism as a solution to the mind-brain problem that escapes traditional terminology with its seductive pull towards either dualism or materialism. We reconstruct Searle's argument and demonstrate that it needs additional support to represent a position truly located between dualism and materialism. The aim of our paper is to provide such an additional argument. We introduce the concept of "autoepistemic limitation" that describes our principal inability to directly experience our own brain as a brain from the first-person (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Searle on rediscovering the mind.Robert G. Burton - 1995 - Man and World 28 (2):163-174.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Searle rediscovers what was not lost.Tim Kenyon - 1998 - Dialogue 37 (1):117-130.
    We shall see that both these projects are deeply misguided. The first suffers from Searle’s misrepresentation, en masse and individually, of the various materialist theories. To show this, I will focus on the basic claims of token identity specifically, and draw out the inaccuracy of Searle’s straw materialism. This is a shortcut; by showing one conjunct to be false, we may show the conjunction of Searle’s summaries to be false. And, after all, token identity is the most widely held current (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Illusions of consciousness.Stewart Nicolson - 1995 - Dialogue 34 (4):769-775.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark