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  1. Testing universal gravitation in the laboratory, or the significance of research on the mean density of the earth and big G, 1798–1898: changing pursuits and long-term methodological–experimental continuity.Steffen Ducheyne - 2011 - Archive for History of Exact Sciences 65 (2):181-227.
    This article seeks to provide a historically well-informed analysis of an important post-Newtonian area of research in experimental physics between 1798 and 1898, namely the determination of the mean density of the earth and, by the end of the nineteenth century, the gravitational constant. Traditionally, research on these matters is seen as a case of “puzzle solving.” In this article, the author shows that such focus does not do justice to the evidential significance of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century experimental research on (...)
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  • The Scope, Limits, and Distinctiveness of the Method of ”Deduction from the Phenomena’: Some Lessons from Newton’s ”Demonstrations’ in Optics.John Worrall - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (1):45-80.
    Having been neglected or maligned for most of this century, Newton's method of 'deduction from the phenomena' has recently attracted renewed attention and support. John Norton, for example, has argued that this method has been applied with notable success in a variety of cases in the history of physics and that this explains why the massive underdetermination of theory by evidence, seemingly entailed by hypothetico-deductive methods, is invisible to working physicists. This paper, through a detailed analysis of Newton's deduction of (...)
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  • Demonstrative induction, old and new evidence and the accuracy of the electrostatic inverse square law.Ronald Laymon - 1994 - Synthese 99 (1):23 - 58.
    Maxwell claimed that the electrostatic inverse square law could be deduced from Cavendish's spherical condenser experiment. This is true only if the accuracy claims made by Cavendish and Maxwell are ignored, for both used the inverse square law as a premise in their analyses of experimental accuracy. By so doing, they assumed the very law the accuracy of which the Cavendish experiment was supposed to test. This paper attempts to make rational sense of this apparently circular procedure and to relate (...)
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  • Beyond divorce: Current status of the discovery debate.Thomas Nickles - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (2):177-206.
    Does the viability of the discovery program depend on showing either (1) that methods of generating new problem solutions, per se, have special probative weight (the per se thesis); or, (2) that the original conception of an idea is logically continuous with its justification (anti-divorce thesis)? Many writers have identified these as the key issues of the discovery debate. McLaughlin, Pera, and others recently have defended the discovery program by attacking the divorce thesis, while Laudan has attacked the discovery program (...)
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  • Deductivism surpassed.John Fox - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):447 – 464.
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  • Meta-Empirical Support for Eliminative Reasoning.C. D. McCoy - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 90:15-29.
    Eliminative reasoning is a method that has been employed in many significant episodes in the history of science. It has also been advocated by some philosophers as an important means for justifying well-established scientific theories. Arguments for how eliminative reasoning is able to do so, however, have generally relied on a too narrow conception of evidence, and have therefore tended to lapse into merely heuristic or pragmatic justifications for their conclusions. This paper shows how a broader conception of evidence not (...)
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  • No actual measurement … was required: Maxwell and Cavendish's null method for the inverse square law of electrostatics.Isobel Falconer - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 65:74-86.
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  • Demonstrative induction: Its significant role in the history of physics.Jon Dorling - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 40 (3):360-372.
    It is argued in this paper that the valid argument forms coming under the general heading of Demonstrative Induction have played a highly significant role in the history of theoretical physics. This situation was thoroughly appreciated by several earlier philosophers of science and deserves to be more widely known and understood.
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  • Hesse’s Condition for Transitivity of Probabilistic Support: A Friendly Reminder.Jakob Koscholke - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-11.
    The probabilistic support relation is known to violate transitivity. But over the years, philosophers have identified various conditions under which it does not, most notably screening-off and weak screening-off. In this short discussion note, I wish to highlight another condition that, unfortunately, is often neglected in the literature. This condition is due to Mary Hesse who recognized its transitivity-ensuring property long before other conditions entered the stage. I show that her condition is logically independent of screening-off and weak screening-off, but (...)
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  • Between the fundamental and the phenomenological: The challenge of 'semi-empirical' methods.Jeffry L. Ramsey - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (4):627-653.
    Philosophers disagree how abstract, theoretical principles can be applied to instances. This paper generates a puzzle for law theorists, causal theorists and inductivists alike. Intractability can force scientists to use a "semi-empirical" method, in which some of an equation's theoretically-determinable parameters are replaced with values taken directly from the data. This is not a purely deductive or inductive process, nor does it involve causes and capacities in any simple way (Humphreys 1995). I argue the predictive successes of such methods require (...)
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