This paper deals with the core version of the Trolley Problem. In one case many people favor an act which will bring about the death of one person but save five other persons. In another case most people would refuse to “sacrifice” one person in order to save five other lives. Since the two cases seem similar in all relevant respects, we have to explain and justify the diverging verdicts. Since I don’t find current proposals of a solution convincing, I (...) propose an alternative one according to which —but not —violates two forms of equality. I also test the underlying egalitarian principle against other cases. I argue that it offers a good explanation and also a normative justification of our intuitive verdicts about the cases. (shrink)

This thesis will utilise the literature on the distinction between doing harm and allowing harm to develop a novel system of moral sequencing that can be applied to general moral problems to decide if, when, and how an agent should intervene to prevent harm from occurring to another agent. Off the back of this discussion, this thesis will offer a way of determining the responsibility of certain agents for their actions within a moral sequence. These motivations will be at the (...) centre of the discussions in this thesis and will be accomplished by ultimately updating the system of moral sequencing so that it makes sense of practical cases of inner-agent change, which itself provides a justification for intervening earlier, and potentially diminishing the responsibility for agents who have experienced an inner-agent change, in a moral sequence. (shrink)

A well-known thought experiment has us ponder a lottery system that selects one person as the source of transplantable organs for two others. The organs are forcibly harvested and the “donor” dies, whereas the other two patients live. The Survival Lottery is supposed to get at the distinction between killing and letting die, but it is also a challenge to beliefs about moral duties: what are my obligations if my life could be used to save yours and another person's as (...) well? A less extreme version of this thought experiment might have us imagining that officials of the public healthcare system would devise a similar lottery in the aftermath of a large-scale medical emergency. We could imagine that a natural disaster or an attack using biological weapons, for example, has so diminished the ability to provide public health care that in some communities, officials might consider implementing a lottery. To avoid the concerns about outright killing of selectees, officials might offer a wide range of participation in medical practice and research, not just organ allocation. Officials could ensure that no significant risks are involved, and selectees could in various ways be compensated. Would it be possible to ethically justify this “Healthcare Lottery” on the grounds that it was a temporary, yet necessary, infringement on autonomy? (shrink)