Richard Heersmink argues that self‐narratives are distributed across embodied organisms and their environment, given that their building blocks, autobiographical memories, are distributed. This argument faces two problems. First, it commits a fallacy of composition. Second, it relies on Marya Schechtman's narrative self‐constitution view, which is incompatible with the distributed cognition framework. To solve these problems, this article develops an alternative account of self‐narratives. On this account, we actively connect distributed autobiographical memories through distributed conversational and textual self‐narrative practices. This account (...) enhances our understanding of the memory–narrative nexus and has implications for philosophical conceptions of self. (shrink)

In this article, we show how the phenomenon of self-deception when adequately analyzed, can be incorporated into a predictive processing framework. We describe four strategies by which a subject may become self-deceived to account for typical cases of self-deception. We then argue that the four strategies can be modeled within this framework, under the assumption that a satisfying account of motivation is possible within predictive processing. Finally, we outline how we can ground this assumption by discussing how such a systematic (...) model of motivation may be developed using the distinction between a world-model and a self-model. (shrink)

Over the past decade, the notion of affective affordances has gained some prominence, particularly in the context of 4E approaches to affectivity. One example of affective affordances, mostly mentioned in passing in 4E approaches to affectivity, are atmospheres. Notoriously difficult to pin down in general, it has so far also remained unclear what distinguishes atmospheres from other affective affordances and whether they are a distinctive type of solicitations. Intuitively, the atmosphere of a situation implies an affect-regulatory profile different to what (...) and how single objects solicit. Notably, as affective frames of sociocultural delineated situations they are relevant for coordinating social interactions and modulate personal concerns pertaining to a given situation. In accordance with paradigm cases of experiencing atmospheres, I will claim that they make salient how one is affectively disposed toward situation-specific feeling norms. I will clarify this claim by drawing on the concepts of social and emotion scripts as they have been developed in cognitive psychology and psychology of emotions. Atmospheres will thus be understood as solicitations to change situational emotion scripts. In this way, they represent a distinct avenue for changing fields of affordances over time, based on personal concerns for social and cultural belonging. Conversely, this account sheds light on the affective underpinnings of the perception of social norms. (shrink)

Self-narration, many philosophers assume, makes important contributions to our mental lives. Two views on self-narration can be distinguished. On the internalistic view, self-narration unfolds in the secluded mind and does not require overt communication. On the situated view, self-narration often depends on the conversational interaction with an interlocutor. The situated view has many advantages over its internalistic rival, including theoretical consistency and empirical plausibility. Yet, research on situated conversational self-narration has been shaped by a harmony bias, which consists in the (...) tacit assumption that interlocutors contribute to self-narration in ways that are beneficial and supportive, rather than malicious and harmful. This paper seeks to mitigate the harmony bias by considering the phenomenon of gaslighting, which is characterized by an interlocutor’s erosion of someone’s sense of epistemic and moral competence. In cases of narrative gaslighting, this erosion proceeds by maliciously interfering with the self-narrator’s mnemonic, interpretational, and conceptual abilities. Bringing together research on situated self-narration and gaslighting for the first time, it will be argued that the emerging account of narrative gaslighting has important implications for both. (shrink)

The imagery we adopt when recalling the personal past may involve different perspectives. In many cases, we remember the past event from our original point of view. In some cases, however, we remember the past event from an external “observer” perspective and view ourselves in the remembered scene. Are such observer perspective images genuine memories? Are they accurate representations of the personal past? This chapter focuses on such observer perspectives in memory, and outlines and examines proposals about the nature of (...) such imagery. (shrink)