In book VI of his Parmenides commentary, Proclus surveys the previous Neoplatonic interpretations of the “hypotheses” of Plato’s Parmenides, starting with Amelius, a disciple of Plotinus. This paper analyses Amelius’ exegesis of the hypotheses. After presenting the extant evidence about his Parmenides commentary, I explore three puzzling aspects of his interpretation: 1) unlike most Neoplatonists, Amelius distinguished eight hypotheses instead of nine. I argue that he considered the last section (Prm. 165e2-166c2) to be devoid of any positive content and merged (...) it with the previous one – contrary to the modern advocates of an eight-fold divisio textus. 2) Amelius assumed that each hypothesis deals with one layer of reality, but the precise meaning of some identifications is elusive: what are the three kinds of matter matched to hypotheses 5-7? I show that these three material layers probably correspond to three entities whose existence is posited on the basis of the Timaeus: the chōra/prime matter, the level of the element-traces, and the ordered universe. 3) In at least one point, Amelius’ exegesis disrupts the descending hierarchical ordering of the subject-matters of the hypotheses (i.e. from the highest to the lowest-ranked entity), which was an undisputed governing principle of the Neoplatonic interpretations. This irregularity depends, as I argue, on a further interpretative rule: the negative quality of a hypothesis (except for the first one) is taken to indicate some sort of debasement of the corresponding entity. Since, in the second part of the Parmenides, the negative hypotheses alternate with the positive ones, this further principle clashed with the linear downward arrangement implied by the hierarchical principle. In the conclusion of the paper, I sketch how the insights gained by this analysis can shed some light on the subsequent development of the ancient Parmenides exegesis. (shrink)

In his commentary on Physics I 9, Simplicius claims that individual forms individuate matter. Given that in the same text he calls the immanent form ‘universal,’ it seems reasonable to conclude that the individual forms are individual instances of one universal species–form. However, Simplicius also mentions accidental properties that are peculiar to form rather than to matter. On the basis of Simplicius’ commentaries on the Categories and on the Physics, I argue that the individuating accidents are not part of the (...) individual forms, but that each individual’s form coordinates the individual’s accidental features. By belonging to a certain species, the individual form sets limits as to which accidents a matter–form compound can assume. This approach enables Simplicius to combine hylomorphism with a theory of individuation through properties. Furthermore, in his commentary on De Caelo I 9 Simplicius explains the uniqueness of each individual’s conglomeration of properties in light of his Neoplatonic cosmology: each individual corresponds to an individual cosmic disposition that determines its characteristic features. (shrink)

Les platoniciens se sont beaucoup souciés de définir de quoi il y a des formes. À l’époque de Syrianus et Proclus, une réponse s’est imposée : des substances naturelles et universelles, ainsi que de leurs perfections et propriétés constitutives. Si Simplicius suit cette ligne directrice, le contexte de ses commentaires le conduit à clarifier certains points aveugles. Cet article examine en quoi le monde et quelques formes connexes lui offrent l’occasion d’interroger le critère de l’universalité. Il montre que ses modifications (...) résultent d’une différence de contexte exégétique mais sans s’y limiter. Résoudre la difficulté posée par Aristote l’amène à développer une théorie qui, contrairement à ses prédécesseurs, évite de postuler une hiérarchie des formes ou une forme pour certains individus. (shrink)