Deconstruction is often depicted as a method of critical analysis aimed at exposing unquestioned metaphysical assumptions and internal contradictions in philosophical and literary language. Starting from Derrida's contention that deconstruction is not a method and cannot be transformed into one, I make a case for a different attitude towards deconstruction, to which I refer as 'witnessing'. I argue that what needs to be witnessed is the occurrence of deconstruction and, more specifically, the occurrence of metaphysics-in-deconstruction. The point of witnessing metaphysics-in-deconstruction (...) is affirmative: it is an affirmation of what cannot be conceived in terms of the system and yet makes this system possible. To the extent to which education is concerned with the 'coming into presence' of new beginners and new beginnings, it shares an interest with deconstruction. Through a discussion of the role of communication in education I indicate how we might witness the occurrence of deconstruction in education. Through this we may be able to identify openings that can become potential entrances for the coming into presence of new beginnings and new beginners. Such an engagement with Derrida's work is more than the application of 'his' philosophy to the 'field' of education and therefore also has implications for how we think of the very idea of philosophy of education. (shrink)

This essay deploys the existence of epistemic vices in the trajectory of Western philosophy to map the erasures and complicities that accompanied the emergence of contemporary African philosophy (CAP1). It argues that the complicity of CAP1 in the hyperspecialization and academic self‐absorption that marked the professionalization of Western philosophy, makes it difficult to attend to the conditions for its own possibility. CAP1 arguably needs to make a critical turn into critical African philosophy (CAP2), understood as a metatheoretical and metaphilosophical framework (...) for an internal transformation that is emancipatory. CAP2 is envisioned, first, as a critique of postcoloniality that rehumanizes the autonomous African subject; and, second, as an ethicopolitical project that explores the cracks between philosophy as theoretical practice and philosophy as praxis in opening up the spaces for postcolonial emancipation. The essay identifies three conditions that instigate the emancipatory possibility of philosophizing on the continent: the spatial/platial, demosophic, and political. (shrink)

Is it Eurocentric on the part of western philosophers (Habermas, Derrida) or of researchers in human sciences to set out from a specific locality (Europe) to formulate ethico-political ideals with universal aspirations? In this article, I critique the ‘universalism vs. particularism’ framework within which the charge of Eurocentrism is deployed and I redefine the notion of Eurocentrism outside the drastic choice between universalism and particularism and in light of an ‘ec-centric’ reflection on the entanglement of the ‘We’ and the ‘others’. (...) I illustrate my position by discussing the Habermasian–Derridean plea for the determination of new European political responsibilities beyond any Eurocentrism. I grant that the two philosophers go indeed beyond Eurocentrism as the latter is usually understood, i.e. along the axis ‘universal–particular’. Yet, without minimizing their political contribution, I detect subtler Eurocentrisms that pervade several assumptions of Habermas’s and Derrida’s collaborative efforts. I argue that a hasty enlisting of possibilities for a politically and morally pertinent European intervention in world affairs fails to account for other, more necessary steps in the direction of reforming the western consciousness and of going beyond less easily discernible Eurocentrisms such as those theorized within the proposed, reformulated notion. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to examine ways in which localized research runs the risk of becoming a boundary discourse in a negative sense. The exaggerated emphasis on immanent critique, contextualization and incommensurability may lead discourse and disciplines to an isolationist self-understanding that leaves unchallenged or even entrenches existing discursive hegemonies. Or, it may side with the kind of facile and hasty fusion of discourses and disciplines that ignores epistemic demands and concerns for validity and semantic accuracy. That is, (...) it may overlook the necessity for positively understood discursive boundaries. Clearly demarcated, a-porous boundaries block osmosis and fruitful exchange and facilitate what is called here ?stronghold fortification?. And they make common cause with a disregard for all boundaries, i.e. with what is called here ?frame demolition?. Discourses of educational research, and particularly of ?special? versus ?inclusive? education, supply examples that are all the more telling since the very possibility of pedagogy reminds us that relativism is not an option here. To discuss interdisciplinarity and discursivity with an eye to such risks, I refer to Habermas? outlook on the position of philosophy after Kant alongside Derrida's rethinking of the right to philosophy ? a rethinking that is grounded in a reading of Kant's cosmopolitical point of view. (shrink)

This article explores both the significance and difficulty of the work of Paul Valéry (1871–1945), arguing that his challenging ideas on Europe and its crisis have much to contribute to recent debates on the philosophy of Europe. For Valéry, Europe is inseparable from its (spiritual) history, caught up in the process of self-understanding and self-alienation. In order to examine this process, the article focuses on Valéry’s tripartite composition of Europe’s “influences,” namely the institutions and laws of the Roman Empire, the (...) self-examination of Christianity, and the discipline of spirit and development of science in ancient Greek culture. (shrink)