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Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation

Oxford University Press (2009)

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  1. Cartesian Sensations.Raffaella De Rosa - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):780-792.
    Descartes maintained that sensations of color and the like misrepresent the material world in normal circumstances. Some prominent scholars have argued that, to explain this Cartesian view, we must attribute to Descartes a causal account of sensory representation. I contend that neither the arguments motivating this reading nor the textual evidence offered in its support is sufficient to justify such attribution. Both textual and theoretical reasons point in the direction of an (at least partial) internalist account of Descartes' views on (...)
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  • Malebranche and the Riddle of Sensation.Walter Ott - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):689-712.
    Like their contemporary counterparts, early modern philosophers find themselves in a predicament. On one hand, there are strong reasons to deny that sensations are representations. For there seems to be nothing in the world for them to represent. On the other hand, some sensory representations seem to be required for us to experience bodies. How else could one perceive the boundaries of a body, except by means of different shadings of color? I argue that Nicolas Malebranche offers an extreme -- (...)
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  • Descartes' Causal Principle and the Case of Body-to-Mind Causation1.Raffaella De Rosa - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):438-459.
    It is a common view that Descartes' causal principle is to be understood in light of a similarity condition that accounts for how finite causes contribute to an explanation of their effects. This paper challenges this common view and offers a sui generis reading of Descartes' views on causation that has also the advantage of solving the two exegetical issues of whether Descartes thought of the body-to-mind relation in occasionalist or causal terms and of whether Descartes regarded sensory ideas innate (...)
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  • Mind–Body Causation, Mind–Body Union and the ‘Special Mode of Thinking’ in Descartes.Tom Vinci - 2008 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (3):461 – 488.
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  • Intentionality Bifurcated: A Lesson From Early Modern Philosophy?Lionel Shapiro - 2013 - In Martin Lenz & Anik Waldow (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern Philosophy: Nature and Norms in Thought. Springer.
    This paper examines the pressures leading two very different Early Modern philosophers, Descartes and Locke, to invoke two ways in which thought is directed at objects. According to both philosophers, I argue, the same idea can simultaneously count as “of” two different objects—in two different senses of the phrase ‘idea of’. One kind of intentional directedness is invoked in answering the question What is it to think that thus-and-so? The other kind is invoked in answering the question What accounts for (...)
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  • Replies to Vinci and Nelson.Raffaella De Rosa - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):117-128.
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  • Raffaella De Rosa's Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation.Tom Vinci - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):97-106.
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  • The Structure of Cartesian Sensations.Alan Nelson - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):107-116.
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