Panpsychist and panprotopsychist views have become more prominent during the past years, greatlydue to Philip Goff, Galen Strawson, David Chalmers, William Seager and others. Panpsychism isthe view that fundamental entitites have phenomenal properties while panprotopsychism is the viewthat fundamental entities have the potential to realise consciousness under certain conditions, invirtue of their protophenomenal properties. My focus will be, particularly, on constitutive versionsof panpsychism, which entail the commitment to the constitutive grounding of ordinary subjects ofexperience in more fundamental phenomenal entities. More (...) specifically, I will evaluate whethersolutions to its ”combination problems”, which theorise the combination or decombination offundamental entities, can be solutions of the problem of experience. Constitutive panpsychismattempts to avoid the emergence of consciousness altogether by postulating fundamental subjects,so that ordinary subjects should be explained exhaustively in terms of them. Emergentistpanpsychism, by contrast, is a form of intelligible, or non-brute, emergentism which considersordinary subjects to be something more than mere structure. However, I will argue that evenconstitutivism involves a type of emergence, compositional or individualizing emergence, whichmakes it collapse into emergentism. That also takes away its ability to solve the problem ofexperience through a combination problem. Furthermore, the problem of other minds puts epistemiclimitations on our abilities to solve combination problems, which makes it improbable, even ifconstitutivism could avoid subject emergence, that it would be possible to reach an objectivesolution to the problem of ordinary subjects of experience through combination. Also physicalism isa form of emergentism but involves the commitment of the brute emergence of phenomenalproperties from non-mental fundamental entitites. I will show that it too gains an emergenceproblem as a consequence of a small conceptual shift that causes its collapse intopanprotopsychism. By recognising that there are common emergence problems, if not aboutphenomenal properties in general then about ordinary subjects, physicalists and panpsychistscan continue consciousness research as a collected force. I will also be presenting versions ofemergentist panpsychism to exemplify views that already expect emergence problems andformulate questions for future research. (shrink)

I shall argue in this article that there are certain objectual and methodological boundaries imposed by the nature of physics that all formulations of physicalism based on physical theories should respect. Therefore, empirical physicalism – i.e., the sort of physicalism that is eager to accept all the entities included in some future, ideal and complete physical theory and all entities dependent on them (see Jeffrey Poland and Janice Dowell) – is already committed to the exclusion of certain sorts of entities (...) from its ontological inventory and it is far less tolerant than one might expect. After having presented my argument, I shall describe four plausible boundaries to what can be studied by physics. The boundaries will contribute to constructing a new version of physicalism, i.e., physics physicalism, whose acceptance is entailed by the acceptance of empirical physicalism. Finally, I shall briefly deal with three objections against my strategy and I shall evaluate the consequences of the acceptance of my conclusions for both physicalists and non-physicalists. (shrink)

Though there is yet no consensus on the right way to understand ‘physicalism’, most philosophers agree that, regardless of whatever else is required, physicalism cannot be true if there exists fundamental mentality. I will follow Jessica Wilson (Philosophical Studies 131:61–99, 2006) in calling this the 'No Fundamental Mentality' (NFM) constraint on physicalism. Unfortunately for those who wish to constrain physicalism in this way, NFM admits of a counterexample: an artificially intelligent quantum computer which employs quantum properties as part of its (...) cognitive operations. If one of these quantum properties serves a proper functional role in the artificial intelligence, then that property counts as a mental under the physicalism-friendly theory of mentality called “realizer functionalism”, which says that a lower-order property is mental if it satisfies an appropriate higher-order functional description. Further, if this quantum property is both fundamental and mental, then NFM must rule that it is not physical. Yet the existence of such an artificially intelligent quantum computer, which possesses mental properties solely in virtue of the functional roles those properties play, is surely consistent with the truth of physicalism. This ought to motivate NFM proponents to reformulate their view. (shrink)