Worried that the current paradigm of political corruption (individual corruption: the misuse of public office for private gain) is too narrow to protect democratic institutions from private interests, the political theorist Dennis Thompson resurrects the premodern notion of institutional corruption, which refers to practices that undermine the purpose of political institutions. From the lenses of institutional corruption, practices such as money in political campaigns, lobbying, or wealth inequality are to be condemned and eradicated to protect democratic institutions. The goal of (...) this paper is to provide reasons against resurrecting the notion of institutional corruption in the realm of policy for three main reasons. First, it is baseless: there is no empirical evidence that the sole presence of money alters democratic results. Second, it is unnecessary: individual corruption can be used to condemn and sanction illegal actions that undermine democratic decision making. And third, it is unclear whether policies against money in politics are beneficial or detrimental to electoral competition. In the light of empirical evidence, I conclude, we should not resurrect the unnecessary and potentially misleading idea of institutional corruption. Empirical studies, in fact, show that liberal electoral democracies, at least in developed countries, are more responsive to the voters’ will than Thompson believes. (shrink)

AI for social good is a thriving research topic and a frequently declared goal of AI strategies and regulation. This article investigates the requirements necessary in order for AI to actually serve a public interest, and hence be socially good. The authors propose shifting the focus of the discourse towards democratic governance processes when developing and deploying AI systems. The article draws from the rich history of public interest theory in political philosophy and law, and develops a framework for ‘public (...) interest AI’. The framework consists of (1) public justification for the AI system, (2) an emphasis on equality, (3) deliberation/ co-design process, (4) technical safeguards, and (5) openness to validation. This framework is then applied to two case studies, namely SyRI, the Dutch welfare fraud detection project, and UNICEF’s Project Connect, that maps schools worldwide. Through the analysis of these cases, the authors conclude that public interest is a helpful and practical guide for the development and governance of AI for the people. (shrink)

Since the early 20th century, advocates of public relations professionalism have mandated that practitioners serve the public interest making it an ethical standard for evaluating the morality of public relations practice. However, the field has devoted little research to determining just what it means for practitioners to serve the public interest. Most research suggests practice-oriented solutions. This article focuses what practitioners must do to serve the public interest. It reviews theories of the social contract and the public interest to identify (...) an approach to serving the public interest that will help practitioners reconcile moral obligations to themselves, their client organizations, and the public. It concludes that combining superior individual interests with John Dewey's public philosophy will contribute to the moral development and improvement of practitioners and the public. (shrink)

The connotations attached to the concept of 'risk' have changed over the last several decades. In particular, the image of risk, at least in the word's most economically advanced countries, has turned from predominantly positive to highly critical. A sociological look at this historic change reveals the emergence of a plurality of risk definitions that can be attributed to different risk cultures. We can distinguish risk cultures by their proximity to the dominant social practice of risk taking ; namely risk (...) cultures belong either to the centre or the periphery of society. Social movements that resist risky technologies are examples of a peripheral risk culture. Due to a certain concept of social community their perception of risk differs fundamentally from that of the centre. In addition, cultural variation across countries leads to different representations of risk-avoidance in social movements. This contribution illustrates these differences by comparing the American and German anti-nuclear movements. (shrink)

Přes rozšířené používání pojmu společné dobro byla mezi antickými a středověkými mysliteli pozoruhodná nejednota o jeho konkrétním obsahu. Někdy bylo společné dobro chápáno jako dobro zúčastněných jednotlivců, jindy jako dobro společenství jako celku. Jakmile politická filozofie začala být stavěna na individualističtějších základech, společné dobro jako pojem ustoupilo do pozadí. Společné dobro by mělo mít dvě vlastnosti: jde o dobro a navíc společné. Dobro však není vnitřní kvalita o sobě, nýbrž subjektivní hodnocení člověka. Zda považujeme určité jednání či situaci za dobré (...) či špatné, záleží na našem hodnocení. Základní vlastností každého hodnocení je jeho subjektivita. Subjektivita v pojetí dobra je hlavním problémem společného dobra. Společné dobro může být společné pouze, když jde o cíl, který je sdílený všemi rozumnými aktéry uvnitř politického společenství. Má-li společné dobro být cílem regulujícím politické úvahy a zdrojem loajality ke společenství, muselo by být všemi sdíleno. To však v praxi je nesmírně obtížné zaručit. Neutrální hlasovací mechanismus, který by rozhodl, co je společné dobro, neexistuje. Společné dobro je příliš vágní pojetí, aby bylo užitečné v politické teorii a praktické politice. Veřejný zájem musí být posuzován partikulárně a lokálně, vždy s ohledem na zvláštní doby a místa. Co vytváří obecný zájem či "společné dobro", nevyplývá z filozofické teorie, ale praxe. Ačkoli společné dobro může být užitečné v politické i církevní rétorice, jeho vědecký smysl je omezený, nebo dokonce nulový. (shrink)

Microfinance aims to better the livelihoods of the bottom of the pyramid by providing them with financial services. However, recent studies show that microfinance can have adverse effects, leading clients into over-indebtedness. This dissertation argues that microfinance clients are by default vulnerable and offers ways to rethink microfinance as client-centered, presuming a responsibility for client protection. Part I discusses the vulnerability of clients and the centrality of their protection. Part II analyzes the causes and consequences of overindebtedness and suggests state (...) regulations, financial literacy programs, and soft law standards for its mitigation. Part III introduces the concept of responsible microfinance, which claims that not only microfinance institutions but also other stakeholders, such as states and transnational and international organizations, have a responsibility to protect microfinance clients. Part IV accepts that over-indebtedness has to be addressed from several angles and considers how public and private actors may enhance its alleviation and develops an encompassing multi-stakeholder framework of responsible microfinance. Developing this framework includes a thorough evaluation of the suitability of ten novel strategies, such as behaviorally informed consumer protection regulations, educational soap operas, and Smart Campaign’s Client Protection Principles, to further the mitigation of overindebtedness. (shrink)

In this article, the authors investigate the applicability and usefulness of three alternative perspectives on corporate issues management: issue life cycle theory, legitimacy theory, and stakeholder theory. Each perspective makes certain as- sumptions about the nature of issues management activities and certain general predictions about corporate social responsiveness. The authors test the relative applicability of the three theories through a case study of the issues management activities of four large forestry companies in Finland and Canada. The authors conclude that all (...) three perspectives have value but differ in the level of analysis and time frame to which they apply. (shrink)