Dignity is omnipresent in Western ethics, but it also provokes dissension and controversy. One of the most striking examples is the debate on medically assisted death, where dignity is invoked to support antagonistic positions. While some authors conclude that the concept is useless as an ethical reference, many others invite us to deepen our analysis from a multidimensional perspective, to enrich it and make it useful. This scoping study is intended to provide an overview of the different conceptions of dignity (...) used in the assisted dying debate, to better grasp the multiple facets of the concept. The Joanna Briggs Institute's JBI Manual for Evidence Synthesis guided the scoping review. Key words were based on the researchers' expertise and were used to identify relevant literature in French and English. Eleven databases covering the last six decades were consulted. Initially, 2,071 references were found in the databases. After excluding duplicates, screening titles, abstracts, and full texts, and after a specific literature search on the concept of relational dignity, 156 papers were found to match the identified inclusion criteria. The literature highlights the stark confrontation between two dominant conceptions of dignity: ontological and autonomist. However, a lesser-known conceptualization of dignity integrates these two perspectives, underlining the relational and social dimensions of dignity. As a result, dignity emerges as a dynamic, experiential, and dialogical concept, that modulates itself according to circumstances. This raises the possibility of breaking through the binary debate and questioning the current frameworks that define dignity. This multidimensional conceptualization of dignity could lead to a more complete and nuanced understanding of the concept, as well as open richer normative horizons regarding the issue of medically assisted death. (shrink)

Two sources of possible disagreement in bioethics may be associated with pessimism about what bioethics can achieve. First, pluralism implies that bioethics engages with interlocutors who hold divergent moral beliefs. Pessimists might believe that these disagreements significantly limit the extent to which bioethics can provide normatively robust guidance in relevant areas. Second, the interdisciplinary nature of bioethics suggests that interlocutors may hold divergent views on the nature of bioethics itself—particularly its practicality. Pessimists may suppose that interdisciplinary disagreements could frustrate the (...) goals of bioethics. In this article, I explore how wonder may alleviate the concerns of the first group of pessimists regarding problems associated with pluralism, provided that we are willing to accept some interdisciplinary frustrations. Then, I invite readers of this issue of The Journal of Medicine & Philosophy to test these intuitions by considering the role of wonder in these articles. (shrink)

Ethics exists among beings that can relate to one another and who can create change in one another. Although this may appear as a simple truism, the implications of relation and change in bioethics are manifold. For instance, one can relate not only to others, but also can enter into self-relation by relating to oneself. Self-relation problematizes autonomy insofar as one does not have immediate access to all of oneself and so therefore also does not immediately fully determine oneself in (...) the way that an uncomplicated understanding of autonomy might imply. This article proceeds as a preliminary exposition of the concepts of relation and change as they apply to bioethics, particularly as they inform autonomy, action theory, and the porous subject. (shrink)