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Evidence, Explanation, and the Empirical Status of Scientific Realism

Erkenntnis 63 (2):253-291 (2005)

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On the alleged impossibility of coherence.Wouter Meijs & Igor Douven - 2007 - Synthese 157 (3):347 - 360.details If coherence is to have justificatory status, as some analytical philosophers think it has, it must be truth-conducive, if perhaps only under certain specific conditions. This paper is a critical discussion of some recent arguments that seek to show that under no reasonable conditions can coherence be truth-conducive. More specifically, it considers Bovens and Hartmann’s and Olsson’s “impossibility results,” which attempt to show that coherence cannot possibly be a truth-conducive property. We point to various ways in which the advocates of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 18 citations
Wouldn’t it be Lovely: Explanation and Scientific Realism. [REVIEW]James Ladyman - 2005 - Metascience 14 (3):331-361.details Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Deflating the Correspondence Intuition.Frank Hindriks Igor Douven - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (3):315-329.details A common objection against deflationist theories of truth is that they cannot do justice to the correspondence intuition, i.e. the intuition that there is an explanatory relationship between, for instance, the truth of ‘Snow is white’ and snow's being white. We scrutinize two attempts to meet this objection and argue that both fail. We then propose a new response to the objection which, first, sheds doubt on the correctness of the correspondence intuition and, second, seeks to explain how we may (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Fitch’s Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism.Igor Douven - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):149-182.details Fitch’s paradox shows, from fairly innocent-looking assumptions, that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable truths. This is generally thought to deliver a blow to antirealist positions that imply that all truths are knowable. The present paper argues that a probabilistic version of antirealism escapes Fitch’s result while still offering all that antirealists should care for. Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations
Deflating the correspondence intuition.Igor Douven & Frank Hindriks - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (3):315–329.details A common objection against deflationist theories of truth is that they cannot do justice to the correspondence intuition, i.e. the intuition that there is an explanatory relationship between, for instance, the truth of ‘Snow is white’ and snow's being white. We scrutinize two attempts to meet this objection and argue that both fail. We then propose a new response to the objection which, first, sheds doubt on the correctness of the correspondence intuition and, second, seeks to explain how we may (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 6 citations
Can the skepticism debate be resolved?Igor Douven - 2009 - Synthese 168 (1):23 - 52.details External world skeptics are typically opposed to admitting as evidence anything that goes beyond the purely phenomenal, and equally typically, they disown the use of rules of inference that might enable one to move from premises about the phenomenal alone to a conclusion about the external world. This seems to bar any a posteriori resolution of the skepticism debate. This paper argues that the situation is not quite so hopeless, and that an a posteriori resolution of the debate becomes possible (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

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