The “Baldwin effect” occurs when natural selection supplements adaptive phenotypic changes acquired during an organism’s lifetime. This effect, first described in 1896, is now usually considered to be rare and insignificant, and is not part of the explanatory repertoire of most evolutionary scientists. Arguments against it are examined here and found to be inadequate, either because they misunderstand the effect, or confuse it with Lamarckism, or fail to perceive it even while describing it. The article proposes examples showing that the (...) Baldwin effect is far more prevalent and powerful than even Baldwin’s few supporters realize. Evolved features of the human mind are described that make this effect unusually difficult to perceive. Some of these mental features are themselves Baldwin effects. Natural selection’s supporters, and its skeptics, appear to disregard the Baldwin effect for different reasons. The article proposes that acceptance of the Baldwin effect can significantly improve the study of human nature, as practiced by both sides in the nature-nurture controversy, and can even provide a bridge to end this controversy. (shrink)

From its inception Darwinian evolutionary biology has been seen as having a problematic relationship of fact and theory. While the forging of the modern evolutionary synthesis resolved most of these issues for biologists, critics continue to argue that natural selection and common descent are “only theories.” Much of the confusion engendered by the “evolution wars” can be clarified by applying the concept of phenomena, inferred from fact, and explained by theories, thus locating where legitimate dissent may still exist. By setting (...) such analysis in the context of research traditions, it is possible to gain further insight into the complex interplay of facts, phenomena, and theories. Two case studies are explored to assess the value of such approaches, one from within evolutionary biology, the Baldwin effect, and one from outside, intelligent design. (shrink)

This paper defends the position that the supposed gap between biological altruism and psychological altruism is not nearly as wide as some scholars (e.g., Elliott Sober) insist. Crucial to this defense is the use of James Mark Baldwin's concepts of “organic selection”and “social heredity” to assist in revealing that the gap between biological and psychological altruism is more of a small lacuna. Specifically, this paper argues that ontogenetic behavioral adjustments, which are crucial to individual survival and reproduction, are also crucial (...) to species survival. In particular, it is argued that human psychological altruism is produced and maintained by various sorts of mimicry and self-reflection in the aid of both individual and species survival. The upshot of this analysis is that it is possible to offer an account of psychological altruism that is closelytethered to biological altruism without reducing entirely the former to thelatter. (shrink)