<P>While there are many books on the romantics, and many books on Heidegger, there has been no book exploring the connection between the two. Pol Vandevelde’s new study forges this important link. </P> <P>Vandevelde begins by analyzing two models that have addressed the interaction between literature and philosophy: early German romanticism (especially Schlegel and Novalis), and Heidegger’s work with poetry in the 1930s. Both models offer an alternative to the paradigm of mimesis, as exemplified by Aristotle’s and Plato’s discussion of (...) poetry, and both German romanticism and Heidegger owe a deep debt to Plato. The study goes on to defend the view that Heidegger was influenced by romanticism. The author’s project is thus both historical, showing the specificity of the romantic and Heideggerean works, and systematic, defending aspects of their alternative mode of thinking while also pointing to their weaknesses. </P>. (shrink)

La pregunta y el planteo por el Ser encuentran un relieve particular al interior del análisis heideggeriano de la obra de arte. Su análisis en términos de una contienda entre la “instalación” de un Mundo y la “elaboración” de la Tierra, fundado en un acontecer de la verdad en la obra como esencia del arte, resulta sustancial para interés que la estética y la filosofía del arte prestan a la caracterización de la naturaleza propia de lo artístico. A partir de (...) dicho tratamiento es posible pensar una modalidad del acontecer estético del arte que confronta y articula con toda una serie de teorizaciones de especial relevancia en el siglo XX para la filosofía ocupada del tema. El presente escrito busca indagar en la caracterización heideggeriana de la obra de arte la existencia de claves conceptuales que permitan el establecimiento de continuidades, tanto como la evaluación de la relevancia de su planteo para el tratamiento del problema de la definición del arte, objetivo perenne de la estética filosófica. Parte de la tarea supone, así, la recuperación de algunas de las mutaciones teórico-prácticas experimentadas por el arte en su instancia contemporánea como fundamento de dicha indagación. (shrink)

An object being non-art appears only trivially informative. Some non-art objects, however, could be saliently ‘almost’ art, and therefore objects for which being non-art is non-trivially informative. I call these kinds of non-art objects ‘failed-art’ objects—non-art objects aetiologically similar to art-objects, diverging only in virtue of some relevant failure. I take failed-art to be the right sort of thing, to result from the right sort of action, and to have the right sort of history required to be art, but to (...) be non-art by having failure where being art requires success. I assume that for something to be art that thing must be the product of intention-directed action. I then offer an account of attempts that captures the success conditions governing the relationship between intention-directed actions and their products. From this, I claim that to be failed-art is to be the product of a failed art-attempt, i.e., to be non-art as the result of the particular way in which that art-attempt failed. An art-attempt I take to be an attempt with success conditions, that, if satisfied, entail the satisfaction of the conditions for being art—whatever those may be. To be art, then, is to be the product of a successful art-attempt. As such, any art theory incompatible with my account of failed-art is an art theory for which the notions of success and failure do not matter, and therefore an art theory for which being art needn't be substantively intention-dependent. So, any theory of art unable to accommodate my account of failed-art is ipso facto false. (shrink)