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Abortion and human nature

Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (6):422-426 (2008)

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The Counterfactual Argument Against Abortion.Ryan Kulesa - 2023 - Utilitas 35 (3):218-228.details In this article, I present a novel argument against abortion. In short, what makes it wrong to kill someone is that they are a counterfactual person; counterfactual persons are individuals such that, were they not killed, they would have been persons. My view accommodates two intuitions which many views concerning the wrongness of killing fail to account for: embryo rescue cases and the impermissibility of infanticide. The view avoids embryo rescue cases because embryos in the rescue scenarios are not counterfactual (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
(1 other version)Does Abortion Harm the Fetus?Karl Ekendahl & Jens Johansson - 2022 - Utilitas 34 (2):154-166.details A central claim in abortion ethics is what might be called the Harm Claim – the claim that abortion harms the fetus. In this article, we put forward a simple and straightforward reason to reject the Harm Claim. Rather than invoking controversial assumptions about personal identity, or some nonstandard account of harm, as many other critics of the Harm Claim have done, we suggest that the aborted fetus cannot be harmed for the simple reason that it does not occupy any (...) well-being level. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
(1 other version)Does Abortion Harm the Fetus?Karl Ekendahl & Jens Johansson - 2021 - Utilitas:1-13.details A central claim in abortion ethics is what might be called the Harm Claim – the claim that abortion harms the fetus. In this article, we put forward a simple and straightforward reason to reject the Harm Claim. Rather than invoking controversial assumptions about personal identity, or some nonstandard account of harm, as many other critics of the Harm Claim have done, we suggest that the aborted fetus cannot be harmed for the simple reason that it does not occupy any (...) well-being level. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Strong's objections to the future of value account.Don Marquis - 2011 - Journal of Medical Ethics 37 (6):384-388.details According to Carson Strong, the future of value account of the wrongness of killing is subject to counterexamples. Ezio Di Nucci has disagreed. Their disagreement turns on whether the concepts of a future of value and a future like ours are equivalent. Unfortunately, both concepts are fuzzy, which explains, at least in part, the disagreement. I suggest that both concepts can be clarified in ways that seem plausible and that makes them equivalent. Strong claims that better accounts of the wrongness (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations

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