Background Relational autonomy is an alternative concept of autonomy in which an individual is recognized as embedded into society and influenced by relational factors. Social context, including social location, political structure, and social forces, significantly influence an agent to develop and exercise autonomy skills. The relational approach has been applied in clinical practice to identify relational factors impacting patient autonomy and decision-making, yet there is a knowledge gap in how these factors influence the demonstration of relational autonomy in the context (...) of medical decisions of adults. Objective The present study targeted the existing knowledge of what and how relational factors impact individuals making medical decisions using the theoretical framework of relational autonomy. Methods A meta-synthesis study was utilized. Four electronic databases, including Embase, OVID Medline, CINAHL, and PubMed, were searched, along with gray literature and reference lists, to identify relevant studies. Results 23 studies reporting 21 qualitative and two mixed-method studies were reviewed. Four themes emerged from the qualitative findings: (1) supportive relationships facilitate an individual’s relational autonomy; (2) obtaining comprehensive information from broader sources helps individuals exercise relational autonomy; (3) undue family pressure impedes the exercising of patient relational autonomy; and (4) healthcare providers’ dominant voice hampers the demonstration of relational autonomy. Conclusions Applying relational autonomy to assist adults in making well-considered decisions is essential. The meta-synthesis suggests establishing a supportive relationship between individuals, healthcare providers, and family. A supportive relationship will allow healthcare providers to make judgments in line with an individual’s values and wishes with the aim of promoting relational autonomy. Advance care planning was proposed as the effective solution to obtain a consensus between individuals and their families while respecting an individual’s values and preferences. Furthermore, it is considered crucial for healthcare providers to appreciate an individual's values and incorporate their preferences into recommendations. (shrink)

Nossa seleção de verbetes parte do interesse de cada pesquisador e os dispomos de maneira histórico-cronológica e, ao mesmo tempo, temática. O verbete de Melissa Lane, “Filosofia Política Antiga” vai da abrangência da política entre os gregos até a república e o império, às portas da cristianização. A “Filosofia Política Medieval”, de John Kilcullen e Jonathan Robinson, é o tópico que mais demanda espaço na nossa seleção em virtude das disputas intrínsecas ao período, da recepção de Aristóteles pelo medievo e (...) da tensão entre poder Papal e Civil. No verbete “Liberalismo”, de Gerald Gaus, Shane Courtland e David Schmidtz, vemos as fontes fundantes da Filosofia Política da modernidade. As ideias de liberdade negativa e positiva se coadunam com a Ética Liberal e sua influência sobre a abrangência do valor fundamental da liberdade individual diante das políticas públicas. O texto de Ian Carter, “Liberdade Positiva e Liberdade Negativa”, expõe o paradoxo da liberdade em suas concepções valorativas e neutra, muito úteis para compreender os problemas políticos que enfrentamos hoje. Por fim, Bas Van Der Vossen no texto “Libertarianismo” trata das noções tensas entre Estado e indivíduos. A concepção de “liberdade de si”, genuinamente negativa, ganha destaque justificatório. Jackie Scully, no verbete Bioética Feminista, exemplifica o valor da influência dessas correntes no âmago de todos os contemporâneos. Sua escrita homenageia postumamente Anne Donchin com um apanhado histórico da luta de inserção de políticas feministas na pesquisa acadêmica global. No verbete “Democracia”, os professores brasileiros Gustavo Dalaqua e Alberto Ribeiro Barros acrescentaram tópicos importantes ao tema geral, respectivamente: “Construtivismo Representativo vs. Representação Descritiva” e “Democracia Contestatória de Philip Pettit”. O texto de Thomas Christiano perpassa os principais argumentos de justificação política contra e a favor da democracia ocidental, com foco central nas concepções de liberdade e igualdade. Os verbetes dispostos nessa seleção de textos são tendenciosos na medida que expressam o interesse genuíno de cada pesquisador com os assuntos relevantes em suas pesquisas. Em virtude disso, a escolha “adota um lado” em detrimento de outros – mais especificamente: de outro que poderia ser mais “progressista”. Por si só, o livro já nasce reclamando um segundo volume, que será providenciado. Colocamos de lado qualquer exigência de “imparcialidade”, algo que não existe na Filosofia, muito menos na Filosofia Política. Sobressai, nesse aspecto, o caráter reflexivo que o assunto exige e a importância do assunto, sem o qual não teríamos a modernas concepções de representatividade, as teorias da justiça ou mesmo as ciências sociais. Um outro volume, portanto, se faz imperativo, por conta da abrangência da própria SEP e do respeito a seu projeto inicial, genuinamente um plano plural. (shrink)

According to many of its proponents, shared decision making ("SDM") is the right way to interpret the clinician-patient relationship because it respects patient autonomy in decision-making contexts. In particular, medical ethicists have claimed that SDM respects a patient's relational autonomy understood as a capacity that depends upon, and can only be sustained by, interpersonal relationships as well as broader health care and social conditions. This paper challenges that claim. By considering two primary approaches to relational autonomy, this paper argues that (...) standard accounts of SDM actually undermine patient autonomy. It also provides an overview of the obligations generated by the principle of respect for relational autonomy that have not been captured in standard accounts of SDM and which are necessary to ensure consistency between clinical practice and respect for patient autonomy. (shrink)

New parents suddenly come face to face with myriad issues that demand careful attention but appear in a context unlikely to provide opportunities for extended or clear-headed critical reflection, whether at home with a new baby or in the neonatal intensive care unit. As such, their capacity for autonomy may be compromised. Attending to new parental autonomy as an extension of reproductive autonomy, and as a complicated phenomenon in its own right rather than simply as a matter to be balanced (...) against other autonomy rights, can help us to see how new parents might be aided in their quest for competency and good decision making. In this paper I show how a relational view of autonomy – attentive to the coercive effects of oppressive social norms and to the importance of developing autonomy competency, especially as related to self-trust – can improve our understanding of the situation of new parents and signal ways to cultivate and to better respect their autonomy. (shrink)

In the debates regarding the ethics of human organoid biobanking, the locus of donor autonomy has been identified in processes of consent. The problem is that, by focusing on consent, biobanking processes preclude adequate engagement with donor autonomy because they are unable to adequately recognise or respond to factors that determine authentic choice. This is particularly problematic in biobanking contexts associated with organoid research or the clinical application of organoids because, given the probability of unforeseen and varying purposes for which (...) a donor’s organoids could be employed and given the different ways in which a donor can relate to her biospecimens, a donor can value her organoids differently in different contexts and her reasons for autonomously permitting use of her cells and tissues in one case may not support an autonomous decision in another. In response, this paper has three aims: firstly, to make the case for why organoid biobanks ought to respect donor autonomy conceived as authentic choice; secondly, to explore the autonomy-respecting limits of established and widely prevalent models of biobank consent; and thirdly, to propose certain conditions that organoid biobanks ought to support or facilitate in order to respect donor autonomy. (shrink)

The High Court continues to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to make declarations about interventions into the lives of situationally vulnerable adults with mental capacity. In light of protective responses of health care providers and the courts to decision-making situations involving capacitous vulnerable adults, this paper has two aims. The first is diagnostic. The second is normative. The first aim is to identify the harms to a capacitous vulnerable adult’s autonomy that arise on the basis of the characterisation of situational vulnerability (...) and autonomy as fundamentally opposed concepts or the failure to adequately acknowledge the conceptual relationship between them at common law. The second part of this aim is to draw upon developments in analytic feminist philosophy to illustrate how standard approaches to autonomy are ill-equipped to capture the autonomy issues of capacitous vulnerable adults when their decisions regarding care and treatment are at stake. The second (normative) aim is to develop an account of self-authorised, intersubjective autonomy on the basis of analytic feminist insights into the relational practices of recognition. This account not only attempts to capture the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults and account for the necessary harms to their autonomy that arise from standard common law responses to their situational vulnerability, it is also predicated on the distinctions between mental capacity, the satisfaction of conditions for informed consent and the exercise of autonomy, meaning that it is better placed to fulfil the primary aim of the inherent jurisdiction – to facilitate the autonomy of vulnerable adults with capacity. (shrink)

As scholars integrate empirical approaches to ethical questions in healthcare, relational autonomy theory must inform research design and change practice. Qualitative approaches are well suited to issues where patient values play a central role, and they can be combined with relational autonomy theory to investigate the factors influencing autonomy-rich experiences. This paper draws upon my experience conducting bioethics research related to clinical trial decision-making to develop a systematic method for applying relational autonomy as a theoretical lens to qualitative health research. (...) The resultant practical guide utilizes Susan Sherwin’s theory of relational autonomy and presents an empirical method responsive to autonomy-relevant questions. (shrink)

Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary Western bioethics. Though the claim that there is an important relationship between autonomy and rationality is often treated as uncontroversial in this sphere, there is also considerable disagreement about how we should cash out the relationship. In particular, it is unclear whether a rationalist view of autonomy can be compatible with legal judgments that enshrine a patient's right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of whether the reasons underpinning the choice (...) are known and rational, or indeed whether they even exist. Jonathan Pugh brings recent philosophical work on the nature of rationality to bear on the question of how we should understand personal autonomy in contemporary bioethics. In doing so, he develops a new framework for thinking about the concept of autonomy, one that is grounded in an understanding of the different roles that rational beliefs and rational desires have to play in it. Pugh's account allows for a deeper understanding of d the relationship between our freedom to act and our capacity to decide autonomously. His rationalist perspective is contrasted with other prominent accounts of autonomy in bioethics, and the revisionary implications it has for practical questions in biomedicine are also outlined. (shrink)

Family involvement in healthcare decision-making for competent patients occurs to varying degrees in many communities around the world. There are different attitudes about who should make treatment decisions, how and why. Legal and professional ethics codes in most jurisdictions reflect and support the idea that competent patients should be enabled to make their own treatment decisions, even if others, including their healthcare professionals, disagree with them. This way of thinking contrasts with some cultural norms that put more emphasis on the (...) family as a decision-making entity, in some circumstances to the exclusion of a competent patient. Possible tensions may arise between various combinations of patient, family members and healthcare professionals, and healthcare professionals must tread a careful path in navigating family involvement in the decision-making process. These tensions may be about differences of opinion about which treatment option is best and/or on who should have a say or influence in the decision-making process. While some relevant cultural, legal and policy considerations vary from community to community, there are ethical issues that healthcare professionals need to grapple with in balancing the laws and professional codes on decision-making and the ethical principle of respecting patients and their autonomy. This paper will highlight and propose that a partial resolution to these issues may lie in relational understandings of autonomy, which in principle justify interventions by healthcare professionals and family that support patients in decision-making. (shrink)

Abortion has been legal in the United States since the Supreme Court's landmark 1973 ruling in Jane Roe, et al. v. Henry Wade, District Attorney of Dallas County. Over the past forty years, however, access to abortion has diminished as states have devised creative ways to regulate and restrict the abortion procedure. In the first half of 2011, state legislators introduced a record number of antiabortion bills. In 19 states alone, 80 laws ranging from mandatory counseling and waiting periods to (...) gestational laws and bans on insurance coverage were passed, a legislative testimony to the incremental successes of the antiabortion campaign. Since 2011, the rapid increase in restrictive... (shrink)

Abstract:I raise several concerns with Earp and colleagues' analysis of enhancement through neurochemical modulation of love as a key issue in contemporary neuroethics. These include: (i) strengthening their deflation of medicalization concerns by showing how the objection that love should be left outside of the scope of medicine would directly undermine the goal of medicine; (ii) developing stronger analysis of the social and political concerns relevant to neurochemical modulation of love, by exploring and suggesting possible counters to ways in which (...) 'wellbeing' may be used as a tool of oppression; (iii) providing reasons to support a broad need for ecological investigation of, and indeed ecological education concerning, neurotechnology; (iv) suggesting ways in which philosophy, and the humanities more broadly, remain directly relevant to responding effectively to issues in contemporary neuroethics. (shrink)

When women become perpetrators of suicide bombing, their agency – their ability to act upon and affect the world – is often denied. There are a number of reasons for this and one this thesis considers is that – as females – they are not expected to be violent. Accordingly, such women are judged to be coerced or incompetent, and so unable to rule themselves sufficiently as agents. Models of autonomy propose various frameworks for assessing whether acts or persons are (...) self-governing, and the relational approach in particular has garnered much support recently. However, some aspects of the relational account remain under-theorised, including how autonomy might be measured. In this thesis, I aim to bring these two elements together by examining whether an extension of the relational model may offer a way in which to estimate the autonomy of the bombers in a more nuanced fashion. I make two claims. First, that the relational conception of the agent and autonomy ‘fits’ the bombers. Second, that my spectrum view, which is rooted in the relational approach, maps the bomber’s autonomy approximately but in detail. As such, my spectrum view is a befitting notion of autonomy and allows a graded and comparative representation of the bomber’s autonomy. (shrink)

The concept of autonomy plays a central role in bioethics,1 but there is no consensus as to how we should understand it beyond a general notion of self-determination. The conception of autonomy deployed in applied ethics2 can have crucial ramifications when it is applied in real-world scenarios, so it is important to be clear. However, this clarity is often lacking when autonomy is discussed in the bioethics literature. In this paper we outline three different conceptions of autonomy, and argue that (...) a substantive, perfectionist approach meets the theoretical requirements for an account of autonomy and also provides practical guidance. As Rebecca Walker argues, bioethics requires a more conceptually adequate account... (shrink)

The global increase in patients with chronic conditions has led to increased interest in ethical issues regarding such conditions. A basic biomedical principle—respect for autonomy—is being reexamined more critically in its clinical implications. New accounts of this basic principle are being proposed. While new accounts of respect for autonomy do underpin the design of many public programs and policies worldwide, addressing both chronic disease management and health promotion, the risk of applying such new accounts to clinical setting remain understudied. However, (...) the application of new accounts of respect for autonomy to clinical settings could support disrespectful attitudes toward or undue interference with patients with chronic conditions. Reconsidering autonomy and respect using Kantian accounts, this paper proposes respect for persons as an alternative basic bioethical principle to respect for autonomy. Unlike the principle of respect for persons in the Belmont Report, our principle involves respecting any patient’s decisions, behaviors, emotions, or life-style regardless of his or her “autonomous” capabilities. Thus, attitudes toward patients should be no different irrespective of the assessment of their decisional or executive capabilities. (shrink)

Justice is a key guiding ethical principle in bioethics. When justice is addressed in bioethics the focus is primarily on the fair distribution of resources, that is, distributive justice. In this thesis, I argue that a distributive conception of justice is unable to adequately address many of the relevant issues of justice within bioethics. These issues are better understood and addressed using a social conception of justice. Social justice is concerned with ensuring that the norms and rules of social structures (...) are fair and equitable. I argue that social and distributive justice are not only compatible, but also complementary. As a result, both conceptions of justice need to be applied to bioethical issues if we are to achieve a truly just outcome. As a case study, I apply this analysis to the controversial issue of the inclusion of pregnant women in clinical research trial. (shrink)

Philosophy and Literature is an internationally renowned refereed journal founded by Denis Dutton at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch. It is now published by the Johns Hopkins University Press. Since its inception in 1976, Philosophy and Literature has been concerned with the relation between literary and philosophical studies, publishing articles on the philosophical interpretation of literature as well as the literary treatment of philosophy. Philosophy and Literature has sometimes been regarded as iconoclastic, in the sense that it repudiates academic pretensions, (...) insidious jargon and institutional vogue. Dutton, who remains the editor, still writes a regular column. A distinctive feature of Philosophy and Literature was the annual Bad Writing Contest, held from 1995–98, which sought to identify (and publish) the ‘most stylistically lamentable passages’ of academic prose, often to great amusement. (shrink)

Customarily patient advocacy is argued to be an essential part of nursing, and this is reinforced in contemporary nursing codes of conduct, as well as codes of ethics and competency standards governing practice. However, the role of the nurse as an advocate is not clearly understood. Autonomy is a key concept in understanding advocacy, but traditional views of individual autonomy can be argued as being outdated and misguided in nursing. Instead, the feminist perspective of relational autonomy is arguably more relevant (...) within the context of advocacy and nurses’ work in clinical healthcare settings. This article serves to highlight and problematise some of the assumptions and influences around the perceived role of the nurse as an advocate for patients in contemporary Western healthcare systems by focusing on key assumptions concerning autonomy inherent in the role of the advocate. (shrink)

Promoting patient autonomy has become a key imperative in health service encounters. We will examine the potential negative effects of over-promoting patient autonomy and consider the impact on patient access, their experience and the provision of equitable services by focusing on an extreme manifestation of this trend, i.e. calls for patient involvement in health care decision making to be mandatory. Advocates of mandatory autonomy hold that patients have a duty to themselves, to society and to the medical system to make (...) decisions on their health care independently. Models of mandatory autonomy may be contrasted to those of optional autonomy that seek to ascertain patients’ decisional preferences and to understand wider limitations on their freedom to choose. Where choice as decisional responsibility becomes mandatory it ceases to promote agency and where autonomous choice is understood as an individualistic practice it will contribute to the cultural dominance of Western values. Moreover, taking a view that principlist ethics needs to take account of the social and cultural contexts of individual lives, we argue that if mandatory autonomy were to be over-emphasised as part of an ongoing move towards patient choice in UK National Health Service (NHS), educated and affluent people would be more able to exercise choices at the expense of people who are experienced in asserting preferences and who have the resources to make use of choices. We will argue that the promotion of autonomy needs to be tempered by steps to enable less powerful social, cultural and economic groups to contribute to decision making and to support individuals who may feel abandoned by having decisional responsibility transferred to them. Until constraints on individual choice can be understood and addressed, we advocate the model of optional autonomy used in shared decision making and make recommendations for practice, policy, education and research. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that the daily practice of expert nurses goes far toward enacting the kind of patient autonomy feminist bioethicists envision. Nursing theorists often utilize philosophical theories in their work, but bioethicists have not paid much attention to nursing theory and what it means to be an expert nurse. This is unfortunate because expert nurses do much in their daily practice to make the ideals for autonomy put forth by feminist bioethicists a reality. With this in mind, (...) I bring these two literatures together in what I hope is a fruitful dialogue. (shrink)

This article is an exploration of how the concept of relational autonomy might be applied in practice. The discussion uses the example of breast cancer nursing as a lens through which to consider how a view of autonomy as relational might affect the ways in which practitioners work with their clients.

Much discussion of decision-making processes in medicine has been patient-centred. It has been assumed that there is, most often, one patient. Less attention has been given to shared decision-making processes where two or more patients are involved. This article aims to contribute to this special area. What conditions need to be met if decision-making can be said to be shared? What is a shared decision-making process and what is a shared autonomous decision-making process? Why make the distinction? Examples are drawn (...) from the area of new reproductive medicine and clinical genetics. Possible gender-differences in shared decision-making are discussed. (shrink)

ABSTRACT People who are paid to provide basic care for others are frequently undervalued, exploited and expected to reach often unrealistic standards of care. I argue that appropriate social recognition, support and fair pay for people who provide care for those who are disabled, frail and aged, or suffering ill health that impedes their capacity to negotiate daily activities without support, depends on a reconsideration of the paradigm of the citizen or and moral agent. I argue that by drawing on (...) the ideas of human vulnerability and dependency as central to our personhood, a more realistic conception of selves, citizens and persons can be developed that better recognises the inevitability of human dependency and the social value of care work. I also indicate the significance of this vulnerability‐focussed view for ethical evaluation of the emotional aspects of care relationships. (shrink)

In Moral Case Deliberation, healthcare professionals discuss ethically difficult patient situations in their daily practice. There is a lack of knowledge regarding the content of MCD and there is a need to shed light on this ethical reflection in the midst of clinical practice. Thus, the aim of the study was to describe the content of healthcare professionals’ moral reasoning during MCD. The design was qualitative and descriptive, and data consisted of 22 audio-recorded inter-professional MCDs, analysed with content analysis. The (...) moral reasoning centred on how to strike the balance between personal convictions about what constitutes good care, and the perceived dissonant care preferences held by the patient. The healthcare professionals deliberated about good care in relation to demands considered to be unrealistic, justifications for influencing the patient, the incapacitated patient’s nebulous interests, and coping with the conflict between using coercion to achieve good while protecting human dignity. Furthermore, as a basis for the reasoning, the healthcare professionals reflected on how to establish a responsible relationship with the vulnerable person. This comprised acknowledging the patient as a susceptible human being, protecting dignity and integrity, defining their own moral responsibility, and having patience to give the patient and family time to come to terms with illness and declining health. The profound struggle to respect the patient’s autonomy in clinical practice can be understood through the concept of relational autonomy, to try to secure both patients’ influence and at the same time take responsibility for their needs as vulnerable humans. (shrink)

One of the ethical issues that has been raised recently regarding emerging neurotherapies is that people will be coerced explicitly or implicitly in the workplace or in schools to take cognitive enhancing drugs. This article builds on this discussion by showing how the law may pressure people to adopt emerging neurotherapies. It focuses on a range of private law doctrines that, unlike the criminal law, do not come up very often in neuroethical discussions. Three doctrines—the doctrine of mitigation, the standard (...) of care in negligence, and child custody determinations in family law—are addressed to show how the law may pressure people to consent to treatment by offering a choice between accepting medical treatment and suffering a legal disadvantage. The doctrines considered in this article apply indirect pressure to submit to treatment, unlike court-ordered medical treatment, which applies direct pressure and is not addressed here. The outcome of this discussion is to show that there is a greater range of social pressures that may encourage the uptake of novel neurotherapies than one might initially think. Once treatments that were developed and offered with therapeutic benefits in mind become available, their existence gives rise to unintended legal consequences. This certainly does not mean we should cease developing new therapies that may be of tremendous benefit to patients, but it does raise some questions for physicians and for legal policy-makers. How should physicians, who are required by medical ethical principles to obtain valid consent to treatment, react to a patient’s reluctant consent that is driven by legal pressure? From the legal policy perspective, are our legal doctrines satisfactory or should they be changed because, for example, they unduly promote the collective interest over individual freedom to reject medical treatment or because they channel us toward economically efficient treatments to the detriment of more costly but potentially superior approaches of dealing with behavioural problems? (shrink)

A man with Alzheimer's who wanders around, a caregiver who disconnects the alarm, a daughter acting on het own, and a doctor who is not consulted set the stage for a feminist reflection on capacity/competence assessment. Feminist theory attempts to account for gender inequality in the political and in the epistemological realm. One of its tasks is to unravel the settings in which actual practices, i.c. capacity/competence assessment take place and offer an alternative. In this article the focus will be (...) on a feminist ethics of care in which relationality, care, vulnerability, and responsibility are privileged concepts and attitudes. The emphasis on these notions leads to a specific view of autonomy that has consequences for both carereceivers (patients, clients) and caregivers (professional and not professional). These concepts constitute a default setting that shapes the context for capacity/competence assessment. Whereas this notion is meant to distinguish between those who need to be taken care of and those who do not, reflection on what it means to say ‘those who need to be taken care of’ is also required. The feminist analysis presented here emphasizes the necessity of the contextualization of assessment of competence. It sketches the multifold and complex grid that comprehends capacity assessment. (shrink)

The “new sociology of childhood” replaces the historical notion of children as inherently vulnerable, helpless and in need of protection, with a perception of children as capable of competent, autonomous, social participation. Although this new sociological perception underlies current children's rights literature, Canadian common law, and important Canadian pediatric health care guidelines, children's autonomy in health care contexts remains easily denied or subverted in favour of adult conceptions of their best interests. In order to try to understand why, I use (...) a feminist, relational approach to autonomy to analyze how oppressive social forces might hinder children from developing and exercising their autonomy in health care, and uncover a tendency to silence the voice of the child within bioethical discourse. These results suggest that greater levels of pediatric autonomy could be fostered by overcoming oppressive social forces and by fostering the skills necessary for the development and exercise of autonomy. (shrink)

The predominant ethical framework for addressing reproductive decisions in the maternal–fetal relationship is respect for the woman's autonomy. However, when a pregnant schizophrenic woman lacks such autonomy, healthcare providers try to both protect her and respect her preferences. By delineating etic (objective) and emic (subjective) perspectives on vulnerability, I argue that options which balance both perspectives are preferable and that acting on etic perspectives to the exclusion of emic considerations is rarely justified. In negotiating perspectives, we balance the etic commitment (...) to protect the vulnerable patient and her fetus from harm with the emic concern to empower a decisionally incapacitated woman. Equilibrium is best achieved by nurturing interdependent relationships that empower and protect the vulnerable woman. The analysis points to the need for better social support for mentally ill patients. (shrink)

This essay will address a general philosophical concern about autonomy, namely, that a conception of autonomy focused on freedom of the will alone is inadequate, once we consider the effects of oppressive forms of socialization on individuals’ formation of choices. In response to this problem, I will present a brief overview of Diana Meyers’s account of autonomy as relational and practical. On this view, autonomy consists in a set of socially acquired practical competencies in self-discovery, self-definition, self-knowledge, and self-direction. This (...) account provides a distinction between choices that express unreflectively internalized social norms and those that are the result of a critical ‘self-reading’. I conclude that this practical conception of autonomy makes much higher demands upon nurses (and patients) than has previously been thought. In fact, if nurses are to be expected to genuinely promote autonomy, they are going to need specific training in counselling-type communication skills. (shrink)

Both living donor transplantation and human subjects research expose one set of individuals to clinical risks for the clinical benefits of others. In the Belmont Report, the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavior Research articulated three principles to serve as the basis for a research ethics framework: respect for persons, beneficence and justice. In contrast, living donor transplantation lacks a framework. In this manuscript, we adapt the three principles articulated in the Belmont Report to (...) serve as the foundation for an ethics framework for living donor transplantation which we supplement with the principles of vulnerability and responsibility. The National Commission supported additional protections for vulnerable groups of potential research participants. In 2001, Kenneth Kipnis effectively argued that the concept of vulnerable groups failed to explore in what ways particular groups of people were vulnerable, thereby risking unnecessary protections for some and inadequate protections for others. He proposed a taxonomy that explored different types of vulnerabilities that all research participants may experience to provide a more robust framework for human subjects protections, which we adapt to living donors. Robert Goodin claims that health professionals, who stand in special relationship with patients, are responsible for promoting and protecting their well-being. In living donor transplantation, the donor transplant team is responsible for empowering prospective donors to address their vulnerabilities and/or for protecting those who cannot by disqualifying them from donation. (shrink)

Japan is among the few countries that have passed laws concerning eugenics. Consequently, the practice of selective abortion (abortion of an abnormal foetus) has been publicly debated for the past 35 years. Nevertheless, data show that knowledge in Japan about prenatal diagnosis is anything but common. In my fieldwork (April- June 2006) only 38% of interviewees (13/34) knew or had heard of 'amniocentesis' and 6% knew nothing about it at all. There are many explanations for why people are unaware of (...) prenatal diagnosis. The most crucial factor is that medical doctors do not talk to their patients about it. My interviews with 11 medical doctors revealed that they do not talk about it because they want to respect the principle of patient selfdetermination. In this paper I aim first to introduce and analyse, in the context of Japanese eugenic history and the contemporary notion of the patient-doctor relationship, medical doctors' explanations for not talking to their patients about amniocentesis. Second, I address whether the principle of 'non-intervention' equates to 'self-determination'. Lastly, I suggest possible improvements to the practice of 'self-determination' in Japan. (shrink)

In this dissertation I examine ethical issues that concern fertility preservation (FP) technologies for women from a feminist perspective. FP technologies involve the removal, cryopreservation and subsequent storage of reproductive materials for future use. The aim of these technologies is to preserve the option of future genetic reproduction. FP technologies have been developed in the cancer context because infertility is one of the long-term side-effects of many cancers or cancer therapies. Many FP technologies are still experimental, but some technologies are (...) becoming available to healthy women who wish to guard against age-related infertility. Although FP technologies are expanding women’s reproductive options and benefitting some women by satisfying their desires for genetically-related children, these technologies pose numerous physical, emotional and financial risks to women. I maintain that a feminist examination of choice is necessary for the ethical provision of FP technologies within patriarchal contexts. My analysis begins by demarcating two oppressive social biases from one another: namely pronatalism and biologism. I argue that each of these biases can unduly influence women’s reproductive choices about FP technologies. I then consider how these biases might be identified and challenged in the FP decision-making context. I outline an ethical process of informed choice that is equipped to protect patient autonomy when such autonomy is threatened by these biases. I then consider whether the choice to use FP should be available to both women within and without the cancer contexts. I argue that both disease-related FP and age-related FP can be morally permissible. Finally, I consider whether there should be an upper age limit on women’s access to their stored reproductive materials. I argue that age can be morally relevant to reproduction and thus age limits on access to assisted reproduction are morally permissible. I conclude by suggesting how feminist insights might inform policies on FP technologies and related assisted reproductive technologies. In sum, my dissertation shows that a feminist analysis of choices about FP is essential for ensuring the ethical provision of FP technologies. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 7, Page 59-61, July 2012.

Self‐management is often presented as a panacea for chronic disease care. It plays an important role at the policy level and increasingly guides the delivery of health care services. Self‐management approaches to care are founded on traditional individualistic views of autonomy in which the patient is understood as being independent, rational, self‐interested, and self‐governing. This conceptualization of autonomy has been challenged, particularly by feminist scholars. In this paper I review predominant critiques of self‐management and the traditional individualistic view of autonomy. (...) I propose that a relational approach to autonomy, which is premised on social embeddedness and attends to social, political, and material conditions, is a more sound conception of autonomy capable of taking into consideration the complexities of illness experiences. I suggest that integrating a relational perspective of autonomy into self‐management will be valuable in guiding its progression and elaborate ways in which self‐management research and practice could benefit from incorporating a relational approach to autonomy. (shrink)

Patient and citizen participation is now regarded as central to the promotion of sustainable health and health care. Involvement efforts create and encounter many diverse ethical challenges that have the potential to enhance or undermine their success. This article examines different expressions of patient and citizen participation and the support health ethics offers. It is contended that despite its prominence and the link between patient empowerment and autonomy, traditional bioethics is insufficient to guide participation efforts. In addition, the turn to (...) a “social paradigm” of ethics in examinations of biotechnologies and public health does not provide an account of values that is commensurable with the pervasive autonomy paradigm. This exacerbates rather than eases tensions for patients and citizens endeavoring to engage with health. Citizen and patient participation must have a significant influence on the way we do health ethics if its potential is to be fulfilled. (shrink)

Ethical concerns surrounding medical research in resource-poor settings. including the 'pharming' out or outsourcing or ‘offshoring’ of clinical trials, and how these relate to the economic, historical and political dimensions of the global scientific field, are a recurrent theme across the different social science disciplines.