Partiendo de la obra de Vicent Martínez en la que explicita qué entiende por “racionalidad práctica” en el marco de sus estudios fi-losóficos para la paz —también para la paz entre los géneros—, repensamos aquí nuestras propias contribuciones a la interacción entre la fenomenología y el feminismo, particularmente la vinculación de la crítica fenomenológica del objetivismo con el desenmascaramiento de la razón patriarcal, para demostrar que el reconocimiento no indiferente de la pluralidad no está reñido con la autonomía y la (...) universalidad de la razón, sino exclusivamente con la razón instrumental dominante hasta el siglo XXI. Consideramos esta última desde el diagnóstico husserliano de la crisis de las ciencias, y desde la crítica a la Modernidad emprendida por la Escuela de Frankfurt. Con la mirada puesta en la tercera generación de la misma y en el fenomenólogo francés Maurice Merleau-Ponty, reivindicamos una razón ampliada, que no solo tiene implicaciones epistemológicas, sino existenciales, y que puede ayudar a superar incluso los dualismos surgidos en el feminismo, una tradición de pensamiento que, en diálogo con la fenomenología, gana radicalización filosófica a la vez que la fenomenología arraiga en el movimiento feminista y, con él, en la autoresponsabilidad de la humanidad.Starting from the work of Vicent Martínez in which he explains what he understands by "practical rationality" in the framework of his philosophical studies for peace–also for peace between genders–, I rethink my own contributions to the interaction between phenomenology and feminism, particularly the link of the phenomenological critique of objectivism and the unmasking of patriarchal reason in order to demonstrate that the non-indifferent recognition of plurality is not at odds with the autonomy and universality of reason, but exclusively with the instrumental reason which dominates until the 21st century. I consider this dominating reason from Husserl's diagnosis of the crisis of the sciences as well as from the criticism to Modernity undertaken by the Frankfurt School. I will pay attention on the third generation of this School as well as on the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty in order to reclaim an enlarged reason which not only has epistemological implications, but existential. This reason can even help overcome the dualisms that have arisen within feminism. Feminism is a tradition of thought that, in dialogue with phenomenology, can attain a philosophical radicalization while phenomenology can take root in the feminist movement and with it, in the self-responsibility of humanity. (shrink)

In his late reflections on values and forms of life from the 1920s and 1930s, Husserl develops the concept of personal value and argues that these values open two kinds of infinities in our lives. On the one hand personal values disclose infinite emotive depths in human individuals while on the other hand they connect human individuals in continuous and progressive chains of care. In order to get at the core of the concept, I will explicate Husserl’s discussion of personal (...) values of love by distinguishing between five related features. I demonstrate that values of love (1) are rooted in egoic depts and define who we are as persons, (2) differ from objective values in being absolute and non-comparative, (3) ground vocational lives as organizing principles, (4) are endlessly self-disclosing and self-intensifying, and (5) establish transitive relations of care between human beings. On the basis of my five-partite distinction, I argue that Husserl’s concepts of love and value of love reveal the dynamic character of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity. (shrink)