Counterfactual definiteness is supposed to underlie the Bell theorem. An old controversy exists among those who reject the theorem implications by rejecting counterfactual definiteness and those who claim that, since it is a direct consequence of locality, it cannot be independently rejected. We propose a different approach for solving this contentious issue by realizing that counterfactual definiteness is an unnecessary and inconsistent assumption. Counterfactual definiteness is not equivalent to realism or determinism neither it follows from locality. It merely reduces to (...) an incongruent application of counterfactual reasoning. Being incompatible with falsifiability, it constitutes an unjustified assumption that goes against the scientific method rigor. Correct formulations of the Bell theorem’s bases show it is absent either as a fundamental hypothesis or as a consequence of something else. Most importantly, we present a coherent Bell inequality derivation carefully devised to show explicitly and convincingly the absence of incompatible experiments or counterfactual reasoning. Thus, even admitting that counterfactual definiteness could be a consistent assumption, the necessary conclusion is that it is irrelevant for the inequality formulation and can be safely ignored when discussing Bell’s inequality philosophical and physical implications. (shrink)

Bell’s theorem in its standard version demonstrates that the joint assumptions of the hidden-variable hypothesis and the principle of local causation lead to a conflict with quantum-mechanical predictions. In his latest counterfactual strengthening of Bell’s theorem, Stapp attempts to prove that the locality assumption itself contradicts the quantum-mechanical predictions in the Hardy case. His method relies on constructing a complex, non-truth functional formula which consists of statements about measurements and outcomes in some region R, and whose truth value depends on (...) the selection of a measurement setting in a space-like separated location L. Stapp argues that this fact shows that the information about the measurement selection made in L has to be present in R. I give detailed reasons why this conclusion can and should be resisted. Next I correct and formalize an informal argument by Shimony and Stein showing that the locality condition coupled with Einstein’s criterion of reality is inconsistent with quantum-mechanical predictions. I discuss the possibility of avoiding the inconsistency by rejecting Einstein’s criterion rather than the locality assumption. (shrink)