Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science, which he developed by focusing on physics, was later applied by other authors to virtually all areas or disciplines of culture. What interests me here, however, is the movement in the opposite direction: the role that one of these disciplines, history of art, played in the conception of Kuhn'stheoryof science.In a 1969 article, his only published text concerning science and art, Kuhn makes a brief and intriguing observation about The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. He says (...) the book was a belated product of his discovery of the parallels between science and art. This is a retrospective assertion about Structure, as well as that of the... (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to respond to Thomas Uebel’s criticisms of my comments regarding the current revisionism of Carnap’s work and its relations to Kuhn. I begin by pointing out some misunderstandings in the interpretation of my article. I then discuss some aspects related to Carnap’s view of the history of science. First, I emphasize that it was not due to a supposed affinity between Kuhn’s conceptions and those of logical positivists that Kuhn was invited to write the (...) monograph on the history of science for the Encyclopedia. Three other authors had been invited first, including George Sarton whose conception was entirely different from Kuhn’s. In addition, I try to show that Carnap attributes little importance to the history of science. He seldom refers to it and, when he does, he clearly defends a Whig or an ‘old’ historiography of science, to which Kuhn opposes his “new historiography of science”. It is argued that this raises serious difficulties for those, like Uebel, who hold the view that Carnap includes the historical or the social within the rational. (shrink)

Depois dos anos 60, e especialmente depois da repercussão da obra kunhiana, tornou-se comum a distinção entre o ponto de vista continuísta e o descontinuísta na avaliação do desenvolvimento científico. Kuhn passou a ser visto como o grande descontinuísta ao lado de Koyré e Butterfield e foi considerado o causador de uma grande mudança no modo de se conceber o desenvolvimento da ciência. Em diversas abordagens, a noção de continuidade tem sido, muito frequentemente, equiparada à acumulação, que implica necessariamente a (...) negação da existência de revoluções científicas. Neste trabalho, buscamos mostrar que o emprego dos adjetivos “cumulativista” ou “continuísta” em oposição ao termo “descontinuísta” pode tanto suscitar interpretações equivocadas de visões históricas quanto estabelecer aproximações entre visões bastante distintas. Isso parece claro quando se analisa, por exemplo, as concepções de Sarton, Conant e Kuhn sobre a acumulação, tarefa a que nos propomos. A análise propicia considerações sobre os papeis desses pensadores na história da ciência. (shrink)

Despite the importance of the “historiographical revolution” in Kuhn’s work, he did not carry out a specific study about it. Without a systematic investigation into it, he even affirms that the “old” historiography of science (OHS) is unhistorical, suggesting its summary disqualification in the face of his “new historiography” of science (NHS). My wider project, of which this paper is a part, is to better discuss the issue of the justification of the NHS. In this paper, I discuss the justification (...) (and the genesis) of the OHS, focusing on Condorcet and Comte and resorting especially to Koyré. This will allow us to understand that the relation between the OHS and the NHS is a new instance of inter-theoretical incommensurability. And, indeed, that the NHS is not stricto senso a new historiography. It is the same historiography used for other disciplines (art, philosophy), which in the twentieth century begins to be applied to science as well. (shrink)