This paper examines one aspect of professional practice for bioethicists: managing conflicts of interest. Drawing from our qualitative study and descriptive analysis of the experiences of conflicts of interest and/or conflicting interests (COI) of 13 Canadian clinical bioethicists (Frolic and Chidwick 2010), this paper examines how bioethicists define their roles, the nature of COIs in their roles, how their COIs relate to conventional definitions of conflicts of interest, and how COIs can be most effectively managed.

Institutional ethics consultation services for biomedical scientists have begun to proliferate, especially for clinical researchers. We discuss several models of ethics consultation and describe a team-based approach used at Stanford University in the context of these models. As research ethics consultation services expand, there are many unresolved questions that need to be addressed, including what the scope, composition, and purpose of such services should be, whether core competencies for consultants can and should be defined, and how conflicts of interest should (...) be mitigated. We make preliminary recommendations for the structure and process of research ethics consultation, based on our initial experiences in a pilot program. (shrink)

The development of a code of ethics for a profession can be an indicator of the coherence and stability of a discipline as a unique and singular entity. Since “bioethics”, as a discipline, is not one profession but many, practiced by persons with not one but many varying responsibilities and training, it has been argued that no code of ethics is possible for the discipline(s) of bioethics. I argue that a code of ethics is possible for bioethics by looking at (...) the nature of the various disciplines and noting necessary overlap between them, and deriving the ethics from the nature of the discipline(s) themselves. I show how this can be done by arguing that strict rules about funding and conflict of interest are necessary for bioethicists. (shrink)

Conflicts of interest are receiving increased attention in medical research, clinical practice and education. Criticism of, and penalties for, conflicts of interest have been insufficiently discussed and have been applied without adequate conceptual backing. Genuine conflicts of interest are situations in which alternative courses of action are ethically equivalent, decision-making being less a matter of moral deliberation than of personal weighing of interest. In contrast, situations usually thought of as conflicts of interest are mostly temptations to follow an attractive but (...) undue option that causes harm by failing to uphold well-entrenched ethical standards. Examples of moral quandaries that pose as ethically neutral conflicts of interest are healthcare providers enticed to favour certain products; patients being referred to non-therapeutic trials entailing risks and non-optimal healthcare; industry-supported scientists failing to deliver unbiased research results and reports or participating in ghost-writing; and sponsored educators who praise their supporters beyond objective evidence. All these are moral blemishes, where integrity gives way to material incentives at the cost of provoking risky and harm-producing situations, thus constituting false conflicts of interest when they are in fact ethical misdemeanours. Disclosure has been the most widely recommended response to avoid the concealment of conflicting and ethically suspect interests. Regulations regarding disclosure reveal a utilitarian stance that shows more concern for the magnitude of support or sponsorship than for the underlying ethical transgression. Education and oversight should directly address and help correct the moral attitude towards undue influence of inducements and marketing strategies falsely posing as conflicts of interest. (shrink)

This article addresses all of the issues involved in the debate about whether or not bioethicists should be paid by private biomedical companies to perform consultations. These issues include the following: differentiation of this role from bioethicists' other roles, an analysis of to whom bioethicists owe a duty, consideration of what bioethicists are “selling,” whether bioethicists should be allowed to get paid, when payment becomes problematic, and whether consulting fee arrangements should be regulated. The author often compares bioethicists' relationship to (...) the companies to bioethicists' other relationships, as well as to professional relationships in other fields, such as law and accounting. (shrink)

Bioethics, once a four-letter word in the private sector, is now an integral part of the decisionmaking process of biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies. And bioethicists, once confined to the classroom and limited to abstract, philosophical discussions about what is right and wrong in medicine and medical research, now play an important role in the practical implementation of ethical boundaries. Bioethicists increasingly are hired by biomedical companies as consultants to highlight and help resolve complex ethical issues that arise in the companies’ (...) normal business practices. Whether motivated by profit, reputation, or a genuine desire to act morally, these companies are willing to pay bioethicists substantial consultation fees for their “expert” opinions. This fairly recent phenomenon has caused some to be concerned about the potential for bioethicists to encounter conflicts of interests. Specifically, many critics of this new relationship between bioethicists and the private sector “are concerned about the appropriateness of ethicists who should have broader interests, such as concerns about social justice, serving clients whose primary interest is profit-maximizing.”. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper I consider whether an academic bioethicist is likely to change the arguments she is prepared to voice if she is in receipt of payment from a corporation. I argue that she is not, so long as a number of conditions are met regarding the size of payment, the values of the academic bioethics community, the degree to which she participates in that community, and the transparency of corporate involvements. In the second half I (...) consider a different concern that one might have with corporate payments that relate to the dubious nature of the functions bioethicists might play within those corporations. I argue that three roles—those of marketer, expert and lobbyist—are best avoided, but that a fourth—the dialectical role—does provide a legitimate niche within which a bioethicist may offer consultation. (shrink)