Under approval voting, each voter just distinguishes the candidates he approves of from those appearing as unacceptable. The preference approval voting is a hybrid version of the approval voting first introduced by Brams and Sanver The mathematics of preference, choice and order. Springer, Berlin, pp 215–237, 2009). Under PAV, each voter ranks all the candidates and then indicates the ones he approves. In this paper, we provide an analytical representation of the limiting probability that PAV elects the Condorcet winner when (...) she exists in three-candidate elections. We perform our analysis by assuming the assumption of the Extended Impartial Culture. The aim is to measure at which extend PAV performs better than AV both on the propensity of electing the Condorcet winner and on that of the non-election of the Condorcet loser. For this purpose, we also provide an analytical representation of the limiting probability that AV elects the Condorcet winner when she exists in three-candidate elections. Our representation of the limiting probability that AV elects the Condorcet winner is more general than that provided by Diss et al. Handbook on approval voting. Springer, Berlin, pp 255–283, 2010) and it leads to the same figures as the representation provided by Gehrlein and Lepelley. (shrink)