Dans laScience de la logiqueet dans l’Encyclopédie des sciences philosophiques,Hegel reconstruit la philosophie critique de Kant en développant i) une logique transcendantale dans laScience de la logiqueet dans laPhilosophie de la nature; ii) une conception pragmatique de l’a priori; et iii) une caractéristique-clé de l’usage du verbe «réaliser» en relation avec les concepts et les principes. Chacun de ces trois éléments constitue un aspect central de la sémantique spécifiquement cognitive de Hegel, que celui-ci développe, en partant de la thèse kantienne (...) de la référence cognitive singulière, en un réalisme pragmatique systématique. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ : Afin de circonscrire lescepticisme qui lui paraît miner l'entreprise métaphysique des Lumières, il est apparu nécessaire au Kant de la période critique de répondre à trois formes de scepticisme : au scepticisme baylien, qui s'interroge sur la capacité de la raison à parvenir à définir une vérité en rapport avec les idées de cette même raison; au scepticisme humien, ce qui le conduit à distinguer la question soulevée par Hume de son scepticisme pour parvenir à dégager la possibilité (...) de jugements synthétiques a priori; et au scepticisme cartésien, qui met en jeu le lien entre concepts empiriques et choses du monde extérieur. L,'analyse du traitement qu'il en propose montre que le scepticisme joue un rôle fondamental au sein de l'entreprise critique si bien qu'il peut être considéré comme un allié possible afin de rabattre les prétentions du dogmatisme idéaliste.ABSTRACT: In his critical period, Kant thought that scepticism was a threat to the metaphysical enterprise of Enlightenment. He consequently tried to tackle three of its species: Baylean scepticism, which doubts that reason could establish any truth concerning its ideas; Humean scepticism, which must be distinguished from Hume's formulation of the problem if we want to show that synthetic a priori judgements are possible; and Cartesian scepticism, which puts in doubt the reference of empirical concepts to things in the external world. Kant's treatment reveals the fundamental role played by scepticism in his critical enterprise not only as a tripIe challenge to the critical project, but also as an ally against idealist dogmatism. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the relationship between naturalism and transcendental idealism in Fichte. I conclude that Fichte is a near-naturalist, akin to Baker, Lynne Rudder (2017). “Naturalism and the idea of nature,” Philosophy 92 (3): 333–349. A near-naturalist is one whose position looks akin to the naturalist in some ways but the near-naturalist can radically differ in metaphilosophical orientation and substantial commitment. This paper is composed of three sections. In the first, I outline briefly what I take transcendental idealism (...) to be, as well as some differences in types of naturalism, and how this maps on to Fichte. In the second, I give an exegesis of Fichte’s key arguments in the Later Jena period, which are important for the question of his relationship to naturalism. In the third, I continue the exegesis with a discussion of Fichte’s conception of God, and conclude that these arguments support a near-naturalist reading of Fichte. (shrink)

Aesthetics is the part of contemporary academic philosophy that is concerned with art, beauty, criticism, and taste. As such, it must address metaphysical issues, epistemic problems, and questions of value. This makes it difficult to present a coherent account of the subject matter of aesthetics. In this article, I argue that this difficulty is the result of ambiguities and contradictions that arose in disputes about the relationship between the science of aesthetics, the critique of taste, and the philosophy of art (...) in German philosophy during the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. By reconstructing the history of these debates, I hope to shed new light on the origins of aesthetics as a discipline and to explain why its subject matter and status within philosophy are still so difficult to define. (shrink)

This paper explores Beck’s theory of original representing in order to discuss both its historical and theoretical relevance and its implications concerning Kant’s views on the capacity to judge. My first concern will be to highlight the main points of Beck’s Kant interpretation and to show at which points he misunderstands Kant. My analysis also contains a positive aspect, for I adopt Beck’s claim that there is only one possible standpoint from which critical philosophy ought to be judged. Unlike Beck, (...) I shall argue that this standpoint is that of Judgment’s normativity. I will consider the normative structure of Judgment from three perspectives: the proto-synthetic import of sensibility; the normative character of the pure concepts of the understanding; the lawfulness of the principles of the understanding. My basic idea is that only a normative account of Judgment can prove how and why all experience depends on the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. On Kant’s account, the capacity to judge applies transcendental rules to establish the laws which make our experience and knowledge both possible and legitimate. Every single object is an object of experience only insofar as it conforms to the normative structure of Judgment. For Kant, to constitute an object means to apply the rules which make something possible as an object of experience and cognition. (shrink)