According to the prevalent scholarly opinion, Eudorus of Alexandria supposes two interrelated levels within the same metaphysical hierarchy: one transcendent principle (to hen) at the highest level and two opposing principles (monas and aoristos dyas) at the subjacent level. This paper presents an alternative interpretation, arguing that Eudorus’ report, in fact, involves two different explanations regarding the first principle(s): one strictly monistic and the other dualistic. Eudorus holds the former approach (the so-called highest teaching, which is particularly influenced by Platonic (...) henotheism) to represent the pinnacle of Pythagorean metaphysics according to which the latter, secondary teaching ought to be construed. In the final analysis, interpreting dualism through the lens of henology results in a somewhat idiosyncratic yet Pythagoreanising account of a Monad and Dyad that are, if understood as principle, identical to the One. (shrink)

The argument of this dissertation is that despite the intellectual gendered burden of the problem of disembodiment I define, it can be employed from within the limitations of a gendered account in feminist philosophy of the continental-realist type. I formulate the problem of disembodiment as rooted in the notion of the boundless (apeiron) associated with femininity. Both boundlessness and disembodiment are subject to radicalization in Plato (chōra) and Plotinus (to hen). Read as a dyad, they culminate in a tendency towards (...) gendered disembodiment, mediated by Plato’s soul-body dualism. The dissertation seeks to compare the gendered dimension of disembodiment in the work of Plato and Plotinus and that of the non- philosophers François Laruelle and Katerina Kolozova. “Part I. The Problem of Boundlessness: Radicalizing Disembodiment” is divided in three chapters, which present an intellectual history of the problem of boundlessness as femininity. I survey the problem of boundlessness as drafting relations between elements and principles and femininity in Greek mythology (Chapter 1), Plato’s cosmology (Chapter 2), and Plotinus’ metaphysics (Chapter 3). I argue that the relation between death and the female was ambivalent by the time of the Anaximandrean apeiron and that it became a subject of radicalization via Plato’s chōra and Plotinus’ One, mediated by the notion of the Indefinite Dyad and the doctrine of divided matter. The problem of boundlessness was subject to conceptual radicalization that led to hierarchical metaphysics and deepened the division between body and soul via the association of femininity, reproductivity and matter. “Part II. The Problem of Disembodiment: Revising Boundlessness” is divided in two chapters focusing on the contemporary relevance and importance of the problem of disembodiment as a way of revising boundlessness. I present and explain the legacy of the Platonic chōra and the Plotinian One and what they as a dyad entail for contemporary continental philosophy. I offer (Chapter 4) a trajectory for a continental feminist philosophy interpretation of disembodiment by combining continental feminist philosophy, non- philosophy and new realism. With the aid of Laruelle’s non-philosophy, I explain how and why chōra and the One can be used for/from continental feminist philosophy, followed by a presentation of how chōra and the One are revised in continental philosophy from non- philosophical and new realist perspectives. I then develop (Chapter 5) a continental feminist philosophical interpretation of and approach to the problem of disembodiment from a realist perspective by problematizing continental and feminist philosophical anti-realism. The approach presented is itself an argument in defence of a feminist engagement with disembodiment and the dissertation’s contribution: a non-philosophical contribution to the problem of disembodiment via a continental feminist-realist philosophical approach. The approach is offered through the intersection of continental feminist realism and non- philosophy, and partially new realism. My conclusion is that an affirmative project and consideration of disembodiment for continental feminist philosophy is possible via a non- philosophical and new realist reconsideration of the One. (shrink)

One of the main issues that dominates Neoplatonism in late antique philosophy of the 3rd–6th centuries A.D. is the nature of the first principle, called the ‘One’. From Plotinus onward, the principle is characterized as the cause of all things, since it produces the plurality of intelligible Forms, which in turn constitute the world’s rational and material structure. Given this, the tension that faces Neoplatonists is that the One, as the first cause, must transcend all things that are characterized by (...) plurality—yet because it causes plurality, the One must anticipate plurality within itself. This becomes the main mo- tivation for this study’s focus on two late Neoplatonists, Proclus (5th cent. A.D.) and Damascius (late 5th–early 6th cent. A.D.): both attempt to address this tension in two rather different ways. Proclus’ attempted solution is to posit intermediate principles (the ‘henads’) that mirror the One’s nature, as ‘one’, but directly cause plurality. This makes the One only a cause of unity, while its production of plurality is mediated by the henads that it produces. Damascius, while appropriating Proclus’ framework, thinks that this is not enough: if the One is posed as a cause of all things, it must be directly related to plurality, even if its causality is mediated through the henads. Damascius then splits Proclus’ One into two entities: (1) the Ineffable as the first ‘principle’, which is absolutely transcendent and has no causal relation; and (2) the One as the first ‘cause’ of all things, which is only relatively transcendent under the Ineffable. -/- Previous studies that compare Proclus and Damascius tend to focus either on the Ineffable or a skeptical shift in epistemology, but little work has been done on the causal framework which underlies both figures’ positions. Thus, this study proposes to focus on the causal frameworks behind each figure: why and how does Proclus propose to assert that the One is a cause, at the same time that it transcends its final effect? And what leads Damascius to propose a notion of the One’s causality that no longer makes it transcendent in the way that a higher principle, like the Ineffable, is? The present work will answer these questions in two parts. In the first, Proclus’ and Damascius’ notions of causality will be examined, insofar as they apply to all levels of being. In the second part, the One’s causality will be examined for both figures: for Proclus, the One’s causality in itself and the causality of its intermediate principles; for Damascius, the One’s causality, and how the Ineffable is needed to explain the One. The outcome of this study will show that Proclus’ framework results in an inner tension that Damascius is responding to with his notion of the One. While Damascius’ own solution implies its own tension, he at least solves a difficulty in Proclus—and in so doing, partially returns to a notion of the One much like Iamblichus’ and Plotinus’ One. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 10, Issue 1, pp 65 - 94 In his highly influential 1928 article ‘The _Parmenides_ of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic “One”,’ E.R. Dodds argued, _inter alia_, that among the so-called Neoplatonists Plotinus was the first to interpret Plato’s _Parmenides_ in terms of the distinctive three ‘hypostases’, One, Intellect, and Soul. Dodds argued that this interpretation was embraced and extensively developed by Proclus, among others. In this paper, I argue that although Plotinus took _Parmenides_ to (...) contain a sort of outline of the true metaphysical principles, he understood the One of the first hypothesis of the second part of the dialogue in a way importantly different from the way that Proclus understood it. The characterization of this One, especially its identity with the Idea of the Good of _Republic_, has significant ramification for Plotinus’ philosophy that set it apart from Proclus’ philosophy in ways hitherto infrequently noted. The widely accepted reasons for rejecting Proclus’ interpretation do not apply to the interpretation of Plotinus. The two different interpretations help explain why Proclus’ notorious proliferation of entities in the intelligible realm is not found in Plotinus. (shrink)

In his commentary on Plato’sCratylus, Proclus interprets the dialogue not as a mere work on logic or linguistics, but as having a full psychological and theological import.Late ancient Platonists had already proposed a similar reading for another Platonic dialogue,i.e.theParmenides. In that case too they rejected the logical interpretation, and aimed to find in the text the description of the hierarchy of reality, particularly of the highest beings. As a result, theParmenideswas seen as the accomplished expression of Plato’s theology.Proclus too draws (...) a comparison between theCratylusand theParmenidesin order to stress their theological significance. He also contrasts Plato’s dialectic with Aristotle’s dialectic. Proclus’ interpretation of dialectic is best understood if it is compared to the doctrines of his master Syrianus and of one of his co-disciples,i.e.Hermeias, at the Platonic school of Athens in the 5th centuryad.Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, in this milieu Platonists were not always committed to the task of reconciling the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. As it happens, they could strongly disagree with and even attack Aristotle, and side with Plato. In particular, they greatly valued Plato’s dialectic, which they viewed as the correct form of reasoning and at the same time as a theory of the utmost theological significance. On the other hand, Aristotle’s dialectic was considered as “bare” logic,i.e.as a mere set of logical rules and arguments with no specific contents.On the basis of a problematicCratylus’passage Proclus defends a theory of truth according to which not only propositions, but also names can be true or false. This allows him to view names as substitutes of propositions. This is particularly the case in the application of the four dialectical methods of definition, division, demonstration and analysis. Proclus’ approach arguably provides a basis—to pagan as well as Christian tradition—for the study of divine names as a part of theology, for the name of a god is held to reveal its attributes. (shrink)

Drawing on recent scholarship and delving systematically into Iamblichean texts, these ten papers establish Iamblichus as the great innovator of Neoplatonic philosophy who broadened its appeal for future generations of philosophers.

Although recent scholarship has begun to clarify Porphyry’s position on the first principle in its distinction from that of Plotinus we must be careful not to gloss over the crucial ramifications of Porphyry’s developments. The Plotinian One is beyond Being, and thus beyond all relation and difference. In his attempt to understand how such a principle can be productive of all else that follows from it, Porphyry considers the Plotinian One in both its transcendent and creative aspects, introducing the notions (...) of difference and self-relation within the One itself. Porphyry’s modifications of Plotinus’s doctrine, however, result in a first principle having a character utterly distinct from what Plotinus envisioned, and from what I believe Plotinus would have accepted. Because Porphyry’s first principle is relational, it loses its decisive Plotinian character as absolutely transcendent. This distinction between the first principles of Porphyry and Plotinus has important ramifications for each of their philosophical itineraria, and further strengthens the status of Plotinus within the Neoplatonic tradition. Plotinus is a unique thinker within the Neoplatonic tradition, and we must be careful not to equate Neoplatonism with Plotinus, when in fact, it is Plotinus who against both his own predecessors and successors often stands alone. (shrink)

The question posed in the title of this paper is an historical one. I am not, for example, primarily interested in the term 'Platonism' as used by modern philosophers to stand for a particular theory under discussion – a theory, which it is typically acknowledged, no one may have actually held.1 I am rather concerned to understand and articulate on an historical basis the core position of that 'school' of thought prominent in antiquity from the time of the 'founder' up (...) until at least the middle of the 6th century C.E.2 Platonism was unquestionably the dominant philosophical position in the ancient world over a period of more than 800 years. Epicureanism is perhaps the sole major exception to the rule that in the ancient world all philosophers took Platonism as the starting-point for speculation, including those who thought their first task was to refute Platonism. Basically, Platonism sent the ancient philosophical agenda. Given this fact, understanding with some precision the nature of Platonism is obviously a desirable thing for the historian of ancient philosophy. (shrink)

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that moral disagreement and widespread moral bias pose a serious problem for moral intuitionism. Seneca’s view that we just recognise the good could be criticised using a similar argument. His approach to argumentation offers a way out, one that may serve as a model for a revisionary intuitionism.

This article is the first to bring into scientific discussion and to provide a historico-philosophical analysis of a manuscript “Neoplatonic Philosophy from the archive of Pamfil Danylovych Yurkevych. The reviewed manuscript belongs to P. D. Yurkevych’s handwritten nachlass stored in the funds of the Institute of Manuscript of V. I. Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine in the city of Kyiv. Additional archival materials are involved to answer several research questions. The author of this article provides arguments in favor of proving (...) that the manuscript is to be attributed to P. D. Yurkevych’s own handwriting, to be dated circa 1856, and that the purposing of its content is to be qualified as didactic. As it is established in the article, textual content of the manuscript in question is an original concise description and analysis of neoplatonic philosophy, which belongs to the set of materials created by P. D. Yurkevych in preparation for teaching the course on Ancient Philosophy in Kyiv Theological Academy during Kyivan period of his work. Turning to the inner critique of the manuscript, author of this article emphasizes an analysis that P. D. Yurkevych conducts concerning Plotinus’s ideas of the process of emanation of the world from the One and the role that philosophy has in true cognition. While comparing the manuscript “Neoplatonic Philosophy” with one of P. D. Yurkevych’s substantial philosophical works “Idea”, additional light is shed upon the prosess of genesis and development of Christian-Platonic worldview of the thinker. Furthermore, it is established that the manuscript in question played a major role in P. D. Yurkevych’s own schooling, particulary concerning his view on the philosophy of Plotinus, and his general reception of the Platonic tradition. (shrink)

What role, if any, does dialectic play in Aristotle’s epistemology in the Topics? In this paper I argue that it does play a role, but a role that is independent of endoxa. In the first section, I sketch the case for thinking that dialectic plays a distinctively epistemological role—not just a methodological role, or a merely instrumental role in getting episteme. In the second section, I consider three ways it could play that role, on two of which endoxa play at (...) least a co-starring role. But in the third section, I argue that endoxa don’t play that co-starring role, by arguing for a deflationary account of what endoxa are. For that reason, the third view emerges as the most plausible; but the third view is, I’ll suggest, Platonic. (shrink)

El presente artículo se centra en el estudio de la exégesis que lleva a cabo Plotino en torno a la significación de la inefabilidad del uno, planteada en el Parménides platónico al hilo de la primera hipótesis. Este ubica a este primer uno inefable en el centro mismo de su sistema, lo que tendrá fuertes implicaciones tanto a nivel ontológico como por lo que respecta a la comprensión del lenguaje. la concepción de la realidad que se deriva de esta inefabilidad (...) del primer principio, de un lado, y las implicaciones en la naturaleza del lenguaje filosófico que abre este postulado, de otro, ocuparán la centralidad de nuestras reflexiones. Atenderemos a los textos originales en los que se plantea la cuestión, apoyándonos en la labor de la crítica, discutiendo los puntos fundamentales a fin de esclarecer la posición que encontramos en las Enéadas. Tomaremos, asimismo, en consideración la actualidad que tiene esta posición y su capacidad de ir más allá de la crítica heideggeriana a la metafísica. (shrink)

La filosofía de Jámblico ha supuesto todo un reto hermenéutico para sus lectores. En concreto, su concepción del _logos_ y su epistemología se clausuran si no las atendemos desde ópticas respetuosas con las prácticas y pensamientos propios de la época y de la tradición de la que nacen. Algunos autores han invalidado precisamente la propuesta jambliqueana al sostener que es una suerte de invitación al irracionalismo. Frente a tal lectura, autoras como C. V. Liefferinge se han apoyado en tesis presentes (...) en la filosofía de P. Hadot para defender que es posible abrirnos a la concepción de filosofía de Jámblico a través de su defensa del ritual y del símbolo. Por ello, en el presente estudio indagaremos en esta idea a fin de iluminar los núcleos de sentido ocultos de la hermenéutica de la racionalidad que emanan de la obra de Jámblico. Para ello sostendremos que su filosofía es, ante todo, una defensa de una forma de vida racional que se puede rastrear en sus raíces platónicas. (shrink)

Dans la première partie duParménide, Socrate présente une théorie des Formes qui explique la comprésence d’opposés dans les choses ordinaires et soutient que les Formes ne peuvent avoir des caractéristiques opposées. Dans la deuxième partie, Parménide s’appuie sur les propos de Socrate; il en dérive des conséquences inacceptables — que la Forme de l’Un n’existe pas, et ainsi, que rien n’existe. Cette conclusion est indéniablement fausse. Pour éviter ceci, Socrate doit abandonner la thèse exposée dans la première partie et trouver (...) une manière de préserver la fonction explicative des Formes. Cet article expose la structure de l’exercice qui occupe la deuxième partie du dialogue. (shrink)

A concepção plotiniana de discurso é complexa e multi-facetada. Na "Enéada" I, 2, Plotino pensa o lógos prophorikós como uma imagem do lógos na alma. Na "Enéada" VI, 9, como um modo imperfeito de falar sobre o Um e um instrumento para exortar e instruir o filósofo no seu caminho de ascensão. Neste artigo, investigo quais são as relações entre discurso e ascensão da alma nas "Enéadas", tentando determinar quais são, de acordo com Plotino, as possibilidades e limites do discurso (...) no seu uso filosófico. The plotinian conception of discourse is a complex and manifold one. In "Ennead" I, 2, Plotinus thinks the lógos prophorikós as an image of the the lógos in the soul. In "Ennead" VI, 9, he thinks it as a fallible way to talk about the One and an instrument to exort and instruct the philosopher in his way of ascension. In this paper, I investigate what the relations of discourse and ascension of the soul are in the "Enneads", in an attempt to determinate what are, according to Plotinus, the possibilities and limits of language in its philosophical use. (shrink)

This article describes Syrianus' teachings on the One, as found in his testimonia on the Parmenides . In order to preserve the transcendence of the One, while still providing a fluid universe connected to the One, Syrianus shows how the nature of the One is seen in the structure of the Parmenides itself: the first hypothesis of the Parmenides outlines the primal God, while the intelligible universe is the subject of the second hypothesis, in so far as the intelligible universe (...) is a product of the One. Thus, whatever is negated of the One in the first hypothesis contains a positive analogue in the second hypothesis. With this description of the One in the Parmenides , Syrianus is able to create a complete, fluid universe. Readings of two lemmata, in particular, illuminate Syrianus' manner of interpreting the Parmenides to show how the One is both transcendent and connected to the universe. In his interpretations of Parmenides 137d and 138a, Syrianus shows how the One is partless with respect to itself, but contains parts with respect to the rest of the universe; and that the One is in itself and in another, again, with respect to itself and with respect to the rest of the universe. With his interpretation of the Parmenides , moreover, one can see how Syrianus differs from the interpretations of Porphyry and Iamblichus, and how he paves the way for Proclus' reading of the dialogue. (shrink)

One of the aims of the Neoplatonists is to demonstrate that ancient Presocratic thought is, in fact, a Preplatonic thought. According to the Neoplatonists, Presocratics, who were not far from the truth, employed an inaccurate and ambiguous language, whereas Plato spoke about the truth in a more appropriate and clear way. That is why the Presocratics are not necessarily erroneous and their theoretical originality and their terminology can be incorporated into the Neoplatonic philosophy. I would like to show how some (...) Presocratic theories are embedded in the Neoplatonic metaphysical system of the three Hypostases. Regarding the One and the Intellect, Plotinus, Proclus and the Anonymous Author of the Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy read and employ some Presocratic texts in order to harmonize the Platonic and the Presocratic accounts. Although the Neoplatonists see themselves as continuing the Greek philosophical tradition started by the Presocratics, their interpretation of Presocratic thought illustrates the birth of exegetic philosophy which is able to apply ancient concepts and predicates to its own metaphysical theory. (shrink)

a single life-span. Philosophers, then, do not see more or know more, and they do not see less or know less. They aim to see less detail and more of the abstract. Their details, if you like, are abstractions. Walking on God’s earth as a pedestrian, as a farmer working his fields or as a passer-by, one’s picture of one’s surroundings is every bit as intelligent as that of the pilot riding the sky. The views of the field are radically (...) different, however. One sees only a specific field and in all lively detail: the exact pattern of the land, or even the exact outline of a given leaf, grasshopper, grain of sand even. Acquaintance with minute detail is not without its price: details may stand in the way of conjuring the big picture. It may be difficult to compare whichever field one happens to be in with far off fields, with respect to their size or shape or any other quality. One may wish to inquire if far off fields were already planted, harvested, or even if they exist. A pedestrian may find it hard or even impossible to do so. The pedestrian view contains fine points that the pilot’s map never would, but it does not necessarily contain more information, for it lacks the general context. After all, there are only so many items that one can observe and account for at a single glance, a single map, a single book, a single life-span. (shrink)

El autor realiza una lectura de las Enéadas de Plotino partiendo de la noción de procesión, pieza clave para comprender la arquitectura del universo plotiniana ordenado jerárquicamente alrededor del Uno-Bien.Del primer principio proceden todos los seres y en él convergen. Cuatro son fundamentalmente los aspectos tratados: 1) El axiomade la procesión. 2) Los dos momentos de la procesión: el ascendente y el descendente. 3) Las imágenes de la procesión.4) Dentro de estas metáforas, privilegia el centro y el círculo, núcleo en (...) el análisis de la noción de procesión. (shrink)

El concepto de “sistema o doctrina de emanación” (Emanationssystem/Emanationslehre) tiene un uso complejo y hasta cierto punto vago durante todo el siglo XVIII, que se extiende también durante el siglo XIX. La vaga mención de ciertas fuentes “orientales” como origen de los “sistemas emanativos” por parte de Jakob Brucker se transforma en un motivo de sugestión para la historiografía posterior. El concepto plotiniano de “procesión” queda fundido con el concepto historiográfico de “emanación”, lo que supone una equiparación de doctrinas distintas (...) bajo un solo gran rótulo. Este rótulo resulta aplicado tanto a la filosofía plotiniana como a las doctrinas de Filón de Alejandría, a la cábala hebrea y cristiana, al gnosticismo, al hermetismo y, ya entrado el siglo XIX, a la filosofía india. Como consecuencia de esta filiación entre “sistema de emanación” y “Oriente”, la filosofía de Plotino será primero excluida del canon de la filosofía europea, pero se irá volviendo además una de las matrices interpretativas principales para la recepción de nuevas filosofías de África y Asia. (shrink)

The present essay aims first at clarifying Werner Beierwaltes’ understanding of Neoplatonism at large as the accomplishment of Greek philosophy pursued by Plotinus and coherently developed by Proclus. It seeks secondly to locate Beierwaltes’ remarkable effort to trace the “Wirkungsgeschichte” of Neoplatonism. Focus has been placed, thirdly on his understanding of Dionysius Areopagita as the effective mediator of Neoplatonic issues in the Latin philosophical tradition long before the rediscovery of Proclus in the 13. century. Beierwaltes’ understanding of Dionysius’ “Christian Neoplatonism” (...) as a lucky instance of “Hellenization of Christianity” is finally compared with different exegesis provided by Ivánka and Balthasar in the years immediately preceding Beierwaltes’ remarkable Proclus-monography of 1965. (shrink)

_The first book-length philosophical study on the Presocratic influences in Plotinus’ Enneads._.

The first book-length philosophical study on the Presocratic influences in Plotinus’ Enneads.

Plotino denomina al Uno-Bien potencia de todas las cosas, o potencia total. Asimismo, el primer principio es designado como más allá del ser, anterior o superior a todas las cosas, pero nunca dice que sea anterior o superior a la potencia. El Uno no es ninguna de todas las cosas, es decir, es “diferente de todas las cosas”, porque es “anterior a todas ellas” y está “más allá de todas las cosas”, porque es “principio de todas las cosas”, “causa de (...) todas las cosas” o también “potencia de todas las cosas”, pero potencia activa y productiva de todo, y no pasiva o receptiva de todo como la materia. (shrink)

This article examines the impact of `exile' — as an individual or collective experience — on how human experience is theorized. The relationship between `exile' and thought is initially approached historically by looking at the period that Eric Dodds famously called the `age of anxiety' in late antiquity, i.e. the period between the emperors Aurelius and Constantine. A particular interest is in the dynamics of `empire' and the concomitant religious ferment as a context in which `exile', both experientially and symbolically, (...) appears to assume an overbearing significance. Plotinus' narrative of emanation and epistrophe as well as a group of narratives often classified as `Gnosticism' are juxtaposed as two radical examples of a wider spiritual trend at the time according to which `exile' could be considered constitutive of human experience. By way of an historical analogy, the insights gained from this study of late antiquity are then used to guide an analysis of the current, `restless' epoch, in which experiences of displacement and exile on a mass scale undermine traditional notions of belonging, thus reviving the gnostic vision of cosmic reality as an alien, exilic environment. The article concludes with a discussion of Jacques Derrida's work as an example of contemporary gnosticism, in which a `metaphysics of exile' is presented in the disguise of an `exile from metaphysics'. (shrink)

After presenting the rules of Eleatic antilogic, i.e., dialectic, I argue that Zeno was a practitioner, and, on the basis of key passages from Plato’s Parmenides (127e-128e and 135d-136c), that his paradoxes of divisibility and movement were notreductio ad absurdum, but simple derivation of impossibilities (adunaton) meant to ridicule Parmenides’ adversaries. Thus, Zeno did not try to prove that there is no motion, but simply derived this consequence from premises held by his opponents. I argue further that these paradoxes were (...) devised, in accordance with Eleatic antilogic, following a scheme that included hypotheses and their contradictories, within which the subject is to be treated both “in relation to itself,” and “in relation to other things”. (shrink)