We present a pragmatic analysis of the different meanings assigned to the term “local realism” in the context of the empirical violations of Bell-type inequalities since its inception in the late 1970s. We point out that most of them are inappropriate and arise from a deeply ingrained prejudice that originated in the celebrated 1935 paper by Einstein-Podolski-Rosen. We highlight the correct connotation that arises once we discard unnecessary metaphysics.

Counterfactual definiteness is supposed to underlie the Bell theorem. An old controversy exists among those who reject the theorem implications by rejecting counterfactual definiteness and those who claim that, since it is a direct consequence of locality, it cannot be independently rejected. We propose a different approach for solving this contentious issue by realizing that counterfactual definiteness is an unnecessary and inconsistent assumption. Counterfactual definiteness is not equivalent to realism or determinism neither it follows from locality. It merely reduces to (...) an incongruent application of counterfactual reasoning. Being incompatible with falsifiability, it constitutes an unjustified assumption that goes against the scientific method rigor. Correct formulations of the Bell theorem’s bases show it is absent either as a fundamental hypothesis or as a consequence of something else. Most importantly, we present a coherent Bell inequality derivation carefully devised to show explicitly and convincingly the absence of incompatible experiments or counterfactual reasoning. Thus, even admitting that counterfactual definiteness could be a consistent assumption, the necessary conclusion is that it is irrelevant for the inequality formulation and can be safely ignored when discussing Bell’s inequality philosophical and physical implications. (shrink)