The classification-cum-explanation Kripke assigns to rigidity requires the notion to apply to singular and general terms alike. But Kripke's own notion of rigidity is tailor-made for singular terms, and an extensive debate has not secured a general notion of rigidity apt to provide the classification-cum-explanation Kripke aims for. I propose that we look for a Kripkean alternative to generalized rigidity. I argue that on Kripkean premises, natural kind terms and proper names belong to the meta-semantic category of paradigm terms. I (...) also argue that the property of being a paradigm term effects precisely the classification-cum-explanation Kripke attributes to rigidity. I conclude that Kripkeans should acknowledge that being a paradigm term, rather than designating rigidly, plays the role Kripke delineates, and that we can stop worrying about generalizing rigidity. Kripke's notion works fine for singular terms. And there is no need for rigidity to apply beyond these. (shrink)