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  1. Epistemic Partialism.Cathy Mason - 2023 - Philosophy Compass (2):e12896.
    Most of us are partial to our friends and loved ones: we treat them with special care, and we feel justified in doing so. In recent years, the idea that good friends are also epistemically partial to one another has been popular. Being a good friend, so-called epistemic partialists suggest, involves being positively biased towards one's friends – that is, involves thinking more highly of them than is warranted by the evidence. In this paper, I outline the concept of epistemic (...)
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  • Understanding friendship.Michel Croce & Matthew Jope - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):371-386.
    This article takes issue with two prominent views in the current debate around epistemic partiality in friendship. Strong views of epistemic partiality hold that friendship may require biased beliefs in direct conflict with epistemic norms. Weak views hold that friendship may place normative expectations on belief formation but in a manner that does not violate these norms. It is argued that neither view succeeds in explaining the relationship between epistemic norms and friendship norms. Weak views inadvertently endorse a form of (...)
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  • Epistemic Partialism and Taking Our Friends Seriously.Cathy Mason - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (3):233-243.
    Two doxastically significant demands of friendship have been discussed in recent literature, a demand to be epistemically partial and a demand to take our friends seriously. Though less discussed than epistemic partialism, I suggest that the demand to take our friends seriously is motivated by similar cases and considerations, and can avoid key objections to epistemic partialism that have been raised. I further suggest that it does justice to what we care about in friendship, and thus is to be preferred.
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  • If epistemic partialism is true, don’t tell your friends.Scott Woodcock - 2024 - Analysis 84 (3):566-575.
    It is generally recognized that friendship justifies a particular set of special permissions and responsibilities. However, a compelling debate has emerged regarding the question of whether we ought to believe claims about our friends that strangers would not. Advocates of epistemic partialism, such as Sarah Stroud and Simon Keller, argue that friendship ought to sometimes lead us to form beliefs that are inconsistent with what is justified from an impartial perspective. In this paper, I identify a puzzle for epistemic partialism (...)
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