This essay develops an approach to a phenomenology of shame by taking recourse to different notions of shame found in various humanistic disciplines and in the history of phenomenology. The first part of this paper analyzes some of the central ideas on the nature of shame to be found in cultural anthropology, pedagogy, history and psychoanalysis. The second part discusses the phenomenological theories of shame proposed by Sartre and Levinas. Since their approaches are opposite to each other in crucial respects, (...) the third part of this paper returns to the analyses of shame undertaken in the first part in order to resolve this apparent conflict and advance a coherent theory of shame. The essay’s final thesis is that shame is neither fundamentally destructive nor fundamentally constructive but that it can assume both guises. While it can threaten the subject up to the point of destruction triggering it in aggressive defensive mechanisms, it can also contribute to the development of the subject into a fully free individual capable of acknowledging and answering to others. (shrink)

For the Greeks, O King, who make logical demonstrations, use words emptied of power, and this very activity is what constitutes their philosophy, a mere noise of words. But we [Egyptians] do not use words [logoi] but sounds [phōnai] which are full of effects.If I could tell you what it meant, there would be no point in dancing it.The Eleatic thinker Zeno was a friend, perhaps adopted son, and student of Parmenides. He is famous for his many paradoxes on space (...) and motion, such as Achilles and the tortoise. He was more than just an intellectual, however, having many pursuits including politics, which led to his gruesome death. Running arms to the Liparans, who were resisting the growing power of the Athenians, he .. (shrink)

A number of Democritean fragments may loosely be called ‘political’, concerned as they are with questions to do with the πλις – with government, with the duties and dangers of public office, with justice, law and order. The majority of them have been preserved in chapters of Stobaeus’ anthology entitled ‘On the State’ , ‘On Laws and Customs’ , ‘On Government’.

A number of Democritean fragments may loosely be called ‘political’, concerned as they are with questions to do with the πλις – with government, with the duties and dangers of public office, with justice, law and order. The majority of them have been preserved in chapters of Stobaeus’ anthology entitled ‘On the State’, ‘On Laws and Customs’, ‘On Government’.

Growing public interest in the dark arts, and the fact that even some philosophers have been accused of casting spells with their own writings, suggest that philosophers should not wholly neglect the topics of spells and spell-breaking. In this paper, written in honor of an effective spell-breaker in social and leadership contexts, Fr Theodore Vitali, I set out a taxonomy of spells and ways in which some philosophers may be said to cast them in a naturalistic sense. I also examine (...) ways of breaking a spell, with reference to the will and second-person relationship. I conclude with a brief observation about the desire for intellectual completeness, the root of a disordered appeal of at least some spells to their victims, suggesting an alternative scenario for a good satisfaction of this desire. (shrink)

No Íon, a autoridade e a sabedoria de poetas e rapsodos são confrontadas por meios indiretos. O caráter oblíquo dessa estratégia impede o acesso direto ao conteúdo do diálogo e provoca inúmeros equívocos de leitura. Um fato contextual estimula mais ainda leituras equivocadas. A poesia tratada no Íon difere muito da forma como nós, modernos, a entendemos. Na Antiguidade grega, de base aural, a poesia era o modo privilegiado de conservação da tradição herdada, e permaneceu exercendo essa função capital até (...) mesmo quando a escrita passou a desempenhar papel relevante na forma de composição e transmissão cultural. Neste contexto, o rapsodo representa uma autoridade que cobre praticamente todos os campos do saber. Autoridade enciclopédica, contra a qual Platão travou uma guerra não sem ambiguidades. O presente artigo busca revelar a motivação profunda que anima o Íon: a contraposição entre dois modos de comunicação, o da poesia e o da filosofia. Defende, ainda, que Platão, ao atacar a performance poética, busca, além de rejeitá-la, substituí-la pelo élenkhos socrático como modo de comunicação ideal para instrução e guia da vida humana. (shrink)

We all make decisions, sometimes dozens in the course of a day. This paper is about what is involved in this activity. It's my contention that the ability to deliberate, to weigh different courses of action, and then to decide on one of them, is a distinctively human activity, or at least an activity which sets man and the higher animals apart from other creatures. It is as much decisio as ratio that constitutes the distinguishing mark of human beings. Homo (...) may not always be rationalis, but he is always decidens.The paper is about practical decision, although there is also another important kind of decision that I won't discuss, namely cognitive decision. The difference is roughly that which distinguishes the function of a jury from that of a judge, at least in jury trials. The jury's job is to arrive at an answer to the question: guilty or not guilty? This is a cognitive decision, a decision that, on the basis of the evidence, such-and-such is the case. The judge, apprized of the jury's cognitive decision, makes the practical decision to sentence the guilty party to 20 years. On some other occasion, I hope to be able to say something about cognitive decision, as well as about a third kind of decision named value decision. (shrink)

During the necromantic ceremony inOdyssey11 Odysseus slits the throats of two sheep and then proceeds to drain their blood into the βόθρος, or pit, which he has dug in the ground (Od. 11.35–6). At this point in the ceremony the dead swarm up from the Underworld, displaying an innate attraction to the blood (Od. 11.36–7). Such is the overwhelming response of the dead that Odysseus must draw his sword in order to hold back the multitudes who clamour to drink the (...) offering (Od. 11.48–50). Odysseus refuses to allow the dead to approach the blood until Tiresias has drunk the offering and offered a prophecy for the future (Od. 11.95–6). After Tiresias has concluded his prophecy for Odysseus some of the other dead step forward and drink the blood, but to what end? Odysseus does not seek prophecies from these figures, nor do they produce any, which means that their reason for desiring and drinking the blood must lie elsewhere. (shrink)

During the necromantic ceremony inOdyssey11 Odysseus slits the throats of two sheep and then proceeds to drain their blood into the βόθρος, or pit, which he has dug in the ground (Od. 11.35–6). At this point in the ceremony the dead swarm up from the Underworld, displaying an innate attraction to the blood (Od. 11.36–7). Such is the overwhelming response of the dead that Odysseus must draw his sword in order to hold back the multitudes who clamour to drink the (...) offering (Od. 11.48–50). Odysseus refuses to allow the dead to approach the blood until Tiresias has drunk the offering and offered a prophecy for the future (Od. 11.95–6). After Tiresias has concluded his prophecy for Odysseus some of the other dead step forward and drink the blood, but to what end? Odysseus does not seek prophecies from these figures, nor do they produce any, which means that their reason for desiring and drinking the blood must lie elsewhere. (shrink)

Hermias of Alexandria wrote down the lectures given on the Phaedrus by his teacher Syrianus, Head of the Neoplatonic School of Athens. In the preserved text the Platonic distinction of madness is presented in a Neoplatonic way. In the first section of the article we discuss Hermias’ treatment of possession. The philosopher examines four topics in his effort to present a Neoplatonic doctrine concerning possession. As he holds that divine possession is evident in all parts of the soul, he first (...) argues that it is primarily applied to the one-in-the-soul. Secondly, he explains that possession is also applied to reason, opinion, imagination, thymos and desire, all the above being distinctive parts of the human soul, but not as important as the one-in-the-soul. The third issue he discusses is whether all causes of possession are identical to the divine. Then, Hermias examines the fact that possession is to be traced not only in the human soul but also in the statues. In the second section of the article Hermias’ analysis of the four kinds of Platonic madness is presented. The philosopher first analyzes the interdependence between all four divine kinds of madness and then describes their function on two levels, inside and outside the soul. The function within the soul is richer and is realized in four fields: the restoration of the soul after its fall, the restoration of the human being as a whole, the Pythagorean mathematical system and the logic processes. The function outside the soul deals with the manifestations of the soul in human society. Under this perspective, Hermias clearly proposes an original classification of the kinds of madness, on the basis of which we encounter poetic madness. After that follow the madness of the seer, the telestic madness, and the madness of love. The whole analysis incorporates Platonic, Aristotelian, Pythagorean and theurgic elements that cover the fields of psychology, logic and metaphysics. (shrink)

In the Theaetetus Socrates provides an elaboration and discussion of Protagoras’ measure doctrine, grounding it in a “secret doctrine” of flux. This paper argues that the anthropology of the myth in the Protagoras provides an earlier, very different way to explain the measure doctrine, focusing on its application to civic values, such as “just,” “fine,” and “pious.” The paper shows that Protagoras’ explanation of the dual etiology of virtue – that it is acquired both by nature and by nurture – (...) tracks the two meanings of “anthropos” in his formulation of the measure doctrine, as “humankind” and “individual human.” On Protagoras’ account, humankind’s survival can be explained by the fact that humans share shame and justice, which enables them to live together in cities. (shrink)

Shame is a painful emotion concerned with failure to live up to certain standards, norms, or ideals. The subject feels that she falls in the regard of others; she feels watched and exposed. As a result, she feels bad about the person that she is. The most popular view of shame is that someone only feels ashamed if she fails to live up to standards, norms, or ideals that she, herself, accepts. In this paper, I provide support for a different (...) view, according to which shame is about failure to live up to public expectations. Such a view of shame has difficulties explaining why an audience is central to shame, why shame concerns the self as a whole, and why the social rank of someone affects their ability to shame others. These features, I argue, are best explained by reference to the descent of shame in the emotion connected with submission in nonhuman animals. The function of submission—to appease relevant social others—also throws light on the sort of emotion that shame is. From the point of view of other people, a subject who experiences shame at her own failing is someone who is committed to living together with others in a socially sanctioned way. The argument is not that we must understand the nature of shame in terms of what it evolved for, but that its heritage is important to understanding the emotion that shame has become. (shrink)

When Andromache emerges from the inner chamber in Book 22, ascends the walls of Troy and looks out over the plain, she beholds a spectacle of ruthless brutality. She who has not been aware of the final combat, nor of the slaying of her husband, is suddenly confronted by the receding trail of utter defeat. Swift horses drag her husband's corpse into the distance, the cherished head disfigured as it is dragged, raking the dust of what was once their homeland. (...) The violence of the scene is forcefully conveyed by one word in particular. The swift horses drag Hektor κηδστως —without κδος without care, ‘sans soucier de, brutalement’. In itself the word κηδστως provides a definition of violence, one captured in Shakespeare's phrase ‘careless force’. Violence is, in its harsh brutality, specifically heedlessness, an absence of any form of care. When Achilles hurls the slain suppliant Lykaon into the river he utters the taunt, ‘the fish, κηδες, will lick clean your wound's blood’ . The discarded corpse is denied funeral rites: in place of the care that the relations of the dead traditionally bestow in tending, washing, enshrouding, lamenting, and burying the dead, here the heedless creatures of nature, fleeting visitors, will attend to the corpse, ‘clean’ it, but utterly without care, completely oblivious to the oblivion they create by destroying. In Book 24 Achilles will describe the gods themselves as κηδες. (shrink)

When Andromache emerges from the inner chamber in Book 22, ascends the walls of Troy and looks out over the plain, she beholds a spectacle of ruthless brutality. She who has not been aware of the final combat, nor of the slaying of her husband, is suddenly confronted by the receding trail of utter defeat. Swift horses drag her husband's corpse into the distance, the cherished head disfigured as it is dragged, raking the dust of what was once their homeland. (...) The violence of the scene is forcefully conveyed by one word in particular. The swift horses drag Hektor κηδστως —without κδος without care, ‘sans soucier de, brutalement’. In itself the word κηδστως provides a definition of violence, one captured in Shakespeare's phrase ‘careless force’. Violence is, in its harsh brutality, specifically heedlessness, an absence of any form of care. When Achilles hurls the slain suppliant Lykaon into the river he utters the taunt, ‘the fish, κηδες, will lick clean your wound's blood’. The discarded corpse is denied funeral rites: in place of the care that the relations of the dead traditionally bestow in tending, washing, enshrouding, lamenting, and burying the dead, here the heedless creatures of nature, fleeting visitors, will attend to the corpse, ‘clean’ it, but utterly without care, completely oblivious to the oblivion they create by destroying. In Book 24 Achilles will describe the gods themselves as κηδες. (shrink)

In his recently published Propertiana, Mr. D. R. Shackleton Bailey has given what I believe to be the correct interpretation of the first two lines. He maintains that sacra has no direct connexion with poetry, that it may be virtually synonymous with Manes or possibly signify the rites paid to the dead, or that it can be taken in the sense of their physical relics, the ashes in the urn. He reminds us that nemus is more than a ‘poetic grove’; (...) it must be a ‘consecrated grove’. (shrink)

For the lack of forty-nine drachmas Socrates was unable to attend the costly epideixis of Prodicus from which he would have learnt the truth about correct use of words. From Prodicus' ὥραι Socrates could also have learnt the concepts and characteristic words associated with arete and kakia: these compete in that work for the allegiance of Heracles, parading their respective characteristics. Thanks to Professor Arthur Adkins we have had for the past decade a book which not only confronts arete and (...) kakia, but also analyses the meaning and usage of many Greek words for the evaluation of action from Homer to Aristotle. The importance of this book is generally acknowledged but it has not received the detailed discussion it deserves. Professor Adkins finds the social structure of ancient Greece inimical to the development of an adequate concept of moral responsibility. He shows, in a most interesting manner, how Greek values changed as the needs of society changed. (shrink)

There are many reasons to worry about shame in moral development. Shame can be employed for bad ends, such as manipulation and making others feel powerless. Shame is often associated with denial and hiding behaviors, social phobia, and anxiety. It is also not a motivation suitable for performing virtuous actions. This article argues that, nevertheless, well-ordered shame plays an indispensable and constructive role, as part of a mixed-methods approach in the development of moral character. This article assesses various reasons why (...) shame has fallen out of favor among Western moral educators and demonstrates why each of these reasons falls short of providing a compelling case against employing shame. It defends shame on epistemic and virtue developmental grounds. Moreover, it proposes ways to employ shame in character education, while mitigating potential damages and avoiding the concerns raised by social scientists. (shrink)

Fragment B 1 of Parmenides describes a youth's journey to the house of a goddess who enlightens him as to the nature of all things. The task of translating Parmenides' Greek text is beset with many difficulties, most notably the phrase kata pant' atê at B 1.3. There, the neuter accusative plural panta ('all things') combines with the feminine nominative singular atê (heavenly sent blindness') to render translation impossible. Some have proposed emending the text to read a<s>tê ('down to all (...) cities'), understood in connection with the pathway of divine inspiration. Others reject the emendation in so far as the youth is said at B 1.27 to travel 'far from the beaten path of men.' I argue in defense of the reading kata pant' a<s>tê in so far as references to pathways of inspiration and poetic journeys to the cities of men occur frequently in the poetry of Parmenides' era. (shrink)

The Acarnanian chrēsmologos Amphilytos spoke the verses to Peisistratos just before the battle of Pallene in 546 b.c. They contain a prediction of imminent victory for Peisistratos and total defeat for the Athenians. The Athenians will be routed and deprived of political self-determination, while the victory will restore to Peisistratos the tyranny from which he was twice forced, ‘rooting’ it once for all. Of course, all of this appears quite evident from the narrative. But as the verses form part of (...) Herodotos' account of Peisistratos' ascent to power they amount to much more, for they constitute penultimate proof of Peisistratos' irresistibility , a recurrent theme in Herodotos' logos, but one which was undoubtedly encouraged by his Athenian sources as a means of explaining how the Athenians were forced to yield the tyranny. Indeed, the theme of irresistibility helps to excuse the Athenians for being overcome; as much of the logos, which is historically quite vague, it is a reaction to fact, not factual itself. (shrink)

The Acarnanian chrēsmologos Amphilytos spoke the verses to Peisistratos just before the battle of Pallene in 546 b.c. They contain a prediction of imminent victory for Peisistratos and total defeat for the Athenians. The Athenians will be routed and deprived of political self-determination, while the victory will restore to Peisistratos the tyranny from which he was twice forced, ‘rooting’ it once for all. Of course, all of this appears quite evident from the narrative. But as the verses form part of (...) Herodotos' account of Peisistratos' ascent to power they amount to much more, for they constitute penultimate proof of Peisistratos' irresistibility, a recurrent theme in Herodotos' logos, but one which was undoubtedly encouraged by his Athenian sources as a means of explaining how the Athenians were forced to yield the tyranny. Indeed, the theme of irresistibility helps to excuse the Athenians for being overcome; as much of the logos, which is historically quite vague, it is a reaction to fact, not factual itself. (shrink)

In this paper we propose a new interpretation of Hegel's views on action and responsibility, defending it against its most plausible exegetical competitors.1Any exposition of Hegel will face both terminological and substantive challenges, and so we place, from the outset, some interpretative constraints. The paper divides into two parts. In part one, we point out that Hegel makes a number of distinctions which any sensible account of responsibility should indeed make. Our aim here is to show that Hegel at least (...) has the materials for a sensible and nuanced account, whatever the precise details of how they hang together. Part two then turns to a hard question concerning the relation of two different aspects of our deeds to responsibility. We consider five alternate ways of relieving the tension in Hegel's text, before putting forth our own preferred solution. (shrink)

[Lichas] ‘videbatur mihi secundum quietem Priapus dicere: “Encolpion quod quaeris, scito a me in navem tuam esse perductum”.’ exhorruit Tryphaena et ‘putes’ inquit ‘una nos dormiisse; nam et mihi simulacrum Neptuni, quod Bais tetrastylo notaveram, videbatur dicere: “in nave Lichae Gitona invenies”.’ ‘hinc scies’ inquit Eumolpus ‘Epicurum hominem esse divinum, qui eiusmodi ludibria facetissima ratione condemnat.’ ceterum Lichas ut Tryphaenae somnium expiavit: ‘quis’ inquit ‘prohibet navigium scrutari, ne videamur divinae mentis opera damnare?’ Priapus and Epicurus have frequently been claimed to (...) be major influences, each in their particular way, on the plot and composition of the Satyrica. (shrink)

Anthropologist Tim Ingold promotes Indigenous animism as a salve for perceived failures in modern science, failures he claims also hobbled his own early work. In fact, both Ingold’s early and later work rely on modern scientific ideas and images. His turn to animism marks not an exit from the history of European science, but an entrance into, and imaginative elaboration of, distinctly Neoplatonic themes within that history. This turn marks, too, a clear but unacknowledged departure from systematic social analysis. By (...) re-embracing social analysis, Ingold would overcome the obscurity that now hobbles his later work. (shrink)

Considering the absence of any ancient systematic approach to the reading of the novel, this paper turns to ancient dream hermeneutics as a valuable field of reference that can provide the theoretical framework for studying the ancient novel within its own cultural context. In introducing dream interpretation as one of the ancient novel's creative sources, this essay focuses on Apuleius' Metamorphoses. It explores the dream logic in Apuleius' novel by turning to such authorities as Heraclitus, Plato, Cicero, Artemidorus, and Macrobius, (...) whose characterization of the phenomenon of dreaming sheds light on specific narratological trtaits of the Metamorphoses. It argues that the lower dream category, the insomnium , provides a notion of textuality that can clarify the traditional status of the Metamorphoses as a marginal work of art. In contrast to divinely sent symbolic dreams, it is primarily the insomnium—conceived as a by-product of the lower functions of the soul—that lends psychological force to Apuleius' fiction. (shrink)

One of the most famous scenes in classical literature is theDichterweiheat the beginning of theTheogony: when Hesiod was tending his sheep below Mount Helicon, the Muses approached him, provided him with a staff and a divine voice, and told him to sing of the blessed, everlasting gods.

The paper reconstructs Hegel’s account of shame as a fundamental affect. Qua spiritual, the human individual strives for self-determination; hence she is ashamed of the fact that, q...

This article discusses the historical opposition in the Western world between Athens as the centre of democratic political thinking, reason and philosophical knowledge and Jerusalem as the centre of religion, faith and revelation. It examines the historical trajectory of the debate from early Christianity to this day with special emphasis on the work of Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin; it addresses the relation between faith and reason as two existential and political principles reinforcing each other and explores the symbiotic relationship (...) existing today after both symbolic landscapes have been replaced by new patterns of social organization. It suggests that we must recast the duality Athens/ Jerusalem, not as terms of antagonism, but as two complementary dimensions of existence and orders of experience. It proposes that the event of human natality belongs to the religious order while that of human conscience belongs to the political order. It concludes that modern complex trans-national societies must absorb the experience of both traditions and articulate a new conceptual framework about the relationship between faith and reason. (shrink)