The existing literature on the rational underdetermination problem often construes it as one resulting from the ubiquity of objective values. It is therefore sometimes argued that subjectivists need not be troubled by the underdetermination problem. But on closer examination, it turns out, they should. Or so I will argue. The task of the first half of this paper is explaining why. The task of the second half is finding a subjectivist solution the rational underdetermination problem. The basic problem, I argue, (...) is as follows. Idealizing subjectivism generates too many ideal selves to deliver determinate or commensurable options regarding what non-ideal deliberating agents ought to do. My solution: these idealized options should be assessed from the only perspective we can, in fact, occupy, namely, that of our non-ideal, actual selves. Deciding what to do therefore becomes, in part, an exercise in deciding who to be. But one might now worry this just moves the arbitrariness bump in the rug. Privileging the perspective of our actual self seems contrary to the rationale for idealizing in the first place. I consider two solutions to the problem, one democratic, the other modelled on trusteeship. In the end, I argue, our actual self has complete freedom to choose the ideal self it grants rational authority. In the final part of the paper, I present my positive proposal as a solution to the underdetermination problem confronting the idealizing subjectivist and then argue that, so understood, this account vindicates a tidied-up version of how some reflective people already do deliberate in their everyday lives. This, in turn, suggests that a decision-procedure closely connected to the account is both possible and attractive. (shrink)

McCoy et al. (2020) give a finely tuned analysis of the role and responsibilities of non-elected or self-appointed representatives in public policy. They take the example of autism activism to illu...

Recent debates within the autism advocacy community have raised difficult questions about who can credibly act as a representative of a particular population and what responsibilities that...

In this article I discuss the advantages of a theory of political representation for a prag- matist theory of (global) democracy. I first outline Dewey’s disregard for political rep- resentation by analyzing the political, epistemological and aesthetic underpinnings of his criticism of the Enlightenment ideal of democracy and its trust in the power of the detached gaze. I then show that a theory of political representation is not only com- patible with a pragmatist Deweyan-pragmatist perspective on democratic politics but also (...) that Dewey’s concept of “publics”, if applied to contemporary circumstances of globalized politics, requires such a theory. I suggest a pragmatic theory of political rep- resentation that combines elements of Dewey’s aesthetics, particularly his own theory of vision, with Michael Saward’s conception of representative claim-making into the notion of aesthetic democratic representation. (shrink)

This chapter aims to present a theoretical survey of political representation of future generations. The chapter focuses on two main normative justifications of representation of future generations. The first appeals to intergenerational justice and the second to democratic legitimacy. Then, the chapter addresses possible objections to the representation of future generations. These objections are: first, we should prevent the inflation of representation; second, representation of future people is not really political representation; third, representation of future people is unnecessary. The next (...) part discusses theoretical proposals to represent future generations in existing institutions. An appendix provides an overview of past and present real-world experiments, including the Finnish Committee for the Future, the Israeli Knesset Commissioner for Future Generations (2001–2006) and the Hungarian Ombudsman for Future Generations. (shrink)

Gibt es einen Zusammenhang zwischen Politik und Philosophie? Bei Fragen, wie sich der Staat legitimieren lässt, was Gerechtigkeit ist oder welche Rolle Interkulturalität, Toleranz und Anerkennung in der heutigen Gesellschaft spie- len, bietet die Philosophie Antworten und Denkanstösse.

In this paper I argue for the following conclusions. First, quotas are not normative goals in themselves but only a means to reach non-discriminatory selection procedures. Second, in a democracy quotas are most plausibly used as a means to fill offices in those bodies which have a major impact on how well interests or discourses are translated into policy. Third, quotas for the young can be justified since, due to demographic development, their discourses tend to be marginalized. Fourth, youth quotas (...) cannot be a means to ensure long-term policy-making, but they can enhance legitimacy of long-term impacts from policy decisions taken today. (shrink)

In two recent articles I have argued that Kant’s legal and political philosophy can shed new light on his much-contested account of moral autonomy and that important changes in his political theory help to explain why in his later work the Formula of Autonomy disappears. In the present essay, I respond to comments by Sorin Baiasu and Marie Newhouse, who argue that the changes in Kant’s political theory fail to explain the disappearance of the Formula of Autonomy, since in both (...) phases Kant held that laws are given by the people’s representatives. I offer additional support for my original argument by developing a more detailed account of Kant’s conception of the relation between the legislating representatives and the people they are taken to represent. I argue that Kant’s conception of the proper representation relation changed, and that it changed so fundamentally that the analogy at the basis of the Formula of Autonomy was no longer apt, thus providing a plausible explanation for its disappearance. I also address several related comments and propose an explanation for why Kant dropped the very idea of autonomy as a property of the will. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with John Stuart Mill’s democratic theory. In chapter I, I examine the relations between political philosophy and political theory and science before providing a detailed outline of the aims of the dissertation. In chapter II, I argue that in order to reconcile the concepts of progress and equality within a utilitarian theory, a Millian political system needs to devise institutions that promote general happiness, protect individual autonomy, safeguard society from mediocrity. Chapter III discusses what different authors (...) have said about Mill and liberty, then explores James Mill’s theory of education and Coleridge’s influence on John Stuart Mill’s thought. I conclude by criticising Richard Arneson’s interpretation according to which the Considerations and On Liberty are inconsistent, and some of Gregory Claeys’ conclusions on Mill and paternalism. Chapter IV explores the methodology of the social sciences and the philosophy of history as found in Mill’s writings; then it considers Mill’s thought in regard to his father’s Radical proposals. I also discuss at some length the idea of the tyranny of the majority. Chapter V begins with a discussion of Hanna Pitkin’s theory of representation. I then provide a critical account of Richard Krouse and Nadia Urbinati’s interpretations of Mill. I conclude by arguing that, in a Millian democracy, the higher is the degree of complexity or the need for expertise in dealing with affairs, the greater is the bearing of the principle of competence in assessing whether a representative should act as a trustee or a delegate. I also introduce the idea of rational debate as a sort of ‘influence multiplier’, arguing that this would help to make a democracy rational and effective along Millian lines. In the last two chapters, I stress the relevance of Mill’s political philosophy as for some contemporary issues (nationalism, European federalism, current social and economic changes) while suggesting some potential further investigations, and summarise my conclusions. (shrink)

As manifestações de 2013 evidenciaram problemas que ainda não faziam parte da agenda sociopolítica brasileira, entre eles, destaca-se a crise da representação política. A pesquisa investiga esses fenômenos a partir deste problema: Por que as instituições não avançam com a sociedade? Nosso viés de análise é interdisciplinar, aplicando o procedimento reconstrutivo através de teorias e diagnósticos dos cenários atuais. Iniciamos nossa análise das teorias da representação sociopolítica na filosofia política moderna, partindo da consolidação do republicanismo nas cidades-estados em território italiano (...) na transição do Medievo para a Renascença, período extremamente influente para o pensamento político moderno; prosseguimos nosso estudo dando um maior foco ao desenvolvimento sociopolítico durante a Idade Moderna, abordando a emergência do liberalismo e da democracia representativa idealizada por Jean-Jacques Rousseau. A seguir, tratamos o tema da representação sociopolítica na formação do pensamento político brasileiro, que começou a idealizar-se a partir da Constituição de 1824. Porém, aqui nos delimitamos a estudar a formação do pensamento brasileiro na Segunda República, com o desenvolvimento industrial, a emergência da sociedade civil organizada e a criação dos partidos políticos. Apesar do longo período de dominação das elites na esfera política e da repressão aos movimentos sociais, o Brasil produziu uma geração de pensadores importantes que refletiram sobre a constituição do povo e a formação do Estado nacional brasileiro. Por fim, problematizamos a democracia representativa em seu estágio atual, analisando cenários, fazendo diagnósticos para recriar a democracia, tal como é institucionalizada na forma-estado ocidental. Porém, como fazer isso, sem incorrer no vício espontaneísta ou no movimentismo sem foco, ou no processismo que nunca se realiza? Os partidos têm pouca capacidade de elaborar estratégias, apenas divulgam ilusões programáticas, de como gerir mais ou menos os negócios estatais, através de marketing e planejamento eleitoral. Trata-se de construir uma gestão democrática, que supere ações emergenciais, reagindo às crises, estados de necessidade econômica e shows eleitorais; uma representação que não fique reduzida a dicotomia de ser gestor a serviço do mercado ou do Estado, mas que articule a horizontalidade das redes sociais, conectando o pensar e o agir estrategicamente, superando dualismos entre público ou privado, entre Estado ou Mercado. (shrink)