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Kripke on Naming and Necessity

R. B. De Sousa

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):447-464 (1974)

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On the plurality of gods.Eric Steinhart - 2013 - Religious Studies 49 (3):289-312.details Ordinal polytheism is motivated by the cosmological and design arguments. It is also motivated by Leibnizian–Lewisian modal realism. Just as there are many universes, so there are many gods. Gods are necessary concrete grounds of universes. The god-universe relation is one-to-one. Ordinal polytheism argues for a hierarchy of ranks of ever more perfect gods, one rank for every ordinal number. Since there are no maximally perfect gods, ordinal polytheism avoids many of the familiar problems of monotheism. It links theology with (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Kripke's Objections to Description Theories of Names.Michael McKinsey - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):485 - 497.details In “Naming and Necessity” Saul Kripke describes some cases which, he claims, provide counterexamples both to cluster theories and, more generally, to description theories of proper names. My view of these cases is that while they do not provide counterexamples to cluster theories, they can be used to provide evidence against single-description theories. In this paper I shall defend both of the claims involved in my view. Download Export citation Bookmark 8 citations
Proper names and the necessity of identity statements.Michael Wreen - 1998 - Synthese 114 (2):319-335.details An identity statement flanked on both sides with proper names is necessarily true, Saul Kripke thinks, if it's true at all. Thus, contrary to the received view – or at least what was, prior to Kripke, the received view – a statement like(A) Hesperus is Phosphorus. Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Kripke, cartesian intuitions, and materialism.George Sher - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):227-38.details In his influential “Naming and Necessity,” Saul Kripke has deployed a new sort of analytical apparatus in support of the classical Cartesian argument that minds and bodies must be distinct because they can be imagined separately. In the initial section of this paper, I shall first paraphrase Kripke's version of that argument, and then suggest a way in which even one who accepts all of its philosophical presuppositions may avoid its conclusion. In the second section, I shall defend this suggestion (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations

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