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> The bullshitter may not deceive us, or even intend to do so, either about the facts or about what he takes the facts to be. What he does necessarily attempt to deceive us about is his enterprise. His only indispensably distinctive characteristic is that in a certain way he misrepresents what he is up to. 1 - Harry Frankfurt In both lying and truth-telling, the speaker intends the audience to believe what she says is true; that her enterprise is (...) |
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A significant proportion of the U.S. population exhibits low health literacy. Evidence suggests that low health literacy is correlated with higher medical costs and poorer health outcomes. Even more concerning, evidence suggests that low health literacy threatens patients’ and families’ autonomy and exacerbates injustices in patients who are already vulnerable to difficulties navigating the health care system. There is also, however, increasing evidence that health literacy interventions—including initiatives such as plain language practices and teach-back—improve comprehension and usefulness of health care (...) |
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Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein define a nudge as “any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.” Much has been written about the ethics of nudging competent adult patients. Less has been written about the ethics of nudging surrogates’ decision‐making and how the ethical considerations and arguments in that context might differ. Even less has been written about nudging surrogate decision‐making in the context of (...) |
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Some philosophers have argued that during the process of obtaining informed consent, physicians should try to nudge their patients towards consenting to the option the physician believes best, where a nudge is any influence that is expected to predictably alter a person’s behaviour without restricting her options. Some proponents of nudging even argue that it is a necessary and unavoidable part of securing informed consent. Here I argue that nudging is incompatible with obtaining informed consent. I assume informed consent requires (...) |
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Nudging is a concept in behavioural science, political theory and economics that proposes indirect suggestions to try to achieve non-forced compliance and to influence the decision making and behaviour of groups and individuals. Researchers in medical ethics are currently discussing whether nudging is ethically permissible in healthcare. In this article, we examine current knowledge about how different decisions (rational and pre-rational decisions, major and minor decisions) are made and how this decision-making process pertains to patients. We view this knowledge in (...) |
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One prominent line of support for nudging in screening programs is the claim that nudging can help ‘bad choosers’ — that is, it can help some patients make choices more in line with their own values and preferences. In this article, I argue that due to the presence of epistemic risk in many screening programs, the argument that nudging can help ‘bad choosers’ should be revised or rejected. Expanding on the work of Biddle, J. B. 2020. Epistemic risks in cancer (...) |
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