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  1. Putnam’s model-theoretic argument (meta)reconstructed: In the mirror of Carpintero’s and van Douven’s interpretations.Krystian Jobczyk - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-37.
    In “Models and Reality”, H. Putnam formulated his model-theoretic argument against “metaphysical realism”. The article proposes a meta-reconstruction of Putnam’s model-theoretic argument in the light of two mutually compatible interpretations of it–elaborated by Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Igor van Douven. A critical reflection on these interpretations and their adequacy for Putnam’s argument allows us to expose new theses coherent with Putnam’s reasoning and indicate new paths to improve this argument for our reconstruction task. In particular, we show that Putnam’s position may (...)
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  • Theoretical terms and the principle of the benefit of doubt.Igor Douven - 2000 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (2):135 – 146.
    The Principle of the Benefit of Doubt dictates that, whenever reasonably possible, we interpret earlier-day scientists as referring to entities posited by current science. Putnam has presented the principle as supplementary to his Causal Theory of Reference in order to make this theory generally applicable to theoretical terms. The present paper argues that the principle is of doubtful standing. In particular, it will be argued that the principle lacks a justification and, indeed, is unjustifiable as it stands.
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  • Putnam’s Model-Theoretic Argument Reconstructed.Igor Douven - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (9):479-490.
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  • Fitch’s Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism.Igor Douven - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):149-182.
    Fitch’s paradox shows, from fairly innocent-looking assumptions, that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable truths. This is generally thought to deliver a blow to antirealist positions that imply that all truths are knowable. The present paper argues that a probabilistic version of antirealism escapes Fitch’s result while still offering all that antirealists should care for.
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