The independence problems for functionalism stem from the worry that if functional properties are defined in terms of their causes and effects then such functional properties seem to be too intimately connected to these purported causes and effects. I distinguish three different ways the independence problems can be filled out – in terms of necessary connections, analytic connections and vacuous explanations. I argue that none of these present serious problems. Instead, they bring out some important and over-looked features of functionalism.

This paper explores a distinction between two types of response- dependence (RD) account (shallow vs. deep). This distinction is inherent in much of the existing literature, however it is neither widely nor well understood, and has never been drawn explicitly. The distinction is often taken to be a metaphysical, or ‘realism-relevant’ one—i.e. deep RD accounts entail qualified realism (or perhaps anti-realism), while shallow RD accounts are metaphysically neutral. I argue that the distinction is not reliably realism-relevant. I formulate a weaker (...) version of the distinction that may help prevent some common and understandable confusion about RD biconditionals and their relationship to realism. The weaker distinction rests on the different roles assigned to RD biconditionals by the two types of account. (shrink)

In der Einführung präsentiert der Artikel, basierend auf dem Werk von Michael Devitt, die widerstreitenden ontologischen Positionen des Realismus und Konstruktivismus. Ersterer besteht auf der Unabhängigkeit der Beschaffenheit der Welt von unserem begrifflichen Apparat, der Sprache oder wissenschaftlichen Theorien, während der andere eine solche Abhängigkeit affirmiert. Der Hauptteil des Artikels versucht darauf hinzuweisen, dass der Realismus-/Konstruktivismusstreit unlösbar ist, und zwar wird das durch ein Gedankenexperiment gemacht, dem die Widerlegung von Argumenten der Hauptkonstruktivisten und Hauptrealisten folgt. Die Ansichten von Hilary Putnam (...) werden auch kurz berücksichtigt und zurückgewiesen. Im Schlussteil wird, teilweise unter Rückgriff auf die Argumente Carnaps, behauptet, dass der Streit nicht aufgelöst werden kann, dass er eine Art kantischer Antinomie ist und dass es deswegen eine Entscheidungssache ist, ob man ein Realist oder ein Konstruktivist ist. Im Laufe des Artikels wird auch eine Ansicht zum Wesen der Philosophie dargelegt. (shrink)

Descartes’ derivation of the primary qualities of matter and their role in explaining observed physical phenomena are briefly reviewed. The lesson drawn from Descartes’ methodology of explanation is that we ought to aim to reduce complex phenomena to simple unifying principles and conceptual primitives. Three proposed solutions to the apparent paradoxes in contemporary quantum physics (primarily associated with the notion of entanglement) are briefly compared with lessons taken from Descartes. It is argued that further research in this field should provide (...) criteria for selecting modifications to the standard (largely Cartesian) conceptual scheme, along the lines of either visualisable causality or the physical spatial separability of all material objects. (shrink)

Pettit presents a selection of essays touching upon metaphysics, philosophical psychology, and the theory of rational regulation. The first part of the book discusses the rule-following character of thought. The second considers how choice can be responsive to different sorts of factors, while still being under the control of thought. The third examines the implications of this view of choice and rationality for the normative regulation of social behavior.

U uvodu članak predstavlja, na temelju djela Michaela Devitta, sukobljene ontološke pozicije, realizam i konstruktivizam. Prvi insistira na nezavisnosti prirode svijeta od našeg pojmovnog aparata, jezika ili znanstvenih teorija, dok drugi tvrdi da takva zavisnost postoji. Središnji dio članka teži pokazati kako je spor između realizma i konstruktivizma nerješiv, i to pomoću misaonog eksperimenta na koji se nadostavlja pobijanje argumenata središnjih konstruktivista i realista . Također se ukratko razmatraju, te odbacuju, gledišta Hilaryja Putnama. U zaključku se tvrdi, pozivajući se djelomice (...) na Carnapova shvaćanja, da se spor ne može razriješiti, da se radi o svojevrsnoj kantovskoj antinomiji, te da je biti realistom ili konstruktivistom stoga stvar izbora. U okviru članka iznosi se također i gledište o prirodi filozofije. (shrink)