There are many strands in the thought of Charles Taylor, a gathering of philosophical interests diverse enough to embrace both political theory and philosophy of science, epistemology, and practical ethics, Nietzsche and Donald Davidson. If he has not succeeded in generating any supreme synthesis out of this diversity—if, indeed, he has sometimes finessed the material to fit a bigger picture, as in the controversial details of his grand intellectual history of modern consciousness, Sources of the Self—Taylor has nevertheless created, within (...) his own work, a lively conversation, a dialogue at least as expressive and interesting as the one he has repeatedly advocated as the centre of any vibrant intellectual and political life. In Taylor’s philosophical works, plurality is met not with the fractured incommensurability now so often in vogue, but rather with a compelling, if necessarily endless, attempt at deep reconciliation. (shrink)

Is a policy of economic growth compatible with the neutrality of the State? Some liberals (Rawls, Dworkin, Ackerman, Larmore, Kymlicka) think so. I do not. I begin by explaining and discussing the different meanings of the neutrality thesis, then I show that, whatever meaning we give to the idea of neutrality, it is very difficult to argue convincingly that a policy of economic growth does not favour some conceptions of the good.