Quisiéramos vivir “bajo el sol de Dios” (Ecl. 8, 15), pero nos descubrimos bajo el sol de Satanás. Nadie más que Bernanos lo ha visto, y también lo ha sabido, pues la literatura alcanza lo que ni la filosofía ni la teología logran expresar, especialmente en lo que respecta al tormento del mal. Oculto bajo la figura del “maquignon picard”, y por tanto de un hombre ordinario, el diablo no se deja ver; prefiere disfrazarse. No existe el mal de un (...) lado y el bien del otro en Bernanos, sino más bien “el mal bajo la figura del bien”. Tal es su suprema astucia, y también su modo más seguro de desenmascararnos. Confundiendo las fronteras, haciéndose pasar por nadie siendo alguien, prefiriendo el “Frío” del hielo al calor de las llamas, y yaciendo con el abad Donissan para quitarle su aliento, Satanás nos acecha siempre, menos para mostrarse que para atraparnos. Una “lectura filosófica” de estas páginas fulgurantes de Sous le soleil de Satan (encuentro del abad Donissan con el maquignon picard) elevará a Bernanos al rango de los más grandes pensadores católicos. Nadie lo había dudado. Pero leerlo y releerlo permite confirmarlo.. (shrink)

Are digital subjects in virtual reality morally equivalent to human subjects? We divide this problem into two questions bearing, respectively, on cognitive and emotional equivalence. Typically, cognitive equivalence does not hold due to the lack of substantialist indistinguishability, but emotional equivalence applies: digital subjects endowed with face or language elicit emotional responses on a par with real-world pleasure, desire, horror, or fear. This is sufficient for projecting moral traits on avatars in the metaverse or on dialog systems based on large (...) language models. Our main case study is a chatbot trained on the chat history between a Canadian man and his deceased fiancée. To demonstrate emotional equivalence and the mechanism of moral transfer, we compare digital devices with the functioning of oracles in a story by Plutarch and in a narrative that draws on the book of Genesis. Finally, we note that, along with the projections of ethical issues, humans also tend to bring real-world solutions of moral conundrums into extended reality. We argue that the lack of cognitive equivalence makes such projections problematic as they lead to overpolicing and a sanitized metaverse. (shrink)

RESUMEN Trabajos recientes han propuesto un tratamiento de la fundación “a la imagen de la causalidad”. Hay importantes analogías entre la fundación y la causalidad: ambas parecen ser relaciones de ‘construcción’, ambas parecen ser órdenes estrictos y ambas parecen ser representables por modelos de ecuaciones estructurales. Pero también parece que hay importantes diferencias, porque la causalidad es usualmente considerada como una relación externa, mientras que la fundación es interna; hay casos de causalidad probabilística, pero no hay nada como una fundación (...) probabilística; la fundación se considera una relación ‘bien fundada’, pero no la causalidad; la fundación implica superveniencia ontológica, pero no la causalidad. Se argumenta aquí que la mayoría de estas supuestas diferencias están motivadas por una concepción humeana de la causalidad en la que no hay conexiones necesarias entre causa y efecto. Una perspectiva no humeana de la causalidad, sin embargo, hace que la unificación de la fundación y la causalidad sea mucho más razonable que cualquier tratamiento separado. ABSTRACT Recent works have proposed a treatment of grounding “in the image of causation”. There are important analogies between grounding and causation: both seem to be ‘building’ relations, both seem to be strict orders, and both seem amenable to representation by models of structural equations. But it seems also that there are important differences, because causation is usually considered as an external relation, while grounding is internal; there are cases of probabilistic causation, but there is nothing like probabilistic grounding; grounding is taken to be a well-founded relation, but not causation; grounding entails ontological supervenience, but not causation. It is argued here that most of those supposed differences are motivated by a Humean conception of causation in which there are no necessary connections between cause and effect. A non-Humean view of causation, though, makes the unification of grounding and causation much more reasonable that any separate treatment. (shrink)

The Darwinian theory of evolution is itself evolving and this book presents the details of the core of modern Darwinism and its latest developmental directions. The authors present current scientific work addressing theoretical problems and challenges in four sections, beginning with the concepts of evolution theory, its processes of variation, heredity, selection, adaptation and function, and its patterns of character, species, descent and life. The second part of this book scrutinizes Darwinism in the philosophy of science and its usefulness in (...) understanding ecosystems, whilst the third section deals with its application in disciplines beyond the biological sciences, including evolutionary psychology and evolutionary economics, Darwinian morality and phylolinguistics. The final section addresses anti-Darwinism, the creationist view and issues around teaching evolution in secondary schools. The reader learns how current experimental biology is opening important perspectives on the sources of variation, and thus of the very power of natural selection. This work examines numerous examples of the extension of the principle of natural selection and provides the opportunity to critically reflect on a rich theory, on the methodological rigour that presides in its extensions and exportations, and on the necessity to measure its advantages and also its limits. Scholars interested in modern Darwinism and scientific research, its concepts, research programs and controversies will find this book an excellent read, and those considering how Darwinism might evolve, how it can apply to the human sciences and other disciplines beyond its origins will find it particularly valuable. Originally produced in French (Les Mondes Darwiniens), the scope and usefulness of the book have led to the production of this English text, to reach a wider audience. This book is a milestone in the impressive penetration by Francophone scholars into the world of Darwinian science, its historiography and philosophy over the last two decades. Alex Rosenberg, R. Taylor Cole Professor of Philosophy, Duke University Until now this useful and comprehensive handbook has only been available to francophones. Thanks to this invaluable new translation, this collection of insightful and original essays can reach the global audience it deserves. Tim Lewens, University of Cambridge. (shrink)

The metaphor is used in the construction process of scientific knowledge. There are, however, metaphors that do not suit the objects they should represent, which thus impacts the accuracy of the knowledge which derives from these objects. It is the case of the machine metaphor, when resorted to in the study of living organisms. Canguilhem has tackled problems it created in twentieth-century life sciences head on. In his criticism, he links the analysis of Descartes’ work to his own philosophical thesis (...) on “biological normativity”. By doing so, he so sheds a light on the pitfalls, both historical and biological, over which the machine metaphor stumbles. He thereby orders sciences to periodically make sure of the relevance of their metaphors and explanatory models to their objects. (shrink)

Este artículo se propone describir el modo de aparecimiento del mundo sensible, entendiéndolo como el primer suelo sobre el cual la vida humana se instala efectivamente entre cosas concretas. Se intentará desvincular este nivel de presencia inmediata y cotidiana del mundo exterior del modo como tradicionalmente se le concibe, a saber, en el sentido de una manifestación “objetual”. En este contexto, se recurrirá a descripciones fenomenológicas de la percepción que tuvieron lugar principalmente en trabajos filosóficos y psicológicos de la primera (...) mitad del siglo XX, y que fueron influenciados por las reflexiones tempranas de Edmund Husserl. (shrink)

Although widely used across psychology, economics, and philosophy, the concept ofeffort is rarely ever defined. This article argues that the time is ripe to look for anexplicit general definition of effort, makes some proposals about how to arrive at thisdefinition, and suggests that a force-based approach is the most promising. Section 1presents an interdisciplinary overview of some chief research axes on effort, and arguesthat few, if any, general definitions have been proposed so far. Section 2 argues thatsuch a definition is (...) now needed and proposes a basic methodology to arrive at it, whosefirst step is to make explicit the various tacit assumptions about effort made acrosssciences and ordinary thinking. Section 3 unearths 4 different conceptions of effortfrom research on effort so far:primitive-feelings accounts,comparator-based accounts,resource-based accountsandforce-based accounts. It is then argued that the first 2kinds of accounts, although interesting in their own right, are not strictly speaking abouteffort. Section 4 considers the 2 most promising general approaches to efforts: re-source-based and force-based accounts. It argues that these accounts are not only compatible but actually extensionally equivalent. This notwithstanding, it explains why force-based accounts should be regarded as more fundamental than resource-basedaccounts -/- . (shrink)

According to Gurwitsch, the body is at least at the margin of consciousness. If all components of the field of consciousness were experienced as equally salient, we would indeed not be able to think and behave appropriately. Though the body may become the focus of our conscious field when we are introspectively aware of it, it remains most of the time only at the background of consciousness. However, we may wonder if bodily states do really need to be conscious, even (...) at the margin, or cannot be simply non-conscious. Action control requires permanent proprioceptive and visual feedback about the state and the position of our body parts. Experimental data show that action monitoring operates at a nonconscious level and we may similarly suggest that we have a continuous unconscious access to bodily information. In this chapter, I thus intend to describe the various levels of body representations with the help of Gurwitsch's distinction. I will investigate the properties and the function of each of these levels. (shrink)

Dugundji proved in 1940 that most parts of standard modal systems cannot be characterized by a single finite deterministic matrix. In the eighties, Ivlev proposed a semantics of four-valued non-deterministic matrices, in order to characterize a hierarchy of weak modal logics without the necessitation rule. In a previous paper, we extended some systems of Ivlev’s hierarchy, also proposing weaker six-valued systems in which the axiom was replaced by the deontic axiom. In this paper, we propose even weaker systems, by eliminating (...) both axioms, which are characterized by eight-valued non-deterministic matrices. In addition, we prove completeness for those new systems. It is natural to ask if a characterization by finite ordinary logical matrices would be possible for all those Ivlev-like systems. We will show that finite deterministic matrices do not characterize any of them. (shrink)

The Middle Included is a systematic exploration of the meanings of logos throughout Aristotle’s work. It claims that the basic meaning is “gathering,” a relation that holds its terms together without isolating them or collapsing one to the other. This meaning also applies to logos in the sense of human language. Aristotle describes how some animals are capable of understanding non-firsthand experience without being able to relay it, while others relay it without understanding. Aygün argues that what distinguishes human language, (...) for Aristotle, is its ability to both understand and relay firsthand and non-firsthand experiences. This ability is key to understanding the human condition: science, history, news media, propaganda, gossip, utopian fiction, and sophistry, as well as philosophy. Ömer Aygün finds Aristotle’s name for this peculiar but crucial human ability of “gathering” both experiences is logos, and this leads to a claim about the specificity of human rationality and language. (shrink)

O conhecimento científico tem ficado a meio caminho entre a episteme - ou a veram &certam scientiam postulada por Descartes - e a doxa. Entre os cientistas é cada vez maior oreconhecimento de que mesmo que a verdade tenha sido alcançada não se tem como saberenquanto a pesquisa prosseguir. Na aparência, a filosofia é em alguns autores e em determinadosmomentos de sua história explicativamente mais pretensiosa que em outros. A tese que defendemosé a de que, no fundo, a hybris explicativa (...) é o traço distintivo dos Grandes Sistemas Filosóficos. Aconsciência metacientífica da falibilidade não tem contribuído para diminuir a arrogânciaexplicativa da maioria das filosofias. E se a soberba intelectual tem sido maior no tratamento dasquestões que fomentam disputationes seculares é porque é difícil, ou quiçá impossível, se chegar a umamodalidade de conhecimento sobre os Lebensproblemen. Para piorar, no panoramafilosófico contemporâneo a busca do conhecimento provado tem sido substituída com freqüênciapela arrogância do retorismo, isto é, pelo discurso vazio que tenta se fazer passar por boa filosofia. (shrink)

O artigo procura avaliar a consolidação e os desdobramentos da função heurística e simbólica ocupada pelo Ungeheuer [o monstro ou o monstruoso] na filosofia kantiana, tendo em vista a emergência do horizonte da racionalidade moderna. Uma reconfiguração dessas imagens do Monstro e da Monstruosidade parece ter lugar no momento mesmo em que a filosofia moderna procurou pensar sua identidade e seus limites. O pensamento de Kant, que ocupa - de fato ou de direito - um lugar central nessa ruptura, apresentaria (...) de modo exemplar, embora não evidente, o percurso dessa transformação. This work intends to evaluate the origins and developments of the symbolic and heuristic function at stake in the term Ungeheuer [the monster or the monstrous] within Kant's philosophy, regarding the rising horizon of modern rationality. A reconfiguration of the Monster and Monstrous imagery seems to take place right at the moment when modern philosophy had to reflect upon its own identity and limits. Kant's thought, that occupies - de jure or de facto - a central place within this rupture could exemplarily, but not obviously, show the path of such transformation. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to address a specific issue underpinning Cartesian metaphysics since its first public appearance in the Discourse right up until the Meditations, but which definitely came to the surface in the Second and Fifth Replies. It involves the possibility that to be thinking and to be extended do not actually contrast as two entirely different properties; hence, these two essences cannot serve as the basis for a disjunctive, real distinction between two corresponding substances, the mind and (...) the body. I dub this problem the ‘thinking matter issue.’ I suggest that Descartes’s concerns about the ‘thinking matter issue’ characterizes and structures the entirety of Meditation Two and its connection with Meditation Six, especially in the attempt to covertly implement what I refer to as Descartes’s ‘prejudice strategy.’ The core of the ‘prejudice strategy’ lies in the idea that the ‘thinking matter issue’ is just a false problem, one raised by the inadequate notions of the mind and the body that we apply to this problem. In section 1, I set out the way in which the ‘thinking matter issue’ emerged in Descartes’s philosophy after the first exposition of his metaphysics in the Discourse. Section 2 deals with the new argumentative path Descartes draws for the Meditations and with the new role that he assigns to the inference about the mind’s non-physical nature after the cogito. In section 3, I contend that the ‘prejudice strategy’ structures Meditation Two and, partially, Six. Section 4 shows that Descartes himself reveals this in his Replies to the Second and the Fifth Set of Objections. In section 5, I delve into Descartes’s foundational theory of the ‘prejudice strategy,’ i.e. his theory of infancy as set out especially in the Replies to the Sixth Set of Objections. -/- . (shrink)

Este trabajo examina si la pregunta “¿puede pensar una máquina?” ha sido respondida de manera satisfactoria. La primera sección, justamente, examina el dictum cartesiano según el cual una máquina no puede pensar en principio. La segunda trata sobre una rebelión en contra de Descartes, encabezada por Babbage. A su vez, la tercera describe una segunda rebelión encabezada por Turing. En ambas se examina, primero el lenguaje mentalista/instrumentalista para describir a una máquina programada y segundo, el reemplazo de la pregunta por (...) el Juego de la Imitación. En la cuarta sección sostengo que la evidencia aportada por dicho juego nos devuelve a la pregunta, pese a Turing. Por último, la quinta sección versa sobre cómo la Habitación China de Searle, paradójicamente, apoya el dictum cartesiano, y lo hace porque tal experimento mental se basa en una capacidad mental falible: la introspección. Se concluye que la pregunta acerca de si puede pensar una máquina es derivada de otra pregunta filosófica compleja: la de la naturaleza de lo mental y el problema mente-cuerpo. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta certos aspectos da crítica à modernidade feita por Hannah Arendt. O percurso se baseia na exposição das princi-pais razões pelas quais a autora afirma que a característica fundamental da era moderna é a alienação do mundo. Esta alienação tem sua origem no descobrimento da América, na Reforma protestante e, sobretudo, no par formado pela invenção do telescópio e a filosofia de Descartes. De-pois de indicar os tipos de alienação do mundo correspondentes a cada um destes eventos, com (...) destaque para o papel da ciência neste proces-so, apresenta-se certos desdobramentos contemporâneos desta alienação que talvez permitam avançar a hipótese de que, de um ponto de vista arendtiano, a ideia de hipermodernidade é mais pertinente que a de pós-modernidade. (shrink)

In marked contrast to Husserlian “unities of sense” that structure consciousness around _egoic_ ideal-meaning intention, contemporary phenomenology orders sense according to an excess of givenness – a surfeit of presence – that surpasses this intentional relation. But Emmanuel Falque argues that there is a resistance that _precedes_ the phenomenological order of givenness and sense. Before the saturated phenomena (Marion), the _pathos_ of the flesh (Henry), and the irruption of the Other (Levinas), there is a resistance of presence that is not (...) _sensu stricto_ given at all. Falque turns to the early writings of Emmanuel Levinas on trauma and insomnia and the hum and buzz of the _il y a_ (the “there is …”) that precedes the order of givenness and sense, including the Levinasian Other, in order to make sense of this _a priori_ resistance. There is a presence of the body, experienced in some sense via trauma, insomnia, and Falque’s own notion of the “spread body” that is not given yet constitutes an integral part of embodied experience. The way Falque engages with these bodily experiences reformulates the phenomenological limit, not in terms of excess and givenness, but in terms of resistance and the “extra-phenomenon.” Phenomenological engagement with resistance thus becomes a wager on meaning and sense, the outcome of which cannot be known in advance, that is, cannot be always and already ordered to phenomenological givenness. (shrink)

In this article I examine the role of anxiety in our motivation to reassess our epistemic states, by taking as a starting point a proposal put forward by Levy, according to which anxiety is responsible for the ruminations and worries about threatening possibilities that we sometimes get caught up into in our everyday life. Levy’s claim is that these irrational persistent thoughts about possible states of affairs are best explained by anxiety, rather than by beliefs, degrees of belief, or other (...) mental states. I will take Levy’s article as a starting point into my study of the role of anxiety in our inclinations to question the epistemic quality of our cognitive states. While I believe that Levy is right in directing our attention to the role of anxiety in these cases, his claim calls for further explanation into the nature of anxiety, and into the mechanisms through which anxiety generates these doubts. Although the relation between anxiety and doubt has already been highlighted, there has been little effort to elaborate on the mechanisms through which an affective state like anxiety generates a motivation to reassess our beliefs. This paper is an attempt at providing such an elaboration. Clarifying the role of anxiety in these phenomena will lead me to revise a common assumption about the interactions between anxiety and higher-level cognitive processes, such as the ones involved in representing hypothetical threatening scenarios through mental imagery. (shrink)

This article traces commonalities between the practices of visual animation and modern law through a political and jurisprudential reading of the animated film Ratatouille. It contends that Ratatouille’s treatment of the ontological and anthropological problem of the human soul not only addresses the philosophical complexities inherent to animation, but also the ideological and material conditions that currently govern the practice of égaliberté in contemporary liberal democracies.

El presente artículo reconstruye la lectura fenomenológica del autor contemporáneo francés Jean-Luc Marion de las Confesiones de San Agustín, en su libro Au lieu de soi. Marion se presenta como un filósofo que busca llevar la filosofía más allá de la ontología, en particular a través de una fenomenología de la donación. La donación se caracteriza por una triple desaparición: la del donatario, la del donador, y finalmente lo dado. El uso de la metáfora del espacio muestra la apariencia de (...) dos espacios vacíos, relacionado por un movimiento múltiple. El artículo concluye con algunoscuestionamientos acerca de la desaparición del yo y de Dios en la lectura de las Confesiones. (shrink)

Ways of prediction, ways of rhetoric? Let me begin by placing side-by-side two statements that, at face value, have nothing in common. The first comes from a report by a world leader in forecasting, Stratfor: Forecasting world events is a difficult task that takes guts and discipline. Though you can find endless scenarios and speculation almost anywhere, Stratfor gives you forecasts. These are a few of the unlikely predictions we made long before the headlines caught up: 1995—Disparity between net creditor (...) and debtor states in Europe will make it difficult to sustain a unified currency. 2005—The center of gravity will shift from al Qaeda's core group to regional spinoffs and grassroots jihadists. 2008—NATO will... (shrink)

The mimetic theory forged by René Girard is completely closed by its own violence. Given that human violence was contained for centuries, by the victimary mechanism, its deconstruction by the Cross has unleashed a complete and total violence, leading us to the possibility of a real Apocalypse. We show here that this closure is based on a metaphysical view of desire, guiding us from the objet to the being of the model. Since Girard is always confined into metaphysics by his (...) constant use of the paradigm of the image, the presence and, consequently, the idol, we demonstrate that there is still a way out of violence, the same way that is today the way out of metaphysics. With Jean-Luc Marion and his phenomenology of givenness, we oppose the paradigm of the icon to the one of the idol, and therefore the model of the sign to the one of the image. We demonstrate then that global mimetic violence can be stopped if we no longer desire objects and start desiring saturated phenomena, which implies a complete shift in the way we think and receive phenomena. (shrink)

We know of rhetorical questions. But what is a rhetorical response? In the philosophical tradition one example of response stands out: René Descartes's Responses to Objections leveled at his Metaphysical Meditations. In an open invitation he had requested objections, using a rhetorical formula that was central to the post-Humanist Republic of Letters: entering into a correspondence with peers, across borders, and above the narrow confines of academia stuck in the practice of disputation inherited from Medieval Scholasticism. As he put it (...) in a letter to Father Mersenne, he asked for objections "so that what readers may find difficult be elucidated by my responses" (Lettre à Mersenne of January 21, 1641, in Descartes... (shrink)

El objetivo de este trabajo es brindar una interpretación del argumento kantiano de la “Refutación del idealismo” presente en la segunda edición de la Crítica de la razón pura. Por un lado, sostenemos que el argumento toma como punto de partida una premisa mínima que es compartida con el idealista cartesiano. Sin embargo, en el desarrollo de la argumentación, Kant apela a premisas que no son necesariamente aceptadas por el idealista cartesiano. Por otro lado, afirmamos que el argumento únicamente logra (...) demostrar que la experiencia interna supone la existencia de algo permanente en general, pero es insuficiente para determinar si en un caso determinado nos hallamos ante algo realmente existente en el espacio o meramente imaginario. Concluimos que el argumento sólo cumple su función antiescéptica si es considerado como una pieza perteneciente al cuerpo sistemático del criticismo kantiano. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the analysis of understanding of calling in the works of Skovoroda and its significance for the world-views and life choices of contemporary people. The current crisis phenomena are explicated in the light of the points of Skovoroda’s philosophy on the disparity between material and spiritual dimensions of human existence, irrelevance of work, devaluation of self-knowledge, individualism, and consumerism. The result is spiritual slavery and inability of people to respond to the challenges of contemporaneity. According to (...) Skovoroda’s principle of self-knowledge, a person has to hear the internal call of existential truth or “God’s Spirit” which motivates for work, public service, and moral improvement. The author explicates 3 semantic levels in Skovoroda’s philosophy of calling: individual, social, and spiritual. By Skovoroda, calling appears as a natural desire to act in a certain sphere, but its end is in the Kingdom of God. The author presents the results of the research of the experience of calling of contemporary Ukrainians and explicates the typology of that experience. The article states that the revealed structure of calling “desire-abilities-realization-good” corresponds in general with the understanding of calling by Skovoroda. Therefore, this structure is constant over time. Nevertheless and contrary to the ethics of Skovoroda, nowadays, the motivation of self-development prevails over the value of care for common good and spiritual goals in understanding of calling. The comparison of the experience of calling in the minds of student youth in Ukraine and in the USA confirms its identity on the basis of common Judaic-Christian tradition. The differences in the contemporary understanding of calling are determined along the lines of religiosity versus secularity, and Protestantism versus Eastern Christianity. In particular, noted moral rigorism of the protestant understanding of calling as an obligation, whereas Jews and the other Christians conceive calling in the forms of light, easiness, and happiness. The author reasoned the significant motivating and pedagogical capability of the idea of calling in the contemporary world. The article emphasizes the importance of Skovoroda’s critical philosophic attitude towards individualism and consumerism in the direction of overcoming problems of environment, particularly of climate change induced by unstoppable growth of energy consumption, and of anthropological crisis. (shrink)

La« théorie cellulaire», élaborée au XIXe siècle sous l'impulsion, entre autres chercheurs, de Lorenz Oken, Matthias Schleiden, Theodor Schwann et Rudolf Virchow, a profondément modifié la vision que l'Homme se faisait jusque-là de la vie, puisqu'elle affirmait que la cellule est l'unité organique constitutive de tous les êtres vivants et que tout être vivant est issu d'une cellule. L'observation d'un unicellulaire comme la paramécie montre, en effet, qu'une cellule doit être considérée comme une forme vivante intégrale puisqu'en se nourrissant, en (...) se développant, en se défendant et en se reproduisant elle manifeste le destin commun à tous les êtres vivants. Son espace vital, engendré par ses déplacements, est coextensif à ses besoins et donc à ses comportements. (shrink)

Dans une large mesure, du XVIIe au XVIIIe siècle, on assiste à une métamorphose théorique des rapports entre plaisir, solitude et sociabilité. Tandis qu’au XVIIe siècle, le plaisir est décrit comme une expérience dont le lieu principal est la sociabilité, à l’inverse de la méditation sise de préférence dans la solitude, le XVIIIe siècle réinscrit le plaisir dans l’intimité solitaire du moi et majore l’idée d’une nécessaire communauté des sujets connaissant. La caractérisation kantienne de l’expérience esthétique, comme expérience d’un plaisir (...) qui enveloppe immédiatement une prétention à l’universalité et à la communication, apparaît dès lors comme une façon de rompre la logique de ce chiasme. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

It is argued here that it is part of our concept of a ‘person’ that persons should be, by its nature, able to endure in time. In no conception of persons as ‘perduring’ entities with different temporal parts for different times, or as sequences of stages in the relation of ‘being a survival of ’ between them, it is possible to make sense of some of our normative intuitions about persons. It is argued also that the traditional psychological theory of (...) personal identity is untenable. Psychological continuity appears to be neither sufficient nor necessary for personal identity. A reasonable conception of persons seems to be either a form of ‘animalism’ where persons are biological organisms, or a theory in which persons are primitive substances, with primitive conditions of identity. (shrink)