Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 4 Seiten: 1-18.

Centré sur le Gorgias de Platon, cet article vise à montrer que la critique platonicienne de la rhétorique ne s’élabore pas sur la base d’une hostilité de principe à l’égard du rhéteur, mais se développe au contraire à partir du discours rhétorique lui-même. Nous analysons d’abord les difficultés de l’analogie posant la rhétorique comme un simulacre de la justice : cette analogie révèle en fait la façon dont Gorgias cherche à manifester la singularité et la valeur de son enseignement. Nous (...) examinons ensuite les principales étapes de la discussion entre Socrate et Gorgias, qui se focalise progressivement sur l’usage spécifiquement judiciaire de la rhétorique, pour montrer, dans un dernier temps, en quoi l’interrogation platonicienne sur la justice reprend la réflexion de Gorgias sur le sujet, en la radicalisant. (shrink)

Does a τέχνη, qua τέχνη, need to be good-directed? On the basis of the Gorgias, many scholars have thought the answer is yes; I argue here to the contrary. There are, of course, many beneficial τέχναι, such as medicine and weaving; and there are even unconditionally good τέχναι, like the πολιτικὴ τέχνη; but Plato also happily construes piracy as a τέχνη in the Sophist, and, more normally, all sorts of neutral practices as τέχναι. In order to make this argument, I (...) provide a taxonomy of the different kinds of τέχναι and demonstrate that, across the corpus, there does not seem to be a good-directedness requirement. I then address the evidence of the Gorgias, where most commentators find a connection between τέχνη and good-directedness. I argue that this interpretation is incorrect, and that rhetoric in fact fails to be a τέχνη in the Gorgias solely because it is unable to give a rational account. A close reading of the Gorgias shows that this is a plausible interpretation, and comparison with the Phaedrus reinforces the point: in both dialogues, whether rhetoric will be a τέχνη or not hinges only on the question of rationality, not a good-directedness condition. (shrink)

El objetivo del presente trabajo es dar cuenta de la posibilidad de establecer una noción de culpabilidad y de reproche en relación al sujeto que actúa injustamente, mediante un análisis de la responsabilidad y castigo en el ámbito moral en el Gorgias de Platón. Para abordar este tratamiento, se profundizará en el intelectualismo moral socrático, según el cual los seres humanos no hacen lo que quieren, sino lo que consideran correcto. De esta manera, se dará tratamiento a cómo la influencia (...) de los apetitos y las pasiones desempeñan un rol fundamental en el dominio sobre sí mismo y, consiguientemente, en los diversos cursos de acción que los sujetos puedan adscribir. Finalmente, se establecerá cómo la educación y el conocimiento cumplen un rol sustancial al momento de la constitución de un juicio de reproche hacia el sujeto. (shrink)

Inspired by my reading of the conclusions of Plato’s Cratylus, in which I suggest that Socrates endorses the claim that speaker’s intentions determine meaning of their utterances, this thesis investigates a modern parallel. Drawing on observations that people who produce an utterances that do not accord with the conventions of their linguistic community can often nevertheless communicate successfully, Donald Davidson concludes that it is the legitimate intentions of speakers to be interpreted in a particular way that determine the meanings of (...) their utterances. This thesis investigates how we might interpret the non-standard utterances of another from the perspective of Davidson’s anticonventionalist picture of language. It proceeds by investigating the possible roles for radical interpretation and triangulation in explaining successful day-to-day communication, where non-standard language use abounds, and argues that - even from a Davidsonian perspective - a full account of the linguistic skills and knowledge that a language user requires to interpret utterances must ultimately appeal at least to regularities word use and expressions, if not full-blown conventions. (shrink)

Rhetoric has always had a bad reputation among philosophers. As far as we know, the first discussion of rhetoric in the history of philosophy takes place in Plato’s works. Plato accuses sophistry as possessing an attitude that contains rhetoric, and thus accuses it for having almost no philosophical value. However, Plato himself uses a kind of rhetoric in some of his works too — this rhetoric can be called a ‘true rhetoric.’ In this work, the notion of rhetoric is analysed (...) considering Gorgias, Phaedrus and Republic, and it will be queried as to whether the ‘true rhetoric’ of Plato is true enough. (shrink)