In this paper I explore the role of manners and morals. In particular, what is the connection between emotional demeanor and the inner stuff of virtue? Does the fact that we can pose faces and hide our inner sentiments, i.e., 'fake it,' detract from or add to our capacity for virtue? I argue, following a line from the Stoics, that it can add to our virtue and that, as a result, moral education needs to take seriously both a commitment to (...) good character and a commitment to the 'aesthetic' of character. (shrink)

This paper proposes that self-deception results from the emotional coherence of beliefs with subjective goals. We apply the HOTCO computational model of emotional coherence to simulate a rich case of self-deception from Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter.We argue that this model is more psychologically realistic than other available accounts of self-deception, and discuss related issues such as wishful thinking, intention, and the division of the self.

This essay looks at the important, but often neglected, contribution that self‐interpretation makes to emotional self‐knowledge. We engage in acts of self‐interpretation when (A) we try to understand what it is that we are feeling, or, relatedly, what it is that we ought to be feeling. On such occasions, we draw upon social and personal narratives as well as on the emotional conceptual repertoires at our disposal. We also engage in acts of self‐interpretation when (B) we try to ascertain the (...) meaning or significance of an emotion, treating it as a datum, or piece of evidence, upon which to make inferences or further Interpretations. Although we often seem to have first‐person privileged access to our mental states, the third‐person strategy of self‐interpretation can be a valuable source of self‐knowledge. I focus here upon the role that self‐interpretation plays in providing us with knowledge about our emotional experiences. (shrink)

The focus of this article is to offer an account of how the development of one’s intellectual character has therapeutic value in the attempt to overcome self-deception. Even stronger, the development of intellectual character has necessary therapeutic value in regard to self-deception. This account proceeds by first consulting the predominant psychological theory of virtuous character offered by contemporary virtue ethicists and virtue epistemologists. A motivational/dispositional account of self-deception is then offered and connected to the former account of intellectual character. By (...) connecting these two sets of literature the therapeutic value of intellectual virtue is displayed. The problem of self-diagnosis is then presented as well as intellectual character as a necessary therapeutic measure to assure agents that they are not self-deceived. (shrink)