The central idea is that the cerebral cortex is a model building machine, where regularities in the world serve as templates for the models it builds. First it is shown how this idea can be naturalized, and how the representational contents of our internal models depend upon the evolutionarily endowed design principles of our model building machine. Current neuroscience suggests a powerful form that these design principles may take, allowing our brains to uncover deep structures of the world hidden behind (...) surface sensory stimulation, the individuals, kinds, and properties that form the objects of human perception and thought. It is then shown how this account solves various problems that arose for previous attempts at naturalizing intentionality, and also how it supports rather than undermines folk psychology. As in the parable of the blind men and the elephant, the seemingly unrelated pieces of earlier theories (information, causation, isomorphism, success, and teleology) emerge as different aspects of the evolved model-building mechanism that explains the intentional features of our kind of mind. (shrink)

Cet article résume l'ouvrage paru en 2005 et répond aux objections de Stéphane Chauvier, Daniel Laurier et Pierre Livet dans le cadre d'une disputatio organisée par la revue Philosophiques.

In this chapter, I outline dynamic models of motivation and emotion. These turn out not to be autonomous subsystems, but, instead, are deeply integrated in the basic interactive dynamic character of living systems. Motivation is a crucial aspect of particular kinds of interactive systems -- systems for which representation is a sister aspect. Emotion is a special kind of partially reflective interaction process, and yields its own emergent motivational aspects. In addition, the overall model accounts for some of the crucial (...) properties of consciousness. (shrink)

I consider the question of whether success-linked theories of content – theories like those of Ramsey (1927), Millikan (1984) and Blackburn (2005) which take there to be a definitional link between representational content and behavioral success – are consistent with the plausible claim that we can use content-attributions to explain behavioral success. Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996) argues that success-linked theories of content are too closely linked to success to be able to explain it. Against this, I present a plausible account of (...) how content-attributions make available good explanations of behavioral success, and argue that if we want our content-attributions to be able to do this explanatory work, then we actually need to embrace a success-linked theory of content. (shrink)

The discovery of mirror neurons has given rise to a number of interpretations of their functions together with speculations on their potential role in the evolution of specifically human capacities. Thus, mirror neurons have been thought to ground many aspects of human social cognition, including the capacity to engage in cooperative collective actions and to understand them. We propose an evaluation of this latter claim. On the one hand, we will argue that mirror neurons do not by themselves provide a (...) sufficient basis for the forms of agentive understanding and shared intentionality involved in cooperative collective actions. On the other hand, we will also argue that mirror neurons can nevertheless play an important role in an account of the production and understanding of joint action, insofar as they provide the basic constituents of implicit agent-neutral representations and are useful elements in a process of online mutual adjustment of participants' actions. (shrink)