Two sources of possible disagreement in bioethics may be associated with pessimism about what bioethics can achieve. First, pluralism implies that bioethics engages with interlocutors who hold divergent moral beliefs. Pessimists might believe that these disagreements significantly limit the extent to which bioethics can provide normatively robust guidance in relevant areas. Second, the interdisciplinary nature of bioethics suggests that interlocutors may hold divergent views on the nature of bioethics itself—particularly its practicality. Pessimists may suppose that interdisciplinary disagreements could frustrate the (...) goals of bioethics. In this article, I explore how wonder may alleviate the concerns of the first group of pessimists regarding problems associated with pluralism, provided that we are willing to accept some interdisciplinary frustrations. Then, I invite readers of this issue of The Journal of Medicine & Philosophy to test these intuitions by considering the role of wonder in these articles. (shrink)

Ethics exists among beings that can relate to one another and who can create change in one another. Although this may appear as a simple truism, the implications of relation and change in bioethics are manifold. For instance, one can relate not only to others, but also can enter into self-relation by relating to oneself. Self-relation problematizes autonomy insofar as one does not have immediate access to all of oneself and so therefore also does not immediately fully determine oneself in (...) the way that an uncomplicated understanding of autonomy might imply. This article proceeds as a preliminary exposition of the concepts of relation and change as they apply to bioethics, particularly as they inform autonomy, action theory, and the porous subject. (shrink)