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  1. Locke's Place‐Time‐Kind Principle.Jessica Gordon-Roth - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (4):264-274.
    John Locke discusses the notions of identity and diversity in Book 2, Chapter 27 of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. At the beginning of this much-discussed chapter, Locke posits the place-time-kind principle. According to this principle, no two things of the same kind can be in the same place at the same time . Just what Locke means by this is unclear, however. So too is whether this principle causes problems for Locke, and whether these problems can be resolved. This (...)
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  • Sui criteri d'identità.Massimiliano Carrara - 2018 - Padova: Padova University Press.
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  • Not Just a Coincidence. Conditional Counter-examples to Locke’s Thesis.Giuseppe Spolaore - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):108-115.
    So-called Locke's thesis is the view that no two things of the same kind may coincide, that is, may be completely in the same place at the same time. A number of counter-examples to this view have been proposed. In this paper, some new and arguably more convincing counter-examples to Locke's thesis are presented. In these counter-examples, a particular entity (a string, a rope, a net, or similar) is interwoven to obtain what appears to be a distinct, thicker entity of (...)
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  • Newton’s substance monism, distant action, and the nature of Newton’s empiricism: discussion of H. Kochiras “Gravity and Newton’s substance counting problem”.Eric Schliesser - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):160-166.
    This paper is a critical response to Hylarie Kochiras’ “Gravity and Newton’s substance counting problem,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 40 267–280. First, the paper argues that Kochiras conflates substances and beings; it proceeds to show that Newton is a substance monist. The paper argues that on methodological grounds Newton has adequate resources to respond to the metaphysical problems diagnosed by Kochiras. Second, the paper argues against the claim that Newton is committed to two speculative doctrines attributed to (...)
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