Pádraig Hogan; What Makes Practice Educational?, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 24, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 15–26, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.146.

This paper provides an analysis of the ideas of John Dewey and George Herbert Mead with regards the relationship between experience, meaning, language and thinking. It discusses how experience, meaning, language and thinking are based on the creative and constructive actions of individuals. Unlike what is the case in so-called radical constructivism, it is argued that the actions of the individual should be understood in a transactional way. The paper shows the implication of a transactional constructivism for education, arguing that (...) education is the medium in which the creative and constructive actions of individuals come together in a social environment. (shrink)

Like many others, I have resisted the idea that education, in general, is a form of training. We always talk about training for something, while an educated person is not educated for any one thing. But for this very reason, I do not wish to abandon the term ‘teacher training’ in favor of ‘teacher education’, although ideally I would prefer to speak of ‘teacher preparation’ because the term ‘training’ always reminds me of monkeys. I shall use the terms ‘training’ and (...) ‘preparation’ interchangeably, with both standing in contrast to ‘education’. All persons deserve to be educated; there is nothing specific to teachers here. Teacher training, whether general or specific to a subject or discipline, remains a contentious business. Some regard Pedagogy as a legitimate subject area and structure training around it; others prefer to see teacher training firmly in the context of the various disciplines that teachers will, in turn, be teaching: mathematics, literature, history and, in this case, philosophy. Indeed, when it comes to training teachers to teach philosophy, the problem is exacerbated by the plain fact that most teachers have no formal background in philosophy. So we are faced with the rather daunting prospect of providing such a background as well as providing whatever is needed in order to teach philosophy to others. Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp were well aware of this challenge when they set up the first training programs in Philosophy for Children at Montclair State College in the early 1970s; hence the requirement that if classroom teachers were not actually qualified in philosophy, at least those who trained them to do philosophy with children should be. However, this idealistic model was always going to be difficult to apply. The problem, as it developed in countries around the world, was two-fold: teachers with little or no philosophical background were, increasingly, being trained by other educators who were in the same boat ; and conversely, when professional philosophers did become involved in teacher training, it quickly became apparent that they lacked any real training in pedagogy, and so were inadequate to the task of modeling the role of the teacher in the classroom. To look on the bright side, some constructive attempts have been made to resolve these shortcomings. The one with which I am most familiar is the Australian model for what is termed ‘Level Two training’, that is, training those who will, in turn, train and work with classroom teachers. This model recognizes the complementary requirements of philosophical and pedagogic expertise, respectively, by awarding certificates of achievement based on whether those trained have come from the discipline of philosophy, the practice of teaching, or both. Ideally, then, training workshops for teachers would be directed by at least one person in the former category, and at least one in the latter. (shrink)

The human adventure in education is one of imperfect expression, punctuated by moments of insight. Education cultivates these epiphanies and nurtures their possible continuation. But even without major or minor insights, education cultivates the appreciation of the good, the beautiful, and the true. An experimentalist's sensibility lies amid the humanist's grasp of the myriad ways of trying to understand our existence. To bridge discourse is to appreciate the languages of other cultures, which reveal the nuances of life and experience.

In this article, I try to make sense conventional notions of ‘premodernism’, ‘modernism’ and ‘postmodernism’ as ways of relating to reality, and apply them to education. I argue for the additional notion of ‘neo-premodernism’ to make sense of recent attempts to engineer social reality. Each of these four approaches coexists and constitutes the four ages: the age of prayer, the age of reason, the age of social engineering and the age of responsibility. I try to trace these ages in modern (...) schooling and critically analyze their consequences and the power relations between teachers and students. (shrink)

This article explores the place of complexity science within education and educational research. The discussion begins with the suggestion that educational research has a history of adopting interpretive frames from other domains with little adaptation. Complexity science is argued to compel a different sort of positioning, one that requires accommodation and participation rather than unproblematized assimilation and application. The argument is developed by considering the following simultaneities in education (and) research: knower and knowledge; transphenomenality; transdisciplinarity; interdiscursivity; descriptive and pragmatic insights; (...) representation and presentation; affect and effect; and education and research. (shrink)

This dissertation explores the relationship between liberal/secular and religious educations. I begin by tracing what I believe to be the source of tension between liberal/secular and religious educations to two highly influential liberal theories that have affected civic education in particular. I begin with an analysis of John Dewey's naturalistic approach to metaphysics and religion, arguing that Dewey's attitude to religious traditions, when used as a basis for civic education, is insufficient. Specifically, I argue that in Dewey's conception, religious doctrines, (...) principles, ideals, beliefs, and ultimately religious traditions as a whole, are important only instrumentally. Furthermore, I conclude that the only possible outcome once one accepts a prior commitment to Dewey's metaphysics is that reflection and deliberation on the 'religious' will denude it of its distinctively religious character. My major conclusion is that such a view of religion and the religious is egregiously deficient when evaluated in light of the liberal principle of respect for religion and religious diversity. I then move to a critical examination of the second highly influential liberal theory, political liberalism. The conclusion that I highlight in my critique of Rawlsian political liberalism is that a civic education based on the political ideals of political liberalism can pretty much ignore religious conceptions without detriment to the development of young citizens' deliberative capacities. I strongly challenge this conclusion, because I see engagement with religious conceptions as valuable – even necessary – for good citizenship, and for enabling citizens of diverse societies to do justice to/for each other. In the second half of the dissertation, I propose a theoretical framework for this supplemental dimension which is based on virtue epistemology. I focus specifically on the recent work of James Montmarquet, particularly his notion of subjective justification, which I incorporate as an ideal basis for engagement which focuses on reason-giving and validates the role that religious traditions can play in moral and civic deliberation. (shrink)

The enthusiasm for a positivistic approach to sexuality education has begun to subside. Recognizing that sexuality is more than a biological phenomenon, and that education is more than just information, sexuality educators throughout North America are now acknowledging the importance of values. There are two problems, however, with the philosophical orientation on values within the literature. The first problem is the pervasive view that teachers should remain neutral to facilitate value clarification. The commitment to neutrality is often based on an (...) appreciation and respect for pluralism, on the subjective nature of values, and on the integrity of persons. The commitment to neutrality, however, confuses pluralism with relativism, subjectivity with subjectivism, and integrity with validity. (shrink)

This paper explores how an ideal relational ethic based on Zygmunt Bauman’s (1995) notion of forms of togetherness is needed to underpin university-community engagement processes and practices. We focus on the notion of being-for, and suggest that it can be used as an ‘engagement bridge’ between higher education institutions, the creation of human capital and communities, and can be a means to achieve ethical outcomes to local concerns. Much of Bauman’s (1995; 2001; 2007) theoretical development has focussed on the liquidity (...) of modernity, to give the impression that community - in the spatially, physically located and fixed sense of the term - no longer exists. This paper proposes that spatial dimensions, particularly in the context of developing relational ethics, are important. This is particularly so for paying adequate attention to context-specific values, principles and issues in communities, for developing enterprising human capital via engagement, and for addressing matters of socio-political importance such as the environment. Contemporary neo-liberal times require ethical and moral leadership from universities. This paper suggests that such leadership can be developed from focussing attention on the forms of togetherness fostered by university-community engagement. (shrink)